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The pattern of discourse in the history of African philosophy resulted from historic events 
such as slavery, colonialism, race and racism. Historically therefore, the concept of race 
played a significant part in the existence of African philosophy. Recent years have seen a 
series of studies on the concept of race, with philosophers at the lead of this research 
development. These philosophers, including Joshua Glasgow, W. E. B. Du Bois, Lucius 
Outlaw, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Naomi Zack and Emmanuel C. Eze, among others, 
undertook to explain the concept of race with articulations on whether it should be 
conserved or eliminated. Thus Eliminativists and Conservationists standpoints, where the 
former hold that race is an illusion and race-thinking should be eliminated, while the later 
contend that race is very real and the concept should be conserved  
This dissertation is a critical assessment of how the concept of race affects African 
philosophy and an exploration of how the concept can be transcended. To achieve this 
objective, the dissertation appraised how the concept of race affects African philosophy. It 
further discussed the eliminativists and conservationists approaches to race, and how they 
contribute to and affect the concept likewise, it made an attempt to respectively reconcile 
the perspectives of the eliminativists and conservationists proponents. In the main, the 
dissertation explored and considered the possibilities of transcending the concept of race. 
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In our world today, racial classification seems to be a common thing. Many people are 
contented with the racial categorization as well as their skin colours, while others are not 
for many different reasons. As might be expected, philosophers and scholars Joshua 
Glasgow and Naomi Zack, in recent years have committed their time to understanding the 
concept of race. In some instances, this has led to the denial by some of the existence of 
race and the logical coherence of the concept. Some scholars like Lucius Outlaw (2001) 
and W. E. B. Du Bios (1897) have defended the concept of race, but with important changes 
to the basis of racial identity which they describe as either a social construct or biologically 
based. Other scholars like Appiah and Naomi Zack oppose the idea that race exists.  What 
seems to be the major questions is whether race is real or not and whether the concept of 
race should be conserved or eliminated.  
It is important to note that the concept of race has played a significant part in African 
philosophy.  The very existence of African philosophy appears to be a contentious issue 
among philosophers. Some philosophers claim that seeking ‘an’ African philosophy is a 
futile attempt and belongs in the realm of cultural anthropology. Some hold that African 
philosophy is a new enterprise that began in recent times under the auspices of Western 
philosophy. Others argue that African philosophy existed as far back as when people began 
trying to contend with their existential situation in the world. Generally, these assertions or 
inquiries of the existence of African philosophy and what should count as African 
philosophy owe to the issues surrounding the idea of race. The term ‘African philosophy’ 
tends to give one an idea of African history and its philosophical views. The pattern of 
discourse in the history of African philosophy was a result of historical events such as 
slavery, colonialism, race and racism. Thus, the topic is a (re)assessment of how race 
affects African philosophy. It illuminates negritude’s and African philosophy’s 
responsibility with supposedly revalued uses of race, and the visible possibilities of a 
transcendental modern notion of race. 
This dissertation intends to answer the question: can we transcend or go beyond the concept 
of race? To do this, the study explores the conundrum of race in African philosophy, that 
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is, it considers the contributions of both the eliminativists and conservationists and 
ascertains whether the contributions can be reconciled and improved upon as a way of 
developing a contemporary race discourse. 
The chapters in this study are systematically arranged with each beginning with an 
introduction of the specific issues to be addressed and discussed. These issues are about 
the concept race as well as the possibility of transcending it. In the first chapter, I discuss 
the idea of colonialism, racism and oppression with regards to race. The chapter furthers 
delves into the biological, philosophical and social concepts of race, with the view of 
showing how the idea of race has affected African identity and philosophy. Using 
Aristotle’s idea of slavery, I argue that the European invention of race as a tool to 
rationalize their enslavement of Africans remains unjust. Concluding on this chapter, I 
contend that part of African philosophical project is to engage in issues like race, African 
philosophy and identity. In essence, these issues capture the experiences of Africa and 
Africans. 
The second chapter examines some of the stances of philosophers that eventually led to 
their perspectives of race (whether directly or indirectly or unconsciously). In this given, I 
also discuss Descartes’ ‘Cogito’, which seems to be the foundation upon which the idea of 
race or racism rests. Likewise, the chapter presents some arguments against David Hume, 
Immanuel Kant and Placide Tempels.  
The third chapter discusses the works of nationalistic-ideological philosophers like Kwame 
Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, Senghor, Biko and Amilcar Cabral, and the 
existence of African philosophy as an indirect response to Humean and Kantian ideas of 
negroes/blacks. In other words, this chapter aims to show that the works of some 
nationalist-ideological philosophers and the existence of African philosophy is proof that 
Africans are not irrational or inferior to the whites. The chapter also explores the 
‘philosophical pride’ that African philosophers acquired from Western philosophy and 
reaffirms the existence of African philosophy. 
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The fourth chapter assesses how scholars engage the discourse of race. A review of the 
ideas of Glasgow1 (2009), du Bois (1897), Outlaw (2001), Appiah (1992), Zack (1993, 
2002) and Eze (2002) regarding the concept of race will also form part of this chapter. As 
a stepping-stone to the possibility of transcending the concept of race, I give a descriptive 
summary about the eliminativists’ and conservationists’ views on the concept of race and 
the common ground between them. I conclude the chapter by contending for the possibility 
of transcending the concept of race. Similarly, I make a rebuttal against my argument on 
the basis of different reasons elaborated in the chapter.  
As a final point, the fifth chapter concludes the study. In this chapter, I provide a summary 
of what each chapter underscored and achieved, and proffer some recommendations for 
emerging studies in African philosophy focusing on the concept of race.  
  
                                                          
1 Although I did not write a review on Glasgow, but I included him because I used his theory of ‘racial 
reconstructionism’ as stepping-stone to the theory I proposed, ‘racial transcendentalism’. I will explain this 




1. Understanding the Concept of Race: the Philosophical and the Social 
meaning of Race, and how Africa’s Identity is shaped by the Issues of 
Race in African Philosophy 
 
1.1. Introduction 
The concept of race has been the subject of discussion for a long time. Historically this 
concept has faced significant scientific and philosophical contestations.  In recent years, 
different books and articles in the humanities and the social sciences have been committed 
to understanding this concept. Eventually, this has led some important thinkers to deny 
both the existence of race and the logical coherence of the concept. Some scholars like 
Kwame Anthony Appiah and Naomi Zack have defended the concept of race, although 
with important changes to the basis of racial identity which they describe as either 
biologically based or a social construct. According to Naomi Zack, for example, “modern 
concepts of race derive from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century pseudoscience that 
rationalized European colonialism and chattel slavery” (1996: p.x). On this view many 
scholars are of the opinion that the Europeans had the idea of race before they enslaved 
Africans and the idea paved the way to that crime (Boxill 2001: 2). 
Accordingly, some scholars like Léopold Sédar Senghor, Aimé Césaire, Emmanuel 
Chukwudi Eze, among others, postulate that the idea of African philosophy ensued from 
historical events such as slavery, colonialism2, race and racism. Basically, Léopold Sédar 
Senghor and Aimé Césaire perceived African philosophy as a philosophy born of struggle. 
The concept of race, as part of the historical events, was born out of colonial 
                                                          
2 In line with Eze, I use the term “colonialism” in respect to Africa “as a clustered concept to designate the 
historical realities of : (a) the European imperial incursions into Africa, which began in the late fifteenth and 
early sixteenth centuries and grew into the massive transatlantic slave trade; (b) the violent conquest of the 
various parts of the continent by diverse European powers which took place in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries; (c) the forced administration of African lands and peoples which followed this conquest, 
and lasted into the years of independence in the 1950s and 1960s and – in case of Zimbabwe and South Africa 
– into the 1980s and the 1990s. Slave trade, conquest, occupation, and forced administration of peoples, in 
that order, were all part of an unfolding history of colonialism” (1998: 213–214). 
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misrepresentation of Africans as culturally naïve, rationally incompetent and intellectually 
docile. This brings to the fore the idea that race has a significant influence on the birth and 
structure of African philosophy. An example of this is the idea that whites have high mental 
capacities, and blacks have low mental capacities. In other words, “some races have high 
levels of mental capacities that others do not” (Eze 2002: 66), and some races are inferior 
to others. It is owing to this history that Appiah (1992: 10) earlier advanced that “for the 
generation that theorized the decolonization of Africa then, ‘race’ was a central organizing 
principle.” 
My aim in this chapter is to discuss the biological, philosophical and social concepts of 
race, and to clearly show how the idea of race has affected African identity and philosophy. 
In the first section I explain the concept of race, and thereafter look at it from the biological 
point of view. Using Aristotle’s idea of slavery, I argue that the European invention of race 
as a tool to rationalize the enslavement of Africans remains an injustice. In addition, I 
discuss colonialism, racism and oppression with regards to race, as well as the 
philosophical and social meaning of the concept of race. In the second section of this 
chapter, I further examine the concept of race but in relation to how it has affected African 
philosophy and identity. Thus I argue that part of the African philosophical project is to 
engage in issues like race, African philosophy and identity which are expressive of African 
experiences. 
1.2. A Brief History of the Concept of Race and the Biological Perspective 
Viewing the concept of race through the lens of history is of a great importance. This 
importance lies in the fact that historically, physical characteristics were (and are still) used 
to distinguish humans from one another. For instance, the “first Portuguese that penetrated 
the interior of Africa in the fifteenth century found men absolutely black, with curled hair, 
flat noses, and thick lips” (Hannah Franziska 1996: 181). This new discovery of black 
people by the Portuguese led to the formation of two distinct races - the white and the black 
race.3 According to Augstein (1996: 183) “these two races are not only distinct by character 
                                                          
3 Winthrop Jordan’s famous book white over Black: American Attitude towards the Negro, 1550 – 1812, 
published in1968 suggests that the Europeans “came to have the idea because they invented it to explain the 
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of form, as the characters drawn from the conformation of the cranium and face are; they 
are so by a character of structure, by a special and very complicated apparatus, by an 
apparatus which exists in one of the two races, and is wanting in the other.” “In the white 
race there are three distinct membranes (the derm, and the two epiderms). While in the 
black race the external layer of the skin is the seat of the pigmentum or colouring matter of 
the Negroes” (ibid: 183). Another distinct race is the red or American race. “Anatomy 
discovered under the second epiderm of the individual of the red, copper-coloured, Indian, 
or American race (for this race is called indifferently by all these names) a pigmental 
apparatus which is the sear of the red or copper colour of this race, as the pigmental 
apparatus of the Negro is the seat of black colour” (ibid: 183). The new concept of race 
worked within a new research space considered as social and natural history. Both of these 
sciences constitute the “science of man” (ibid) 
According to Naomi Zack, the “modern concept of race is derived from the eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-century pseudoscience that rationalized European colonialism and chattel 
slavery” (1996: 7). The word “race,” according to Michael Banton, had acquired at least 
these meanings:  
The notion that mankind is divisible into a certain number of ‘race’ whose characteristics are 
fixed and defy the modifying influences of external circumstances;… the idea that 
intellectual and moral capacities may be unevenly spread within the various human races;… 
and the notion that mental endowments are bound up with certain physiognomical 
specificities, which being defined as racial characteristics, are considered to reveal the inward 
nature of the individual or the population in Question (1987: ix-x).  
Thomas Jefferson argued in his book – Notes on the State of Virginia –  that the “natural” 
differences between whites and blacks is a prerequisite for them to be segregated “beyond 
reach of mixture” (1972: 143). He further explained that whether a black or a negro 
“resides in the reticular membrane between the skin and scarf-skin, or in the scarf-skin 
itself; whether it proceeds from the colour of the blood, the colour of the bile, or from that 
                                                          
physical differences between themselves and the people they were meeting on the other continents. As Jordan 
put it, the Europeans’ ‘discovery’ that various groups of men looked very different from each other 
‘demanded explanation’, Africans black skin exciting particular wonder, and became, he says, a ‘standing 
problem for natural philosophers’” (quoted in Boxill 2001: 3). 
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of some other secretion, the difference is fixed in nature, and it is real as if its seat and 
cause were better known to us. And is this difference of no importance?” (1972: 138–142). 
Eze argues that the “importance” that Jefferson implied “was to free black slaves and send 
them back to Africa” (2001: 27). Similarly, Lincoln the emancipationist shared parallel 
views as Jefferson, wherein during one of the visits by black leaders to the White House, 
he explained: 
You and we are different races. We have between us a broader difference that exists 
between any other two races. Whether it is right or wrong I need not discuss, but this 
physical difference is a great disadvantage to us both, as I think your race suffers very 
greatly, many of them by living among us, while ours suffer from your presence (Banton 
1987: 1). 
According to Banton, this gives us an idea of the natural science of race and people’s idea 
of whites and blacks. To Naomi Zack, race in biological terms means “a biological 
taxonomy or set of physical categories that can be used consistently and informatively to 
describe, explain, and make predictions about groups of human beings and individual 
members of those groups” (2002: 1). The biological concept of race can be seen as 
European invention. According to Bernard Boxill, the Europeans “invented the idea of 
biological race after they had enslaved Africans as part of a strategy to rationalize crime 
that was already well under way” (2001: 3). This idea of biological race paved the way for 
the crime which the Europeans had in mind, which is that of slavery. The historian Betty 
Wood sets out the following debate:  
Some see it [the enslavement of West African peoples] as a process emerging out of a racial 
ideology that even before the English began to colonize the New World, they had identified 
West Africans as potential candidates for enslavement. Others downplay the initials 
significance of ethnicity and claim that economic and demographic considerations largely 
explain the substitution of involuntary Africa workers for indentured European servants in 
the English planation colonies… The racist theory that underpinned the slave laws that 
began to be drawn up during the second half of the seventeenth century was a post hoc 
phenomenon (1997: 7). 
According to Bernard Boxill, the first position that Wood listed suggests that “Europeans 
had the idea of race before they enslaved Africans and that the idea helped to identify 
Africans as candidates for enslavement” (Boxill 2001: 3). The second position, “that the 
idea of biological races was invented as part of a rationalization of slavery, is implicit in 
Eric Williams’s equally famous book –Capitalism and Slavery (ibid: 4). These positions 
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clearly show that there are reasons behind various actions. As humans we try to explain 
some certain things not because we want others to say how good or bad they are, but for 
others to get a better understanding of that thing. Boxill better explains this when his says 
that “the motives for inventing the idea of race were similarly innocent, and its 
consequences similarly deadly. It was invented for morally neutral reasons, probably to 
explain human physical variety; but it paved and eased the way for European enslavement 
of Africans” (ibid: 5).  
Boxill further argues that Aristotle’s ideology that some human beings are natural slaves 
is possibly the only “viable traditional grounding available to Europeans for rationalizing 
black slavery” (2001: 6). Thus, by inventing the idea of race, Europeans used this argument 
to persuade themselves that Africans are natural slaves. In my view, the above argument 
did not really justify their position, given that as I take an analytical look into this argument, 
I construe it as a misinterpretation of Aristotle’s idea.4 Aristotle’s comments about 
“barbarians” constitute his idea of “natural” slaves. The inquiry of whether the Asians can 
be seen as “natural” slaves remains a complicated idea because, Aristotle purported that 
they possess intelligence and skills in craft-making. Another reason emanating from 
“Aristotle’s remarks on moral education, suggested that natural or innate tendencies can 
be modified or replaced by social training, political institutions, and by individual rational 
control” (Ward and Lott 2002: xiii). These reasons and factors do not support the 
description of the idea of natural slaves in Aristotle’s Politics Book I. Thus, we cannot 
dispute the fact that the same can be said of Africans, because Africans are intelligent, and 
they also possess other qualities.  
The enslavement of Africans by the Europeans was purely a contingent reason, given that 
Africans were as free as others before the invention of the idea of race. To Aristotle, not 
all those who are actually slaves or actually freemen are natural slaves or natural freemen” 
(Book 1, chap. V: 1255b). The Europeans applied a method of force during their 
enslavement of Africans. The application of force clearly shows that the slaves (Africans) 
                                                          
4 I believe that Aristotle’s view of ‘natural slaves’ came as close in explaining that race do not determine 
his idea of natural slaves. 
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in question were not suitable for their role as slaves. Even in the midst of white and black, 
“a man is thus by nature a slave if he is capable of becoming… just as some are by nature 
free, so others are by nature slaves, and for these reasons, the condition of slavery is both 
beneficial and just” (ibid: 1254b–1255a). In these trends of thoughts, Aristotle further 
postulate that “coercion is a sign of injustice, not because consent legitimates all roles, but 
because the need for force suggests an unnatural fit” (ibid).5 Therefore, the application of 
force was and is a clear indication that the slave in question was and is not naturally suitable 
or fit for that role. Drawing from Aristotle’s ideas, I maintain that the Europeans (Portugal, 
France and England) position of the biological idea of race to rationalize their enslavement 
of Africans did and does not constitute a reasonable point to justify their intention of 
slavery. Indelibly linked to this discourse on the biological idea of race and its 
consequences are the concepts colonialism, racism and oppression. 
1.2.1. Colonialism, Racism and Oppression 
1.2.1.1. Colonialism 
Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze described colonialism as “the indescribable crisis 
disproportionately suffered and endured by the African peoples in their tragic encounter 
with the European world from the beginning of the fifteenth century through the end of the 
nineteenth into the twentieth” (1998: 213). Historically, much of Africa has been the scene 
of long series of invasions by European fortune seekers. Each of these fortune seekers “was 
attracted to the continent by self-interest: economic, political, military, and prestige” 
(Harris 1998: 203). This self-interest was aimed at the extraction and trading of natural 
resources and raw materials like gold and ivory, among others. Sooner than later, these 
commercial, individual and institutional interests “quickly expanded into the exportation 
of able-bodied Africans and their children as slaves to the Americas and other parts of the 
world” (Eze 1998: 213). According to Aimé Césaire, “colonialism of the past three hundred 
years, particularly of the black people of Africa, has had more sophisticated weapons – 
efficient methods of economic exploitation, pseudo-psychology, pseudo-anthropology, 
                                                          
5 I believe that Aristotle’s view of ‘natural slaves’ came as close in explaining that race do not determine 
his idea of natural slaves. 
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uprootment of large populations to areas of new white settlements, and cultural 
indoctrination” (1959: 10).  
The colonial period is a period “marked by the horror and violence of the transatlantic slave 
trade, the imperial occupation of most parts of Africa and the forced administrations of its 
peoples, and the resilient and enduring ideologies and practices of European cultural 
superiority (ethnocentrism) and “racial” supremacy (racism)” (Eze 1998: 213). This period, 
can be understood as what Cornel West categorized as “the Age of Europe.” According to 
West, this is the period “[b]etween 1492 and 1945”. This period was marked by “European 
breakthrough in oceanic transportation, agricultural production, state consolidation, 
bureaucratization, industrialization, urbanization and imperial dominion [that] shaped the 
makings of the modern word” (1993: 5). Describing the European domination and the 
situation as it was during the colonial period Aimé Césaire relates that: 
Between colonizer and colonized there is room only for forced labour, intimidation, 
pressure, the police, taxation, theft, rape, compulsory crops, contempt, mistrust, arrogance, 
self-complacency, swinishness, brainless elites, degraded masses. No human contact, but 
a relations of domination and submission which turn the colonizing man into a classroom 
monitor, an army sergeant, a prison guard, a slave driver, and the indigenous man into an 
instrument of production… colonization = “thing-ification” (1972: 21). 
“Colonial and capitalist expansions are therefore a logical necessity for the realization of 
the obviously universal European idea, and by labeling the non-European territories and 
people as “backward” in “industry,” they become legitimate prey for colonial and 
colonialist activities” (Eze 1998: 216). The colonizers maintained the balance of power 
through instigating fear and violence. They often kept a constant watch and control over 
the colonized preventing them from any form of rebellion. For instance, the Apartheid 
regime in South Africa used several forms of segregation and cruelty to dominate and stifle 
any rebellious acts by black natives. 
According to Césaire (1972: 47), it was habitual for the colonized to feel that they are 
nothing without their masters, the colonizers (They felt helpless and unsure of whether to 
initiate any radical change. In most instances, they even tended to copy the way of life of 
the colonizers hence abandoning their own native values and principles. Though African 
countries have gained independence, western values still remain the required mode of 
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living. Thus, Africans want to do things as their colonizers, tagging or seeing it as a proper 
and a better way of living. “From the transformations in the African economies and politics 
to religion and the educational institutions, the goal was to maximize European profit, 
secure the total domination and subjection of the colonial territory to the metropole and 
reproduce Europe and European values not only in material lives, but also in the cultural 
and spiritual lives and expressions of the African” (Eze 1998: 216). Nicholas B. Dirks says 
that, “now that decolonization and the twentieth-century transformations of the world order 
have rendered colonialism a historical category, linked to the present more by such terms 
as neo and post than by any formal continuity, there is both license and risk in our collective 
interrogation of the colonial past” (1992: 5). 
By means of false generosity, the colonizers capitalized on the dependent nature of the 
colonized and manipulated them through offerings of charitable help, which kept them 
bondage as beggars and servants (Césaire 1972: 60). Also, the colonizers proved that 
colonization “dehumanizes even the most civilized man; that colonial activity, colonial 
enterprise, and colonial conquest which is based on contempt for the native and justified 
by the contempt, inevitably tends to change him who undertakes it; that the colonizer who 
in order to ease his conscience gets into the habit of seeing the other man as an animal, 
accustoms himself to treating him like an animal and tends objectively to transform himself 
into an animal” (Césaire 1972: 20). 
1.2.1.2.  Racism 
The word ‘racism’ and ‘racist’ were used by individuals to describe the idea and actions of 
other people who espouse the doctrine of inequality. In light of this, Mogobe B. Ramose 
argues that “the struggle for reason – who is and who is not a rational animal – is the 
foundation of racism” (2003: 3). Hume and Kant are good examples of the above statement. 
Hume believed that “some races have high levels of mental capacities and that others do 
not” (2002: 66). 
Racism mostly comes down to prejudice against one or more racial groups that 
displaysome certain kind of hostile behaviour towards the members of the other groups. In 
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other words, “racism exists when one ethnic group or historical collectivity dominates, 
excludes, or seeks to eliminate another on the basis of differences that it [the first group] 
believes are hereditary and unalterable” (Jorge Garcia 2004: 36). I think that this can be 
direct or indirect, it can be intentional or unintentional, and it can be implicit or explicit. 
Our actions can be racist, just like policies and societies can be racist. 
Anthony Appiah used his impression of racialism to better explain the idea of racism. He 
argues that racism can be defined in terms of racialism. According to him,  racialism is a 
“presupposition of other doctrines that have been called ‘racism’, and these other doctrines 
have in the last few centuries been the basis of a great deal of human suffering and the 
source of a great of moral error” (Appiah 2003: 208). Appiah further explains that racialism 
is the “belief that there are heritable characteristics possessed by members of our species 
that allow us to divide them into a small set of races, and in such a way that all the members 
of these races share certain traits and tendencies with each other that they do not share with 
members of any other race” (Appiah 1990: 3-17). As such, racialism can be seen as the 
belief in a “racial essence.” In addition, he distinguished between two kinds of racism - 
extrinsic racism and intrinsic racism. For extrinsic racism, “the racial essence entails 
certain morally relevant qualities; that is, the extrinsic racist believes that people in 
different racial categories exhibit different characteristics, and these justify different 
treatment” (Valls 2005: 6). This form of racism involves empirical claims, while intrinsic 
racism “is like someone who prefers her own family members simply because they are her 
family members” (Valls 2005: 6).  
 
Peter Sedgwick further explains the idea of racism when he states that: 
Racism draws a hierarchical distinction between races, opening a gulf between them and 
setting one racially designated group over and above another on a scale of worth, 
intelligence, or importance. A racist ideology, therefore, is constructed on the basis of 
hierarchical distinctions drawn between different groups… racism thus embodies the 
attitude of a rigid and naturalized conception concerning the nature of individuals and 
groups. Whether or not racism should therefore be defined solely in terms of ideologically 
constructed attitudes or additionally in terms of the norms and practices of a given society 
is a matter of some debates (1999: 325). 
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Racism has been frequently entangled with hostility and prejudice between different 
groups of people. Sometimes one’s idea of racism has to do with the matter of physical 
characteristics that deals with one’s bearing on the other’s abilities or moral character. 
Racist attitudes are wildly backed by mistaken and inaccurate beliefs about others as a 
group. Their hostility and prejudice are harshly based on something that the other cannot 
change; for example, skin colour. This example goes to the heart of the other’s identity.  
1.2.1.3.  Oppression 
Oppression as defined by Paulo Freire is “any situation in which “A” objectively exploits 
“B” or hinders his and her pursuit of self-affirmation as a responsible person’ (1970: 55). 
It is the subjection of a person or a group of people to a cruel and inhumane domination. 
Drawing from this point, oppression, in the words of  Sally Haslanger “might begin with 
the idea that x oppresses y just in case x is an agent with some power or authority and that 
y is suffering unjustly or wrongfully under x or as a result of x’s unjust exercise of power” 
(2004: 98–99). From time immemorial, oppression has subsisted in any place where human 
beings inhabit. More evident is the oppression in Africa during the colonial times (Césaire 
1972 and Dirks 1992). Oppressors and people with oppressive minds coined several 
ideologies to justify this unjust and inhumane treatment of the oppressed. The oppressed 
are considered by the oppressors to be an uncivilized, primitive, savage, worthless and 
barbaric set of people who need to be civilized (Freire 1970: 56).  
According to Freire, the oppressors justify their oppressive acts by claiming that their 
actions are meant in some ways to civilize the oppressed and raise them to the level of true 
human beings. For the oppressors, it is really an act of charity (false generosity) to oppress, 
teach and force their ideologies on the oppressed who are seen as under-developed humans 
(1970: 26–27). “In order to have the continued opportunity to express their “generosity,” 
the oppressors must perpetuate injustice as well. An unjust social order is the permanent 
fount of “generosity,” which is nourished by death, despair, and poverty. That is why the 
dispensers of false generosity become desperate at the slightest threat to its source” (ibid). 
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Oppression is a very cruel form of dehumanization for both the oppressors and the 
oppressed in the inclination of being fully human (Freire 1970: 44). Freire argues that the 
oppressed people are the only ones capable of liberating themselves and the oppressors 
from the dehumanizing structure of oppression (1979: 56). This is because the oppressors 
are often preoccupied with their success and gains from oppression. In effect, they are 
oblivious to and incapable of liberating themselves and the oppressed. It is sometimes 
possible that the oppressors come to realize their ill treatment of the oppressed and they 
give up and allow the people to live freely once more. Nevertheless, it is the exclusive task 
of the oppressed to truly overcome oppression and restore true humanity. In the process of 
bringing about liberation, the way forward for the oppressed people is to engage themselves 
in a critical reflection that will enable their liberating actions to be an objective and 
humanizing one. Their actions should not be a mere switching of sides to become 
oppressors of the former oppressors or their own people (Freire 1970: 62). 
The next section of this chapter discusses the philosophical and social meaning of the 
concept of race. It looks at Outlaw’s and Appiah’s stipulative definitions of race, and the 
discussion of the concept of race as a social construction. 
1.3. Race: The Philosophical and the Social Meaning 
Among philosophers there is no universal definition of the concept of race. “Part of the 
problem is that since ordinary language does not provide precise definitions, any 
philosophical definition of these key concepts must be, to at least some extent, stipulative” 
(Valls 2005: 6). Still, one advantage of a stipulative definition is that it “captures some of 
the important features of how the word is ordinarily used” (ibid). The inquiry of which 
features to pick out in the stipulated definition, is open to debate. However, different 
philosophers, who agree on the need for greater conceptual clarity than ordinary language 
provides, disagree on how this is best achieved (ibid). According to Outlaw, “the term 
‘race’ is a vehicle for notions deployed in the organization of these worlds in our encounters 
with persons who are significantly different from us particularly in terms of physical 
features (skin color and other anatomical features), but also, often combined with these 
when they are different with respect to language, behavior, ideas, and other ‘cultural’ 
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matters” (2001: 58). In the public arena today, there is surprisingly little consensus about 
the meaning of the concept of race. This is so because of the stipulative definition of the 
concept of race. 
Appiah also makes an effort to distinguish between racism and racialism. According to 
Appiah, racialism is a “presupposition of other doctrines that have been called ‘racism’, 
and these other doctrines have been, in the last few centuries, the basis of a great deal of 
human suffering and the source of a great deal of moral error” (1992: 14). In other words, 
racialism can be seen as the belief in a “racial essence,” because things like skin colour, 
hair type, and facial features are part of the essential heritable characteristics of the “races 
of human beings”. “We could divide human beings into a small number of groups called 
‘races’, in such a way that the members of these groups shared certain fundamental, 
heritable, physical, moral, intellectual, and cultural characteristics with one another that 
they did not share with members of any other race” (Appiah 1996: 192). In my view, 
Appiah’s attempt to characterize racism and racialism seems to achieve clarity on the 
concept of race. To make Appiah’s characterization more precise, Ron Mallon (2004: 668) 
underscore that: 
we need to distinguish between heritable difference that are mediated by the environment, 
and those that result more directly from a genotype. Heritability measures the ration of 
variance in a characteristic in an environment that is due to genes to the total variance in 
the environment. If a community systematically tattoos the hand of every person with a 
cleft in their chin, then the heritability of the tattoos would be high. Nonetheless, the 
presence of the tattoo on the hands is the result of a social policy. 
For some, race is a socially constructed idea produced by human interaction within a 
society. This is to say that it is contingent on the collective acceptance of the concept within 
the society. “We construct the social world at least out of other social constructions of the 
world, and certainly by re/constructing material objects of nature” (Eze 2008: 212). This 
in other words means that our socially constructed idea of race is produced out of other 
constructions of the world. This construction is certainly based on the construction and 
reconstruction of some material objects and things of nature. The existence of humans and 
other things rightly reveal that we did not construct or make the world ex nihilo (Eze 2008: 
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121). So, the concept of race is created from the idea of something, like matter, nature or 
the idea of human being. Furthermore, this position “does not commit us to explain what 
‘matter’ or ‘nature’ consists of in every state, not how either is permanently in itself” (ibid). 
Through the discovery of newer truths, the society reconstructs or constructs what it 
believes to be objective idea of a particular thing or concept. Things like volcanic eruption 
and tornado are examples of things the society can reconstruct and construct. They are 
forces we have no choice but to reckon with (ibid). “To say that these not-us-es which we 
have decided to call brute facts of nature can be ‘constructed’ by humans might be to say 
something meaningful, but meaningful only in a special way. It is meaningful only in a 
very technical, limited sense” (ibid). 
From the above we might say that “race” as we know it to be today is socially constructed 
or invented. It is socially constructed based on the way people engage with the concept and 
the discovery of Africa, America or Asia, among others. It is noteworthy that to speak of 
this is not to say that any of the above did not exist before the individuals behind the 
concept. Many historians, philosophers and social scientists believe that race is socially 
constructed, meaning that the biological concept of race has been guarded by the social 
framework in which racial research has taken place (Yudell 2009: 1). Philosophers 
generally accept that race is a piece of social construction because human beings’ concept 
of race does not arise in a vacuum. Therefore it rightly suggests that our social 
environments play an important role in explaining the content of our concepts of race. 
Likewise, it “correctly emphasizes the diversity of human beings’ concepts of race across 
cultures” (Machery and Faucher 2005: 1208). People’s ideas on the concept of race are 
based on their social environment. Some social constructionists believe that this concept 
can be culturally transmitted. This is to say that one’s culture can influence one’s idea of 
race, and the idea can be handed down to generations to come. The above is in line “with 
social constructionists’ reliance on traditional theories of social learning, that is, with the 
idea that the concept of race is acquired from one’s social environment” (Machery and 
Faucher 2005: 1208). Hence, this explains why people within a culture sometimes have 
the same concept of race. “Social constructionists propose that the concept of race – that 
is, the belief that a classification based on skin color and other skin-deep properties like 
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body shape or hair style maps onto meaningful, important biological kinds – is a pseudo-
biological concept that has been used to justify and rationalize the unequal treatment of 
groups of people by others” (Machery and Faucher 2005: 1208). 
I think that the concept has been in existence before the inventors and European explorers, 
because to speak of race is to speak about its existence. “This manner of speaking is 
merely, as Rorty would have it, a way of paying compliments to – or for others, and in 
some cases, expressing a more ambiguous evaluation of the thing discovered, the 
discoverer, or both” (Eze 2008: 122). I think that the existence of race can be compared to 
Wittgenstein’s idea of language. Wittgenstein had a major influence on philosophical 
thoughts in topics like language and logic. In his philosophical investigations, Wittgenstein 
showed the “application of modern logic to metaphysics, via language, provided new 
insights into the relations between world, thought and language and into the nature of 
philosophy” (Biletzki and Matar, 2011: 1).  Language according to Wittgenstein is the 
word that speaks to us. For example “someone coming into a strange country will 
sometimes learn the language of the inhabitants from ostensive definitions6 that they give 
him,  and will often guess the meaning of these definitions which sometimes maybe right 
or wrong” (Wittgenstein 1972: 32). The word only speaks to him what he guesses, and 
what he guesses is what the word speaks to him, meaning he cannot go beyond what the 
word has in store for him. Same can be said about the concept of race, given that as humans 
we come into the world with the idea of nothing, waiting in hope for the world to give us 
what it has. The idea of race comes into our minds based on the way the words speak to 
us, and in connection with something around us. Essentially, one can round these up to 
entail that we did not force the word to speak to us in other for us to know what we know 
today. We only know what we know today based on what the world offered us. The word 
only speaks when it thinks that it is time for humans to know about that particular thing or 
concept. Therefore the inference from this is that the concept of race has been in existence 
before us. 
                                                          
6 Ostensive definition is a definition that involves the exhibition and characterization of things to be defined. 
It is also a definition that points out the instances to be covered. 
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Since the idea of race has been in existence before the inventors, there is no need to criticize 
the inventors. Instead, we need to compliment the genius of the inventors and explorers as 
a way to acknowledge their efforts in discovering this concept which we were ignorant of 
its existence. There is no doubt that the discovery of race has led to various risks (e.g., 
economic and political exploitation, racism etc.). This notwithstanding, we cannot doubt 
its epistemic value and contribution to our well-being and survival.  Also, it is because of 
the above risks, problems and damages that some philosophers were able to venture in the 
debate of conserving or eliminating7 the concept of race. The question of how to go 
beyond8 these risks, problems, and damage should however be our main focus. Just like 
the concept or idea of race was discovered by someone, so too the idea or way in which 
we can go beyond the concept of race needs to be discovered. More so, just because we 
have not taken time to think about the concept does not mean that it is not in existence. 
Will anything in the world today be true if it had not existed? We cannot speak to 
affirmative here and “Heidegger in his inimitable style also opined that Newton’s law 
could not be true if Newton had existed” (Eze 2008: 122). Therefore, the idea of race could 
not be true if there is nothing as race. This means that the existence of this concept depends 
on the concept itself for its validity. 
Africans have been blaming the Europeans for the way they handle and interpret the 
concept. However, I think that there is a need to reconsider or consider the possibility that 
based on the existing nature of the concept of race, the Europeans actually explained and 
made use of the concept properly. Reversing the positions to envision that Africans were 
the inventors and discoverers, would their actions be different from that of the Europeans 
or would they have acted differently? I submit that the answer to this question is a no, 
because if they were the discoverers or inventors (irrespective of the mode of discovery – 
accidental or deliberate), Africans would do just the same thing the Europeans did. 
Therefore, “whether rightly or wrongly greeted by laurels or threatened with fatwa in 
drawing the attention of a people to new realities–that is, “inventing,” “discovering,” or 
“constructing” perceptions of realities in question – the inventor or discoverer presents a 
                                                          
7 I will consider this the idea of the conservationist and eliminativist in some detail in chapter Four. 
8 I will consider this in some detail in chapter Three. 
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world of meaning to a people” (Eze 2008: 122). Referring to the word “meaning,” 
Wittgenstein explains that, “for a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we 
employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the 
language” (1972: 43). He further articulated that “the meaning of a name is sometimes 
explained by pointing to its bearer” (Wittgenstein 1972: 43). What we make of the world 
now remains the conceivable thing it would have been, regardless of who the inventors 
were or would be. Thus, the society constructs or reconstructs what it believes to be 
objective reality out there through the discovery of newer truths. It clearly shows that the 
way in which the Europeans interpreted the concept might actually be its nature, and we 
cannot go against the laws of nature. 
1.4. The need for a Rethink: Race, African Philosophy and Identity 
The philosophical writings of some modern philosophers like Hume, Kant and Hegel, 
arouse psychological defensiveness by most modern African intellectuals when they come 
across intellectual racial discrimination and anti-African prejudices in the works of some 
Europeans thinkers. Appiah, for example, writes: “Few contemporary readers are likely to 
be undisturbed the moments when they discover Africa is banished from Hegel’s 
supposedly universal history; when Hume declares in the essay on ‘National Characters’ 
that blacks are incapable of eminence in action or speculation” (1997: 400); and Kant’s 
classification or hierarchical chart on the different “races”. Appiah’s statement on the idea 
of race and other colonial and neo-colonial exploitation and degradation of African 
humanity reawakens the existence of African philosophy. I articulate the word 
“reawakens” because African philosophy has always been in existence even before 
colonization. It was as a result of the Europeans misinterpretation of African cultures, ideas 
and ways of life that Africans reinforced their ideas to ensure the Europeans can better 
understand their philosophy. This was done after many African scholars assimilated 
European culture and life style through education. The Europeans were ignorant of the 
existence of African philosophy due to the language problems and barriers. By educating 
the Africans to better understand their language, the Europeans unconsciously paved the 
way for them to better understand African philosophy. However, many are still ignorant of 
this fact because the forethought of educating blacks was merely for the purpose of easy 
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communication and exploitation. Unknown to many, European education sequentially 
became a means for Africans to educate the Europeans about their philosophy (African 
Philosophy). Eze confirmed this when he voices that “we know that the earliest Africans 
in America and Europe were largely and forcefully brought there through slavery, and the 
succeeding generation who came after the abolition of slave trade came largely to learn the 
ways of the West in preparation for the revolutions that would crystallize in constitutional 
de-colonization (Kwame Nkrumah, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Senghor etc.)” (1998: 219). Thus 
African philosophy is still an ongoing task because of the denigration of Africans’ 
humanity. 
According to Chinua Achebe, all these racial tags, exploitation, and degradation, are 
“unfortunately for the black man, a tag of disability.”9 To quote Appiah (1992: 176): 
“Race” disables us because it proposes as a basis for common action the illusion that black 
(and white and yellow) people are fundamentally allied by nature and, thus, without effort; 
it leaves us unprepared, therefore, to handle the “intra-racial” conflicts that arise from the 
very different situations of black (and white and yellow) people in different parts of the 
economy and of the world. 
From the above it is quite clear that the idea of race is a real issue that affects Africans in 
various ways. Amongst the ways are “social conjectures about given economic relations 
such as “exploitation of the masses” to political repression or to more complex events such 
as apartheid and other forms of discrimination” (Masolo: 1994: 249), and the degradation 
of Africans and African philosophy.  We cannot doubt the fact that it is because of the 
issue of race that “African Philosophy labours under this yet-to-end exploitation and 
denigration of African humanity. Apparently, it challenges the long-standing exclusion as 
the negative “other” of reason and of the western world in the major traditions of modern 
Western philosophy” (Eze 1998: 219). 
Léopold Sédar Senghor’s theoretical work illustrates how race plays itself out in modern 
and African discourse. Senghor stipulates that the “Black man’s emotivity is due neither 
to inherently superior sensory faculties nor to inherently inferior rational faculties, but to 
a particular attitude toward the external world and its apparent complexity. Essentially 
                                                          
9 Achebe, Interview. 
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positive and dynamic, this attitude is a direct result of the notion of life force and its 
intensification and the tendency to relate to the external world as to a network of interacting 
forces” (Senghor quoted in Wolfers 1979: 75). The above explains his idea about the 
meaning of reason and humanity. Following Eze’s point, “Senghor may have been 
disingenuous but he was not at all innocent of modern racial battles over the meaning of 
reason and humanity, especially when he notoriously defended a thesis that on the surface, 
is unsurpassably droll: “Emotion is Negro, and reason Greek”” (Eze 2001: 41). According 
to Eze, “it is as if Senghor said, “Well, you keep your Reason; we have our Emotion. 
Besides, our Emotion is superior to your Reason” (ibid).  The above reaction from Senghor 
is simply an example that better describes and informs us how the concept of race has 
affected some Africans. It explicitly shows Africans’ awareness of racial consciousness 
and their intellectual urge to defend it without the fore-knowledge of them being racist at 
the same time. Trying to philosophically justify a person’s capability of reasoning and 
responsibility one falls into this idea of racialization. “Racialization has produced arbitrary 
boundaries and exacerbated tension in the diaspora alliance with other peoples of colour; 
qua victims of racism – people of south Asian descent in England, Hispanics in the United 
States, “Arabs” in France, and Turks in Germany–have proven essential” (Appiah 1992: 
176). 
It was the issue of race that led to the question of the existence of African philosophy. This 
contentious and perennial query saturated the discourse of African philosophy for so many 
years because, “the imperative of whiteness as a normative idea, which even today seems 
to operate to consign diverse Afros in diverse nations to a “race: of inferiors” (Eze 2001: 
xv). This idea has affected Africans to the extent that they have to distinctively show what 
should be considered as African philosophy. In addition to this, Appiah explains the 
concept of identity when he asserts that “every human identity is constructed historical; 
everyone has its share of false presuppositions, of the errors and inaccuracies that courtesy 
calls “myth”, religion “heresy”, and science “magic” (1992: 174). As such, various 




From Eze’s point of view, to designate a field of philosophy as “African” is consistent 
with the custom of naming philosophical traditions and practices according to their 
cultural, ethic, national, merely geographical origins” (Eze: 1997:3). Following from this, 
I believe that to engage in philosophy is principally a matter of employing one’s mental 
and rational capacities to address, articulate and resolve the ultimate question in life about 
existence, God, human nature and so on. This view is no different from what the Europeans 
or Modern Western philosophers have done. All human beings as rational animals are 
endowed with these capacities and all societies are confronted by these ultimate questions. 
Since we apply reason in all that we do, reasoning does not belong to anyone, it is part of 
nature. Therefore handed-down beliefs are bound to exist, whether reserved in writing or 
orally-transmitted, which are the fruit of individuals’ attempts to employ their inventions 
of some concepts and the postulation of ultimate questions in life. 
The inventions of some concepts and the postulation of ultimate causes are a reflection of 
this search, some of them representing immaterial or quasi-material realities (the Soul, 
God, and the like). However, conceptual transformations that have been happening 
through the centuries, in both Africa and Europe, attest to the fact that our articulation of 
reality is a highly contested terrain. Therefore, I consider as “Philosophy” all discourses 
or texts that represent an attempt by individuals to employ their rational capacities to 
address, articulate and resolve the ultimate question of life. An unmistakeable feature of 
the African continent is its cultural and ideological plurality. We cannot subscribe to any 
essentialist notion of African thought, except that as members of human race living on the 
African continent, we can all account for an innate capacity to employ our mental and 
rational capacities. I believe that there are some ultimate questions which have been 
accorded greater emphasis in African and those that need more emphasis, depending on 
the particular era of African history. The concept of race constitutes one of the questions. 
The arrival of the colonizers in Africa marked the interchange of modernity and tradition. 
Out of this contentious union came some ultimate questions, one of which is the underlying 




It is, of course true that the African identity is still in the making. There isn’t a final identity 
that is African. But, at the same time, there is an identity coming into existence. And it has 
a certain context and a certain meaning. Because if somebody meets me, say, in a shop in 
Cambridge, and he says “Are you from Africa?” This means that African means something 
to some people. Each of these tags a meaning, and a penalty and a responsibility (quoted 
in Appiah 1992: 173).10 
According to Appiah, “meaning is not always one we can be happy with, and identity is 
one we must continue to reshape. So in thinking about how we are to reshape identity, it 
becomes important to remember that the African identity is for its bearers, only one among 
many” (1992: 177). Masolo also gives a better explanation of African identity using the 
word “return” in Aimé Césaire’s book. According to Masolo, the word “return” which 
appears in the title of Aimé Césaire Poem – Return to My Native Land – is a term “which 
symbolizes many aspects of the struggle of the people of African origin to control their 
own identity… a symbolic call to all black peoples to rally together around the idea of 
common origin and in a struggle to defend that unifying commonality… – a uniting idea 
of common origin for all black peoples” (1994: 2). This commonality became their identity 
tag and a language that expresses Africans unification. 
There might be some who may want to object with the following question: how can 
superstitious beliefs, some of which answer to ultimate questions and still abound in Africa 
today, be a product of African philosophical speculation? Also, it could be argued that if 
the object of African philosophical speculation should be limited to “ultimate questions 
which are expressive of the African experience”, the various African philosophical 
schools, especially professional philosophy would have to refrain from exploring new 
horizons.  
Primarily, while superstitious beliefs cannot be considered the fruit of philosophical 
speculation, by contemporary standards, they do represent an era when the rational 
capacities of a people, determined by their traditional cultural context and the resources 
available to them, had more limited access to speculative and experimental knowledge. 
However, these beliefs could be coherently understood within their immediate context. 
Kwasi Wiredu further explains this when he says “African philosophers cannot… take the 
                                                          
10 Achebe, Interview. 
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sort of cultural pride in the philosophical achievement of Aristotle or Hume or Kant or 
Frege or Husserl, of which the Western student of philosophy may permit himself... thus 
any partiality that African philosophers may develop for these thinkers must rest mostly 
on considerations of truth-value” (1984: 159).Additionally , when we endeavour to 
articulate the ultimate questions which are expressive of this contemporary era in African 
experience, it is important that one has insight into this experience. Among many things, 
this experience is characterised by the “differences played by the colonial experience in 
shaping the continent’s diversities. But then, even identical colonial policies identically 
implemented working on the very different cultural materials would surely have produced 
widely varying results” (Appiah 1992: 174). It can also be characterised as a movement 
towards modern and contemporary thoughts. Hence African philosophers are only limited 
by their readiness to embrace the aforementioned and other resources to take the field of 
African philosophy to new horizons. 
Concurring with Eze’s views, I will like to say that “race” “continues to be valued as a 
means of recognition or appointment of worth. The “black” social identity raises questions 
not only about “the future of the race” but also about the future of race itself – anyone’s 
race. Perhaps only the future can address these questions, hoiwever, I see no harm in 
reading the present for signs of this future” (Eze 2001: xv). 
1.5. Conclusion 
This chapter outlined a basic understanding of the concept of race from a biological 
perspective while also looking at how the concept of race has affected Africans’ identity 
and African philosophy. The chapter drew attention to the fact that the concept of race can 
be linked or identified as one a struggle history. Race, as part of historical events was born 
out of colonial misrepresentation of Africa as culturally naïve, rationally incompetent and 
intellectually docile. Using Aristotle’s idea of slavery, I expanded on this concept of race, 
arguing that that the Europeans invention of race as a tool to rationalize their enslavement 
of Africans remains an unfair act that cannot be justified. Furthermore, the concepts of 
colonialism, racism and oppression with regards to race were also elaborated in this 
chapter. I provided the philosophical meaning of race and the social constructive meaning 
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of the concept of race, and argued that even if Africans were to be the colonizers they 
would have made the same mistake as the Europeans did. In what followed, I briefly 
discussed race, African philosophy and identity, indicating how the concept of race has 
affected African identity. I also drew attention to the fact that African philosophical 
projects seek to resolve the race concept which is expressive of the African experience. To 
sum up, I also asserted that though the idea of race is a real issue that affects Africans in 
various ways, the race concept continues to be valued as a means of recognition or 




2. Intellectual Lineage and the Indirect, Direct and Unconscious 
Interest in the Concept of Race 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Having expanded on the concept of race in the previous chapter, this chapter now focuses 
onhow some modern philosophers provided theoretical grounds for the formation of race 
as a modern idea. My choice of philosophical figures includes Descartes, Hume, Kant, 
Sartre, and Tempels. For me, these philosophers represent an intellectual lineage that 
indirectly, directly, unconsciously took up interests in the concept of knowledge and the 
idea of race. My aim in this chapter is to engage some of the ideas of these philosophers 
by firstly taking us back to Descartes’ “Cogito,” which seems to be the foundation upon 
which some idea of race or racism rest. In discussing the Descartes’ “Cogito,” I go on to 
maintain that that Descartes in actuality did not engage in discussions about race or racism. 
However, his Jesuit teacher did engage the discussions on race and slavery. Descartes 
decision not to discuss these concepts could be attributed to his intellectual journey of 
knowing who he was, which shaped his philosophical perspectives. Secondly, I discuss 
Hume’s empirical theory of knowledge, his concept of human mind, and his idea on race. 
Departing from Hume’s views, I contest that he was wrong about the idea of European 
civilization, his idea of inferiority and superiority, and intellectual level of humans. 
Thirdly, I discuss Kant’s notion of human knowledge and his idea of race, where I also 
contest his view of the Negro slave from Guinea that drowned himself when being forced 
into slavery. In this case, I argue that Negro or rather anyone in his situation must have a 
reason for his/her action, and this in turn is evidence of reason and self-awareness; which 
can be found in all humans. From the above give a general critique of Hume’s and Kant’s 
perspectives on the idea of reasoning or intellectual capacity. Fourthly, I explain Placide 
Tempels’ idea of force, and allege that he misinterpreted the idea of force, which actually 
led to his unconscious idea of race. My reason for including Tempels is to show his 
misinterpretation of force, his unconscious idea of race, and to show that he is like a 
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mediator between Descartes, Hume, Kant, Sartre, and Africans or African philosophers 
and the discourse of African philosophy. 
In everyday conversation as human, we show an inner desire for knowledge and truth. We 
ask questions and request proofs in order not be stuck in what we do not understand. This 
inner desire could be traced back to our whole being as human, just as Aristotle said, 
‘human beings by nature desire to know’.11 Pertinent to the act of knowing, knowing beings 
know reality in respect to the nature of their being. Thus, human beings as embodied spirits 
come to know things using the bodily senses which are directly exposed to the physical 
world. Modern philosophy was thought to deal with the most universal of issues, from 
reason to humankind, using the most pure of methodologies. However parts of Hume’s and 
Kant’s philosophy for which one hold them responsible are statements directly about race 
or “varieties of men”, such as Hume’s infamous footnote, which will be discussed in details 
in the chapter. Against this footnote, James Beattie criticizes Hume, saying that thousands 
of years before now, the whites were as much savages as the blacks. Beattie further argues 
that Hume’s expectation on black slaves in Europe to display ingenious acts was an idea 
that was hard to defend. They had little or no exposure to any form of formal education, 
yet they were expected to have brilliance in science and other inventive fields. If given 
same opportunities as their white Europeans, the slaves would surely have expressed 
enormous ingenuity as has been seen of Africans who were/are opportune to be educated 
in both European and African ways. One’s colour cannot be a determinant to the person’s 
intellectual level. While Hume was dismissive to Beattie’s criticisms,  in a letter to William 
Straham, later published in the London Chronicle of June 12-14, 1777, he however reacted 
by calling Beattie “a bigoted silly fellow.” This exchange showed that Hume was not 
unaware of the controversial nature of his racial views, or why some of his contemporaries 
considered them troubling (Eze 2001: 52). 
My focus in this chapter is based on three points:  (1) Descartes introduced the idea of self, 
the “thinking thing,” as a way of defining the human person. Descartes never knew that he 
was bringing to the fore the idea of reason, which will be used as a direct criticism against 
                                                          
11 Aristotle’s opening sentence in his Metaphysics 
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the Negroes. His idea can be seen as an idea that today plays an indirect role in the proper 
discourse of the concept of race. (2) Hume is really and deeply into the idea of race. It is 
clear in his footnote and in some of his writings. It is my thinking that his footnote explicitly 
described his idea and views about race. His direct interest in the concept of race can be 
seen in his discussions and response to Beattie. His theory of mind, informed him of the 
nature of race, and it was a way of expressing his prejudices against black people. (3) 
Kant’s position is informed by Hume’s essay – On National Characters. Like Hume, Kant 
was deeply into the idea of race as evident in his Anthropology and Geography. Matolino 
explained better Kant’s direct involvement in the concept of race when he said that, Hume’s 
and Kant’s actions were a result of their ill-informed prejudices to form their racial outlook. 
He further argued that “this is unlike an ordinary uneducated racist who will combine 
prejudice with fear and hatred to promote or defend his attitude. Such racism is not well 
thought-out, given that it is not based on any reflection. However, it is based on pure hatred 
or inherited attitudes from the racist environment” (2011: 336). (4) Tempels’ idea of the 
Baluba people can be seen as an indirect role in the concept of race.12 I think his intention 
was not bad, but his misinterpretation of the culture and philosophy Bantu people was. His 
intention was to help his fellow Belgian missionaries and colonial administrators in their 
quest for the civilisation of Africa. 
2.2.    Descartes’ Cogito: A Logical Step of Human Knowledge of the Self 
As a young boy, Descartes studied at the famous Jesuit college of La Fleche and at the 
University of Poitiers Law Faculty. While in La Flèche, Descartes studied mathematics, 
logic, philosophy (like the works of scholastic philosophers) in which he distinguished 
himself by founding coordinate geometry. During these years, he showed special ability in 
mathematics, and was most impressed with the certainty and precision of mathematics, as 
compared with philosophy which produced chaos and doubts. But his silence on the views 
and practices of slavery posed a serious question. This was strange because “his Jesuit 
                                                          




teachers’ teachers, from Aristotle through Aquinas to the Coimbran commentators, to Luis 
de Molina (1535–1600) and Francisco Suarez (1548–1617), were never silent on slavery. 
They followed tradition in taking it as a fact in the human condition” (Reiss 2005: 18). The 
debate on slavery was also vital in “Francisco de Vitoria’s (1483–1546) and Domingo de 
Soto’s (1494–1561) work at Salamanca on law in general and Spain’s legal duties to the 
indigenous peoples of the Americas in particular. It was crucial in the fierce debates 
between Juan Guan Ginés de Sepulveda (1490–1573) and Bartolomé de Las Casas (1484–
1566)” (Reiss 2005: 18–19). Descartes’ Jesuit teachers were groomed on all of these. So 
while Descartes’ silence on these issues remains questionable, his indirect interest could 
only be recognized in his Meditations. 
During Descartes’ time, new and different ways of philosophizing emerged among 
thinkers. These revivals were due to the discovery of some ancient texts, like the renowned 
Greek sceptic Sextus Empiricus’ summary of Pyrrho (c 360-c. 270).13 This work notably 
influenced the famous French sceptic Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) (Copleston 1994). 
Montaigne largely contributed to the rebirth of scepticism during the XVIth century (Foglia 
2013: 4). The main core of Montaigne’s argument was and remains that “the relativity and 
unreliable character of sense-experience, the mind’s dependence on sense-experience and 
its consequent incapacity for attaining absolute truth, and our inability to solve the 
problems which arise out of the conflicting claims of the senses and reason” (Copleston 
1994: 19). He claimed that “man (sic) lacks the power to construct any certain metaphysical 
system, and the fact that the metaphysicians have arrived at different and incompatible 
conclusion bears witness to this” (Copleston 1960: 31). His “scepticism was intended to 
lead man (sic) to care for what really is – the individual’s concrete life in all the reality of 
its givenness – of its situation” (Gilson & Langan 1963: 16). Foglia (2013: 4) makes known 
that around 1576, Montaigne had his own personal medal coined, he had it engraved with 
his age, with “Epecho”, “I abstain” in Greek, and another Sceptic motto in French: ‘Que 
sais-je?’: what do I know? ().  This simply confirms his sceptical position towards the 
                                                          
13 Pyrrho was an ancient Greek philosopher, who is said to have accompanied Alexander on his march to India. 
And according to Diogenes Laertius, Pyrrho expressed his philosophical views only by word of mouth, but his 
views are known through those of his pupil (Copleston 1961:413). 
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realization of certain knowledge. According to Montaigne, doubting was the highest mark 
of wisdom, because he was conversant with the method of doubts. Like Montaigne, 
Descartes began philosophizing on life by using doubtg as a device of judgment. Just like 
Socrates tried to free philosophy from the scepticism of the sophist, so too did Descartes. 
According to Gilson (1955: 26), Descartes was "a direct answer to the challenge of 
Montaigne’s skepticism”, as he employed scepticism as a means of overcoming scepticism. 
Descartes knew many of Montaigne’s works and those of his Jesuit teachers. Thus, 
Montaigne’s sceptical essays became a firm foothold to Descartes’s quest for certainty. 
Descartes, a 17th century French rationalist philosopher, and father of modern philosophy, 
investigated the nature of “man.” He postulated the theory of human knowing. He was 
concerned chiefly with the problem of intellectual certainty. Descartes began the 
Meditations with this words: “Opportunely on this day, I have thus rid the mind of all cares, 
I have obtained for my mind secure leisure, I am quite alone, I shall work seriously and 
freely at a general overthrow of my opinions” (AT 7:17–18). These meditations appeared 
to have directed Descartes general project of wanting to cast doubt on opinions on the way 
to something firm and lasting (a foundation for knowledge). 
According to Stumpf (1975: 250), Descartes searched for his one truth and found it in the 
very act of doubting. The Cogito is the argument which Descartes uses to ascertain 
certainty on the human person. He started off by telling us to doubt everything we know in 
order to arrive at a certain or indubitable truth. “Though I can doubt that my body exists, 
or that I am awake, or that I am being deceived14, in short that all is illusion or false, one 
thing remains about which I can have no doubt at all, that I think”  (ibid).  From this, we 
should be able to deduce something that is certain. This would be the existence of a self as 
a conscious or a thinking being. Properly structured, the argument may take this shape: “to 
doubt is to think, and it must necessarily be that I who [think am] something; and remarking 
this truth, I think” (ibid). Hence Descartes assertion “cogito ergo sum, that is, I think 
therefore I am” (1979: 17). Put in this form, Descartes’s argument is logically valid 
                                                          
14 It is important to underscore that St. Augustine used a similar concept like the one of Descartes, though 
in a different way; St Augustine asserts that if he is deceived then he exists: ‘si fallor, ergo sum.’ 
31 
 
because, if thinking is a prerequisite for existing, being able to think necessarily qualifies 
me to be an existing thing. 
For Descartes, the cogito ergo sum is the first item of knowledge, and the first absolute 
foundation of truth in his enquiry. The reason for this is because the truth in itself is 
indubitable and it is a clear and distinct truth. The truth in cogito ergo sum is so solid and 
sure that the most excessive suppositions of the sceptics could not conquer it, “I concluded 
that I might without scruple accept it as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was 
in search” (D.M. 4; AT VI 32). Ipso facto, Descartes said that “this conclusion, I think, 
therefore I am, is the first and most certain of all which occur to one who philosophizes in 
an orderly way” (PP I, 7; AT VIII 7). Accordingly, Descartes employed this basic truth for 
reversing his doubting of the self, things, true ideas, and God (Stumpf 1975: 251). 
Having found the indubitable truth that he is a thinking thing, Descartes then tried to define 
the essence of this thinking thing. Descartes said that to say Cogito ergo sum is to affirm 
his existence. Crossing from epistemology to ontology, Descartes asks: What is this ‘I’ 
who thinks and therefore exists? He reasons that I cannot be the body since its existence 
betokens doubt. I am essentially a thinking thing, says Descartes, and nothing more. I am 
a thing that “doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, and which also imagines 
and feels” (M. 2; AT VII 28). It is to these regards that Descartes said: 
Examining with attention what I was, I saw that I could pretend that I had no body and that 
there was nor any place where I was, but that I could not pretend, on that account, that I 
did not exist; and that, on the contrary, from the very fact that I thought about doubting the 
truth of other things, it followed very evidently and very certainly that I existed. On the 
other hand, had I simply stopped thinking, even no reason to believe that I existed. From 
this I knew that I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which was merely to 
think.15 
From the above, it is clear that the essence of the human is the capacity to think. And that 
is the truth of the cogito. There is no doubt that Descartes’s views on other things (including 
dualism, his proof of God’s existence, and innate ideas) have been argued against, and have 
been crushed by some thinkers. But “his essential definition of ‘man’ as a being whose 
                                                          
15 René Descartes, “Letter of Dedication,” Meditations on First Philosophy [1641], trans. Lawrence J. 
Lafleur, New York: Library of Liberal Arts, Macmillan, 1951, pp. 3 and 5; Eze’ emphasis. 
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reason for being is ‘merely to think’ has remained acceptable” (Eze 2001: 5). According to 
Paul Ricoeur (1970: 417), Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am” is “the reflective foundation 
of every proposition concerning man.” Blaise Pascal, a contemporary thinker, further 
acknowledged that one “can easily conceive of a man without hands, feet, head…I cannot 
conceive of man without thought” (1995: 59). 
2.2.1.    Nothing on Race 
Descartes said nothing about race or slavery – directly, at least not in any modern sense. 
Many though have (like Joan Dayan) accused Descartes of philosophical liability for 
modern racist attitudes.16 Dayan was the one who founded the 1685 code noir that regulated 
French colonial slavery. Thus for him slavery was unthinkable without Descartes. “After 
the Discours de la method and Meditations, the Code was “the nasty belch that follows a 
meal of pure thought.” The thinkers of Descartes’ Meditations in 1640 set the stage for the 
1685 edict of Louis XIV” (Reiss 2005: 18). These two texts basically show how the making 
of enlightened man led to the destruction of the unenlightened brute, and how the thinking 
mind’s dominated the servile body. 
According to Reiss, “Descartes’ quest for his essence in the first Meditation’s thought 
experiment of self-dismemberment, enabled later arguments that those supposedly lacking 
thought–black ivory, “pieces of the Indies,” or African “ebony wood”–could be “bought, 
bartered, and sold… figured as heads of cattle, coins, parcels of land, pieces of furniture” 
(ibid). For these, being without thought aligns with Dayan’s idea that “no amount of 
amputation, torture, or disfiguring can matter” (Dayan 1995: 204) because, “objectifying 
racialized others resulted from claims of mind’s control of body and body’s lack of 
thought” (Reiss 2005: 18). His silence about these ideas is still questionable, but maybe he 
made due of what his mind demanded at that point in time. By this I mean that Descartes 
decided to venture into a new discourse, different from what was in place during his time. 
                                                          
16 According to Timothy Reiss, Descartes “virtual silence and seeming indifference have not stopped people 
from taxing him and some putative “Cartesianism” with spawning modern Western philosophical apologia 
for slavery and racism or, conversely, from praising him both for having treaded everything human except 
mind as purely accidental, making all facets of body, including sex and skin color, insignificant” (2005: 17). 
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2.3.    Hume’s Empirical Theory of Knowledge 
Hume presents us with a theory of knowledge which is empirical. Empiricism is an 
epistemological movement according to which nothing around us can be known to be real 
unless its existence is revealed in or is inferable from information we gain directly in sense 
experience or introspection of our subjective state (Dancy 1992: 120). This is a 
philosophical movement that Hume strongly promoted. This theory starts from his 
distinction between perception and thought. He stated that when we see, hear, feel, 
something we are aware of something immediately present to the mind through the senses. 
We can as well, think, believe, and reason about things that are not present to our senses at 
the time, such as objects, past events, and the future (ibid). However, these thoughts are 
products of some objects that were present to the senses. Hence, the guiding principle of 
empiricism says that nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu – there is nothing 
in the intellect which has not first been in sense. Hence, to discover the causes and effects 
of our perception, we ought to consult experience, and not reason. We realize this view 
about the discovery of causes and effects when we notice the constant link between 
particular objects with one another. We tend to overlook this because most ordinary causal 
judgments are so familiar to us. Hence, our judgment of them seems immediate due to the 
multiplicity of our experience of them. Reasoning concerns either relations of ideas or 
matters of fact (Hume 1888: 261). 
Hume sought to use his empirical theory as a reformation for philosophy. This reform in 
philosophy has two related aspects: the elimination of metaphysics and the establishment 
of an empirical experimental science of human nature. Hume was greatly influenced by the 
success of experiment in natural science, hence wanted to apply the same method of inquiry 
to human beings. He shifted the focus away from the traditional metaphysical search for 
‘ultimate original principles’ in order to concentrate on describing the human nature. “This 
nature is discoverable through experience and observation, and to which we can give 
reasoned cognitive content by tracing the ideas involved to the impressions that gave rise 
to them (Dancy 1992: 183). His choice Dancy further explains is because he claimed to 
have found that, “ultimate principles are not just false; they are incoherent, because they 
go beyond anything that can be experienced” (1992: 183). 
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Hume also called these ultimate principles ‘perceptions’. Perception is the first type of 
mental activity (psychological and epistemological). They are contained, basically in the 
mind, because the mind has them as its immediate objects of comprehension. Hume 
separated these perceptions into impressions and ideas, arguing that what differentiates the 
two terms consists in “the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the 
mind” (Solomon 1977: 112), and register into our thought or consciousness. According to 
Hume, “those perceptions, which entered with most force and violence, we may name 
impressions; this will include sensations, passions and emotions in their first appearance 
to the soul” (ibid: 112–113). On the other hand, He referred to ideas as the ‘faint images’ 
of impressions in thinking and reasoning as the mind recalls its impressions, which includes 
perceptions or thoughts provoked by conversations. To him, “the comparison to theatre 
must not mislead us, as only the successive perceptions constitute the mind” (1962: 253). 
In distinguishing between simple and complex perceptions, Hume divided them into 
impressions and ideas, based on the degree of impact they have on the mind. To him, 
perceiving the colour of something, say a green apple example remains a simple 
impression.  While the thought of this very green apple would be regarded as a simple idea, 
the use of sight to view an object will produce a complex impression of that object in the 
mind. The recollection of such an impression would produce a complex idea. Impressions, 
as accentuated by Hume, have precedence over ideas because they are a result of the direct 
contact of the mind with the sensual experience of a thing, whereas ideas only come in 
later. “The true idea of the human mind,” Hume insisted, “is to consider it a system of 
different perceptions or different existence which are linked together by the relation of 
cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other” (1962: 
252–259). While complex ideas stand the chance of alteration as the mind recollects them, 
complex impressions cannot be altered by the mind because they are quite visible and 
worthy of experiment. What we call the mind, according to Hume, “is nothing but a heap 
of collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations” (1962: 207). 
Thus, “Knowledge, understood in this way, is indirectly what Hume regarded as the “key 
feature of human nature”–because knowledge is coeval with, and represents the unique 
aspects of the human subjectivity” ( Eze 2001: 65). 
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2.3.1.    Hume on the Human Mind 
In a revolutionary step in the history of philosophy, Hume rejected the basic idea of the 
self. He worked towards the total refutation of the traditional philosophical concepts of the 
self as being constant and invariable. He asserted that we claim to be thoroughly conscious 
of this thing called the self, but looking into himself, he did not notice anything called self. 
Rather, he only collided with a series of perceptions such as cold or heat. To Hume 
therefore, perceptions were the only observable things in him, as there was no time that he 
was without a perception.  These perceptions are what we mistakenly give the term self. 
According to Hume, we need real ideas to attach an invariable existence, thus his 
suggestion that real ideas only emerge from ‘one impression’, which ought to remain 
constant despite the change in time. Hume (1888: 251–252) however went further to 
explain that the human personis not ‘one impression’, but a reference of several 
impressions since no impression is stable and constant, giving the idea of self to the human 
person would be erroneous..  
The notion of invariable and unstable perception led Hume to deny the existence of the 
individual’s self-identity. He upheld that because people do not have a stable perception of 
themselves as distinct entities, they “are nothing but a bundle or collection of different 
perceptions which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual 
flux and movement” (Hume 1888: 252). In this sense, Hume emphasized that what is 
responsible for the mind’s linkage of perceptions as one causing the other is a secret tie 
between particular ideas. However, it is to these successive perceptions that we ascribe our 
self-identity. According to Hume, no single power of the soul remains unchangeably the 
same even for a moment.  Hume debunked the traditional metaphysician’s claim of 
essential unity that the different related objects are the same in effect, by arguing that only 
an invention of new and unintelligible theories that connects the objects together can 
prevent their disruption of variation.  Some of such claims included the metaphysicians’ 
view on “the continued existence of perceptions of our senses..., hence, running into the 
notion of a soul, self and substance to disguise the variation” (: 254). What then would be 
our outlook to this ascription? In view of this inquiry, Hume therefore resolved that it would 
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be our task to prove that all objects to which we ascribe identity consist of succession of 
related invariable perceptions and objects. 
Hume’s theory of human nature appears to be racial in nature because he puts forth a new 
idea of man in his theory of nature. His idea of “man” was new because it was different 
from those of his predecessors, especially Descartes. Hume aimed at bringing out new ideas 
in view of undertaking a broad scientific study of man, which he called “anatomical 
philosophy.” Anatomical philosophy, “would combine Cartesianism and Newtonian 
theories, a synthesis Hume hoped would yield a completely general theory of human nature 
to explain why human beings act, think, perceive and feel in all the ways they do” (Hume 
2001: 60, Stroud 1977: 4). Hume actually admitted that it was impossible to regard the total 
scepticism of the existence of human nature, and human knowledge on natural grounds.  
To Hume, the idea of total scepticism was superfluous because nature could not consent to 
it, thus his his Treatise that: 
Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity has determin’d us to judge as well as 
to breath and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and 
fuller light, upon account of their customary connexion with a present impression, than we 
can hinder ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake, or seeing the surrounding 
bodies, when we turn our eyes toward them broad sunshine (1978: 251). 
Eze explains the above by saying, “the ‘proof’ offered here against scepticism on natural 
grounds is similar to Descartes’s conclusion on logical grounds in “I think, therefore I am”. 
This is because by the very act of doubting, one proves that one exists. Therefore one could 
not, according to Hume have a mind and body structured by nature in certain ways and 
deny that this structure of this mind and this body inescapably leads one to think, judge, 
breathe, feel, and so on, in specific ways” (2001: 61). In Hume’s view, a philosopher must 
identify and anatomically define these natural processes and the structures of their 
organization. 
Hume’s theory of the mind was at the heart of his analysis of his theory of human nature. 
The mind according to Hume, constitutes what he called the “self.” His idea of the mind 
did not depend on anything or the existence of anything. Based on his idea, the mind is not 
a thing, as he actually denied the existence of any substances, material or immaterial that 
37 
 
can be attributed to the mind. This is to show that he was not in support of Berkeley’s 
notion of “spirit”, and Locke’s and Malebranche’s ideas of material or immaterial 
substances. Hume explicitly rejected Descartes’ definitions and ideas of the mind  that 
“thought was the essence of the mind – not this thought or that thought, but thought in 
general” (1962: 298–299). This in Hume’s perspective seemed to be “absolutely 
unintelligible, since everything that exists is particulate; and therefore it must be our several 
particular perceptions that compose the mind. I say compose the mind, not belonging to it. 
The mind is not a substance in which the perceptions inhere” (1962: 298–299). Hume went 
further to reject the idea or position that “we are every moment immediately conscious of 
what we call self; that we feel its existence and continuance in existence, and are certain 
beyond the evidence of a demonstration that both of it perfects identity and simplicity” 
(ibid). He continued in his Treatise by stating that these assertions “are contrary to that 
very experience which is pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of self, after the manner 
it is her explain’d”; he queries: “From what impression cou’d this idea [of the self] be 
deriv’d? This question ’tis impossible to answer without a manifest contradiction and 
absurdity” (1978: 251). Hume therefore proposed that “what we call a mind is nothing but 
a heap of collection of different perceptions united together by certain relations” (1978: 
207). 
The above posed a question of what these relations can possibly be. Hume suggested that 
we have common relation and philosophical relation. These two relations together make 
the relations in Hume’s discussion. Thus, the idea of relations is the important feature of 
the human mind; the common relations is “attributed to processes of unreflective nature 
and the union of ideas, where the mind actively generates (self) reflection in the form of 
combination or comparison – in fact, by self-doubling as a wall of mirrors – of ideas” (Eze 
2001: 64). Hume was of the idea that the common relation is based always on the ways or 
“sense in which we used the word, relation; and ’tis only in philosophy that we extend it to 
mean any particular subject of comparison” (1978: 14). For Hume, common relation occurs 
naturally, while philosophical relation is driven by the activities of understanding. There 
are many philosophical relations according to Hume, about seven of them. He estimated 
these as follows: resemblance, identity, space and time, quantity, quality, contrariety, and 
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cause and effect. These relations are the ones that offer themselves to the “determination 
of the mind” (1978: 14). And they are the ones that create the possible certainty and 
objectivity of knowledge, therefore the possibility of sciences and the arts” (Eze 2001: 66). 
The true idea of the human mind, Hume insisted, “is to consider it a system of different 
perceptions or different existences, which are link’d together by the relation of cause and 
effect and mutually produce, destroy, influence and modify each other” (1978: 252–259).  
Furthermore, Hume linked intellectual capacity and achievement with skin complexion as 
a statistical examination. This is to say that the theory of human mind is at the heart of 
Hume’s analysis of human nature, because he believed that intellectual achievement is 
based on one’s skin colour. This was why Hume said that some races are inferior to others, 
and the the Negro is an example of this racial inferiority. 
2.3.2.    Hume on Race 
Since nature has essentially yielded or produced different kinds of human beings – by race, 
Hume thought that the same nature made some people to have high levels of mental 
capacities and others not. Hume used the Negro as an example of those that did not have 
mental capacity. The whites were/are capable of active use of their mental capacity or 
reason, but the blacks were/are incapable. “The double use of psychological and 
epistemological that Hume made of his theory of mind underlies his remarks about the 
“nature” of the races. He believed that the races – of which he said there are about four or 
five – are endowed naturally with different kinds of psychological and cognitive 
constitutions” (Eze 2001: 66). Hume actually wrote little that directly addresses the concept 
of race. However, his views on human racial difference occurred in his famous footnote 
within “Of National Characters”. Ironically, the footnote was not part of the original essay; 
it was added between 1753 and 1754 to a revised version. The original was written in 1748 
(Eze 2001: 51). The writing of the footnote was first published in the 1754 edition of his 
essays – Moral, Political and Literary. In this footnote, Hume asserted: 
I am apt to suspect the Negroes, and in general all the other species of men (for there are 
four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a 
civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either 
in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences. 
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On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the whites, such as the ancients 
GERMANS, the present TARTARS, have still something eminent about them, in their 
valour, form of government, or some other particular. Such a uniform and constant 
difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an 
original distinction betwixt these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies, there 
NEGROE slaves dispersed all over EUROPE, of whom none ever discovered any 
symptoms of ingenuity; tho’ low people, without education, will start up amongst us, and 
distinguish themselves in every profession. In JAMAICA, indeed, they talk of one negroe 
as a man of parts and learning; but ’tis likely he is admired for very slender 
accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few words plainly [This note was added in 
Edition K.] (1882: 252). 
It is clear that Hume was of the idea that members of different races differ in respects that 
permit different treatments – respects like intelligence. That for Hume is a basis for treating 
people differently. “We should keep in mind therefore, that when Hume said that some 
races are inferior to others, and the evidence for this is that the inferior ones lack the science 
and the arts, he was saying in effect that members of the inferior races are ontologically 
(psychologically) and functionally (cognitively) deficient” (Eze 2001: 66). By ontological 
(psychological), it means that the inferior races are incapable of active uses of reason. By 
functional (cognitive), it means that the inferior races are susceptible to only the passive 
process of the mind. Hume further explained that:  
All kinds of reasoning consist of nothing but comparison, and a discovery of those 
relations, either constant of inconstant, which two or more objects bear to each other. This 
comparison we may make, wither when both objects are present to the senses, or when 
neither of them is present, or when only one. When both the objects are present to the 
senses along with the relation, we call this perception rather than reasoning; nor is there in 
this case any exercise of the thought, or any action, properly speaking, but mere passive 
admission of the impressions thro’ the organs of the sensation (1997: 30 – 33). 
It is evident in this modern time that there are no “such differences in morally relevant 
characteristics–that Negroes do not necessarily lack intellectual capacities” (Appiah 1992: 
14). Hume’s belief was a result of cognitive incapacity - an inability to change his mind 
even after the revised footnote in the face of evidence and various reply and responses. 
What Hume had in mind was not a theory but an ideology. As Appiah said, “it would be 
odd to call someone brought up in a remote corner of the world with false and demeaning 




2.4.    Kant’s Idea of Human Knowledge 
Like Descartes, Kant hoped to contribute to the advancement of knowledge and 
philosophy. Kant’s deontological version of liberalism dominated moral and political 
discourses, having prevailed over the earlier dominant consequentialist version of 
liberalism primarily connected with Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill (Gaus, 
Courtland,  & Schmidtz  2015: 1 – 2). Kant is the famous theorist of personhood, whose 
Logic reformulated Descartes’ anthropological thesis. Although Kant took more seriously 
the consideration that “cultures may differ in their conception of human subjectivity so that 
“I think, therefore I am” is not the only interesting thing that could be said about human 
nature, in the Logic the question of determining the rational nature of man remained the 
major focus” (Eze 2001: 5). Kant classified philosophy into four categories: (1) what can I 
know? (2) What ought I to do? (3) What may I hope? (4) What is man? (Kant 1974, ibid: 
5). “The first question belongs to metaphysics, the second to morality, the third to religion”, 
but all could be placed under the fourth, which is anthropology, because the first three 
questions are connected to the last (ibid: 5). 
In Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Kant expressed the view that “the aim 
of every step in the cultural progress which is man’s education is to assign the knowledge 
and skill he has acquired to the world’s use. But the most important object in the world to 
which he can apply them is man” (1974: 3). If Anthropology was, accordingly, “intended 
to explain the internal and external nature of the “earthly being endowed with reason”; it 
would be a “systematic treatise comprising our knowledge of man””17 (Kant 1974: 3, Eze 
2001: 5). In his Anthropology, Kant went on to explain what he thought about the “I” that 
                                                          
17 However, Kant elaborates further in his Critique of Pure Reason in B138: “To know anything in space (for 
instance, a line), I must draw it, and thus synthetically bring into being a determinate combination of the 
given manifold, so that the unity of this act is at the same time the unity of consciousness (as in the concept 
of a line); and it is through this unity of consciousness that an object (a determinate space) is first known. 
The synthetic unity of consciousness is, therefore, an objective condition of all knowledge. It is not merely a 
condition that I myself require in knowing an object, but is a condition under which every intuition must 
stand in order to become an object for me…. Although this proposition makes synthetic unity a condition of 
all thought, it is, as already stated, itself analytic. For it says no more than that all my representations in any 
given intuition must be subject to that condition under which alone I can ascribe them to the identical self as 
my representations, and so can comprehend them as synthetically combined in one apperception through the 
general expression,  ‘I think’” (1929). 
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Descartes was talking about. Kant saw the “I” as a transcendental unity of human 
consciousness. He further explained his point in his Anthropology when he said: 
The fact that man can have the idea “I” raises him infinitely above all the other beings 
living on earth. By this he is a person; and by virtue of his unity of consciousness through 
all the changes he may undergo, he is one and the same person–that is, a being altogether 
different in rank and dignity from things, such as irrational animals, which we can dispose 
of as we please. This holds even if he cannot yet say “I”; for he still has it in mind. So any 
language must think “I” when it speaks in the first person, even if it has no special word to 
express it. For this power (the ability to think) is understanding (1974: 18–19). 
This passage addresses Kant’s idea of the nature and function of the “I” with human setting. 
We can see from the above that the “anthropological definition of “Man’s Inner Self” is 
cognitivist; and the epistemological definition of the transcendental consciousness is also 
anthropological” (Eze 2001: 6). There is a striking similarity between the “privileges 
accorded by both thinkers to the faculty of understanding, which according to Eze is the 
advancement made by “both as the bearer of anthropological identity, as in the assertion: 
“I am human”” (ibid: 8). In the stream of modern thought and in both Descartes and Kant’s 
propositions, the position assigned to reason is the position at which “man” is on its own – 
“(1) constitutes itself and through this self-act (2) stabilizes otherwise dispersed and 
contradictory states of reality” (ibid: 8–9). Kant (1929: 472) briefly explained that: 
Man is one of the appearances of the sensible world, and in so far one of the natural causes 
the causality of which must stand under empirical laws. … Man, however, who knows all 
the rest of nature solely through the senses, knows himself also through pure apperception; 
and this indeed, in acts and inner determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of 
the senses. He is thus to himself, on the one hand, phenomenon, and on the other hand, in 
respect of certain faculties the action of which cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of 
sensibility, a purely intelligible object. We entitle these faculties understanding and reason. 
Kant’s understanding of man is in his concept of nature, which is more established in his 
anthropology and geography. He believes that man is best understood in these two studies 
because humans are part and parcel of nature. “Within ‘man’, nature is manifested in two 
ways or in two aspects: externally (as body) and internal (as soul, spirit). To study ‘man’ 
in nature or as part of nature, is therefore to study the two aspects of nature contained, 
revealed, or manifested in the human entity. While the one human aspect of nature (or 
natural aspect of the human) is bodily, physical, and external, the other is psychological, 
moral and internal” (Eze 2003: 431). According to history it was Kant who introduced 
42 
 
anthropology as a branch of study to the German universities. As mentioned above, both 
Kant’s physical geography and anthropology combined to study man’s physical, bodily 
and internal aspects of man, and the psychological and moral aspects of man.  
2.4.1.    Kant on Race 
According to Kant, “among the deviations, that is, among the hereditary dissimilarities that 
we find in animals that belong to a single line of descent are those called races. Races are 
deviations that are constantly preserved over many generations and come about as a 
consequence of migration (dislocation to other regions) or through interbreeding with other 
deviations of the same line of descent, which always produces half-breed offspring” (AA, 
II, p. 430, Bernasconi 2002: 146).  The same can be said of Negroes and Whites, because 
in Kant’s view, both are not different species of humans, but they are different races. Kant 
classified humans into different classes: “white” (European), “yellow” (Asians), “black” 
(Africans), and “red” (American Indians). This classification is based on his geographical 
and psychological classifications. Within Kant’s elaboration, “the races that inhabit 
America, Africa, Asia, and the Hindustan are incapable of moral maturity because they 
lack talent – a gift of nature” (ibid:  98). Therefore, Kant situated a taxonomy of race and 
hybrid within species. Kant made use of his taxonomy of races when he said that: “in this 
way Negroes and whites are not different species of humans (for they belong presumably 
to one stock), but they are different races, for each perpetuates itself in every area, and they 
generate between them children that are necessarily hybrid, or blendings (mulattoes)” 
(Kant 1950: 17, Zack 2002: 19).  
Furthermore, Kant offered the psychological-moral explanation for the differences on the 
basis of rational ability to raise oneself into a full humanity. “In Kant’s table of moral 
classifications, while the Americans are completely uneducable because they lack ‘affect 
and passion’, the Africans escape such a malheur, but can only be ‘trained’ or ‘educated’ 
as slaves and servants” (Eze 2003: 438–439).18  Based on his view, the African deserves 
                                                          
18  “The meaning of the distinction that Kant makes between ability to be ‘educated’ or to educate oneself on 
the one hand, and to ‘train’ somebody on the other, can be surmised from the following. ‘training’, for Kant, 
seems to consist purely of physical coercion and corporeal punishment, for in his writings about how to flog 
the African servant or slave into submission, Kant ‘advises us to use a split bamboo cane instead of a whip, 
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this kind of ‘training’ because he or she is lazy, prone to jealousy and hesitation (ibid). He 
further affirmed that, “the African is all these because, for climate and anthropological 
reasons, he or she lacks ‘true’ (rational and moral) character” (Kant 1978: 264, Eze ibid: 
439). 
In 1785, Kant argued that “the presence of an inflammable ‘substance’ phlogiston in the 
African’s blood makes the skin colour ‘black’ and, by analogy and extrapolation is 
assumed to be responsible for the skin colour of other ‘race’ or ‘racial’ distinctions He 
nevertheless maintained throughout a hierarchical extrapolation of these colour 
differences” (1997, Eze 2003: 441). Kant further attributed the supposed grades of 
superiority and inferiority of race to the presence or absence of “talent.” According to Kant, 
white skin was the only concrete and “physical evidence of racial superiority (1785: 138). 
As such, skin colour for Kant, was proof of rational superiority or inferiority. His position 
on the importance of skin colour was obvious in a statement he made on the question of 
the reasoning of a black person. When he evaluated a statement with the comment: “this 
fellow was quite black from head to foot, a clear proof that what he said was stupid” (ibid). 
Based on the above comment, Eze stresses that “it cannot therefore be argued that skin 
colour for Kant was merely a physical characteristic. It is rather, evidence of an unchanging 
and unchangeable moral quality. ‘Race’ then, in Kant’s view, is based upon an ahistorical 
principle of reason (Idee) and moral law” (2003: 441). Here is another example illustrating 
that Kant’s view of race is an ahistorical principle of reason. In 1761, Immanuel Kant 
wrote: 
Montesquieu is correct in his judgement that the weak-heartedness that makes death so 
terrifying to the Indian or the Negro also makes him fear many things other than death that 
the European can withstand. The Negro slave from Guinea drowns himself if he is to be 
forced into slavery. The Indian women burn themselves. The Carib commits suicide at the 
slightest provocation. The Peruvian trembles in the face of an enemy, and when he is led 
to death, he is ambivalent, as though it means nothing. His awakened imagination, 
however, also makes him dare to do something, but the heat of the moment is soon past 
and timidity resumes its old place again… The inhabitant of the temperate parts of the 
world, above all the central part, has a more beautiful body, works harder, is more jocular, 
more controlled in his passion, more intelligent than any other race of people in the world, 
                                                          
so that the ‘negro’ will suffer a deal of pains (because of the ‘negro’s’ thik skin, he would not be racked with 
sufficient agonies through a whip) but without dying’. To beat ‘the Negro’ efficiently requires ‘a split cane 
rather than a whip, because the blood needs to find a way out of the Negro’s thick skin to avoid festering’ ” 
(Neugebaur quoted in Eze 2003: 438–439). 
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that is why at all points in time these peoples have educated the others and controlled them 
with weapons (1997: 62–64). 
What the above simply shows is the reaction of different races when any of them was being 
forced into slavery. The Negro slave from Guinea decided to drown himself because he 
was being forced into slavery, while the Indian women decided to burn themselves on the 
same account of slavery. Other races also had their own reaction when they were being 
forced into slavery. So the idea of all suicide as irrational is one way to understand the 
broader view of Kant’s argument as ahistorical. Despite this background, I however think 
that the actions of the individual (Kant’s examples) shows that they were aware of what 
they will go through if they were subjected to slavery. In my view, this   can be used against 
Kant’s argument on human knowing, because reasoning is a free gift to humanity. How we 
as humans and individuals use it is up to us. Whether we make a wrong judgment or a right 
judgment, what counts at the end is the fact that we made use of it. In the above case, the 
different examples of people that Kant mentioned could identify with the “I”. That very act 
of identification makes them a thinking thing. Their consciousness had reached the 
objective existence, which in turn made them to be more aware that it was better to die, 
than to be enslaved and tortured to death in the hands of the Europeans. According to Hill 
and Bernard (2001: 465) “people often do terrible things from blind sentiments and 
impulse,  not because they did not think about the outcome of their actions, but because 
they are merely taking means perceived as necessary to achieve ends prompted by their 
non-rational inclinations” at that point in time.  This a claim which Hill and Bernard argue 
Kant was obviously aware of but ignored. This also is a claim I concur with on the basis 
that as humans, we must first have a concrete consciousness of who we are and what we 
want to do. This is to say we cannot know or be conscious of something without 
participating in that thing and being participated in by that thing. Consciousness paves the 
way for reasoning. When one is conscious of something, it creates room for thoughts about 
that particular think before one’s action follows. One’s mind/reasoning/thought has to work 
in a coherent way with one’s actions. The action of that Negro and that of the other people 
that Kant used as an example better explains a reasoning that coincides with their actions. 
Thus, in the face of slavery they thought of what to do to escape slavery and this for me is 
coherent reasoning in display. 
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Let’s take for instance, myself as a human being. Since I was conceived in my mother’s 
womb until now, I have passed through many stages of change. I have changed size, shape, 
degrees of strength, things I learnt, and skills I developed. In addition to these changes, I 
take responsibility of my doings, with the consciousness to assume my responsibility. In 
fact, these changes cannot take place in somebody if they are not aware of their personal 
identity. Therefore, every moment I recall to my conscience, I am aware of what I call self 
because the things I do are done by myself. Undoubtedly, there is a common belief that 
there is such a thing as ‘self’ that persists throughout one’s life. This simply means there is 
something about a person’s feature or quality that survives from birth throughout childhood 
and adulthood until death.  It is true also that they are human beings like myself to whom 
it is vital for preserving my dignity as a morally responsible person. As such, I am aware 
and conscious of my actions. In other words, I am conscious of things I do and some things 
I want to do in order to avoid mistakes; and I reason or engage in a critical thinking before 
doing whatever I want to do. I think the same can be said of those people that Kant used as 
an example, especially the Negro slave. 
I think all humans have the right to life (their own life), to well-being and freedom. “If the 
intrinsic value of any person’s enjoyment of these goods is equal to that of any other, then 
all men do have an equal right – hence a human right to secure, obtain, or enjoy these 
goods” (Wasserstrom 2001: 186). Kant perceived the action of the Negro slave as irrational 
only because he was black. In this case can one say Kant turned a blind eye to the idea of 
suicide during his time? I think that he did not see that as irrational solely because it was 
an action committed by a white person. In the act of suicide, whether one is white or black 
there is a reason behind the action and that reason cannot been seen as irrational from the 
part of the viewer, because it is a rational decision from the point of the person that 
committed suicide. So, talking about reason in this case, the Negro that drowned himself 
engaged in a rigorous thinking before making his choice based on the self-evident reason 
of slavery. I suggest that this cannot be tagged or seen as lack of reason, because Kant only 
considered it that way based on his racial idea of reason. If Kant insisted on the irrationality, 
then I suggest that it would be irrational for any person, no matter the race, to comment 
suicide. Suicide is a premeditated decision or action and not a spontaneous decision or 
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action. A premeditated action involves reason, no matter the time of the action. I think 
therefore that Kant’s statement above, regardless of his idea of other races, indicates that 
we are all humans capable of reasoning, self-awareness, and knowing. 
Kant and Hume have inappropriate views of blacks. To have a mind is to think, and to think 
is to have a mind. Both of these go together. Surely all blacks have minds, hence are 
thinkers. Philosophy is basically a way of thinking, and Africans think. How will we regard 
the thoughts of the blacks if they are denied any philosophy or rationality? Even the black 
slaves in Europe would have had times when they contemplated on their situation and what 
ought to be done. Besides, in African tradition, there are proverbs, riddles, tales and other 
folk stories. Though many are not written, yet the oral ones express a great philosophical 
thought and system. Sayings such as “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu” (it is through others 
that one attains selfhood), express some deep value of the other. This can be seen in Sartre’s 
Ontology of Being. Hence, such value will drive people towards others and acting 
harmoniously. Such is surely a philosophy which can keep a society’s system in check. 
Moreover, we cannot doubt that which does not exists, and to have a doubt on whether 
there is an existence of something or not, it essentially means that that thing does exists 
and is a matter of discussion to know its depth and value. 
2.5. The Unconscious Racial Intention: Tempels’ misinterpretation of the 
Bantu Ontology and African philosophy 
As a Belgian missionary Placide Tempels worked among the Baluba people on the North 
Katanga province of the Congo (Deacon 2003: 99). In the course of his work, he discovered 
that “fellow Belgians who worked in various stations and held different positions in the 
colonial administration were mostly worried about the failure of civilisation to take hold 
on the Baluba” (Matolino 2011: 336). Because of this failure, Tempels decided to 
investigate what the possible cause of the failure could be “by presenting what he deemed 
to be a comprehensive study of the Baluba” (ibid). Just like Hume and Kant claimed to 
have investigated and comprehensively understood African people, Tempels also claimed 
to have done same with regards to the Baluba, but still could not avoid the idea of hasty 
generalization. According to Matolino, “Tempels did not just wish to limit his findings to 
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the Baluba. Instead, he generalized his findings to apply to all the Bantu, and justified it on 
the ground that other colonial administrators had confirmed with him that his articulation 
of Bantu philosophy resembled what they had observed but could not articulate” (2011: 
337). In other words, his investigation was influenced by the indoctrinated viewpoints and 
opinions of the colonialists (Deacon 2003: 100). 
Life and death, as Tempels had observed among both Christian Europeans and the Bantu, 
seemed to condition human behaviour universally. Even the evolues – the ‘civilized’ 
Christians among the Bantu - return to their old ways “because their ancestors left them 
their practical solutions to the great problems of life and death, of salvation and 
destruction” (Tempels 1965: 13). Now these ‘solutions,’ which are based on fidelity to 
magical interpretations of life and on magical practices, are as he argued, “conceptions 
which in the course of centuries have persisted and been embraced by entire peoples” 
(ibid). Tempels goes on to suggest that the only satisfactory explanation of this persistence 
is that these conceptions must be found within a body of logically coordinated and 
motivated thoughts, within a ‘Lore,’ since no behaviour can be universal or permanent 
through time “if it has not got at its base, a body of ideas, a logical system, a complete 
positive philosophy of the universe, of man, and of the things that surround him, of 
existence, of life, of death and of the life beyond” (Tempels 1965: 14). 
Having observed the frequent return by the so-called ‘civilised’ Bantu Christians to their 
old ways of behaviour, Tempels began to “postulate, seek and discover a logical system of 
human thought as the ultimate foundation of any logical and universal system of human 
behaviour,” since “no live code of behaviour is possible unless the meaning of life sensed” 
(Tempels 1965: 15). According to Tempels, anybody working among the Bantu needs to 
understand their ontology, because even their logic depends on it. Whoever understands 
this ontology penetrates into the ‘soul’ of the Bantu. The gulf dividing the blacks and whites 
will “remain and even widen for as long as we [whites] do not meet them in the wholesome 
aspirations of their ontology” (Tempels 1965: 16). According to Tempels, all aspects of 
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Bantu customs, including religion and magic,19 “lie on the unique principle, the recognition 
of the intimate nature of things, that is to say, on the principle of their ontology. For it is 
only this philosophical term that can best designate their knowledge of being and of the 
existence of things” (1965: 22–23). The entire system of Bantu thought based on this 
ontology is what Tempels calls ‘philosophy’ in his work, though he confesses not to be 
able to convince his reader – the missionaries and colonial administrators – “that a true 
philosophy can exist among the natives, and that there is sense in searching for it” (Tempels 
1965: 28). Thus, for Tempels, ontology is the focus of Bantu philosophy and this ontology 
is saturated by the vital force. 
Since Tempels was writing primarily for European readers, his exposition of Bantu 
Ontology was expressed in western philosophical terms to make it accessible to its intended 
readers. Thus it was done by the systematic exposition of a theory, often preceded by the 
analysis of those examples (expressions or behaviour of the Bantu) from which the theory 
emerged. But an undertaking already begs the question: can the Western methodology be 
applied successfully to African values without limiting the richness of those values?  
Tempels is no different from Locke, because his aim in systematically presenting ‘African 
philosophy’ was for the purpose of civilizing, Christianizing and raising the Bantu or 
African person to the Western mode of living. He sought only to understand the African 
way of life so as to present it to his European audience so that they can devise better ways 
of teaching and training the Africans. According to Hountondji, this clearly showed that 
Tempels’ Bantu “is not addressed to Africans but to the Europeans, and particularly to two 
categories of Europeans – colonials and missionaries…As usual, Africans are excluded 
from the discussion and Bantu philosophy is a mere pretext for learned disquisitions among 
Europeans” (1982: 34). 
To further elaborate on the above point, I argue Tempels started off on a wrong note, and 
then I build my argument using the standpoints of philosophers like Masolo (1994). Firstly, 
his objective of investigating the philosophy of the Bantu was biased, given that it aimed 
                                                          
19 Sometimes the use of these concepts reveals a grave misunderstanding of the religious beliefs and 
practices here in question. 
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to benefit his colleagues, the missionaries and colonialists that he philosophized about the 
Bantu and not for the interest of the latter (Masolo 1994: 46).  
Secondly, Tempels’ action of thinking for and about Bantu puts him as a colonialist. Close 
to this is his outright confession that his studies would serve as a guiding tool for the 
civilization of the ignorant people of Africa (Masolo 1994: 46). It is important to note then 
that the result of Tempels’ research, the Bantu Philosophy, is a colonial machinery, a tool 
which was to be used in the exploitation of the Bantu. Since no one philosophizes out of 
context but always within the world of his experience, Tempels’ project was marred by his 
own background. This is why Aimé Césaire condemns Tempels’ ideology when he 
explains that: “Bantu thought is ontological, the Bantu only ask for satisfaction of an 
ontological nature. Decent wages! Comfortable housing! Food! These Bantu are pure 
spirits, I tell you: “What they desire first of all and above all is not the improvement of 
their economic or material situation, but the white man’s recognition of and respect for 
their dignity as men, their full human value”” ( 1972: 38–39). As a Christian, he felt obliged 
to view the Bantus’ behavior with distrust. Their regard for their traditional model of life 
was seen as awkward; thus, his use of the verb ‘return’ to describe the christened African 
practice of their tradition ( Masolo 1994: 47). Besides, as a trained Western thinker with 
all that that entails, his model of philosophy was scientific and theoretical; so he could not 
feel comfortable regarding the African mode of thought as philosophic. 
Lastly, I will like to point out that it cannot be assumed that Tempels’ study of the way of 
life of the Bantu and the philosophy that arose from it is enough to suffice as African 
philosophy. Tempels “failed to articulate a philosophical system of the Bantu and rather 
presented a magical system of the Bantu that was supposed to offer evidence of how 
ridiculous Bantu thought is and hence, why the African should not be seen as an equal to 
the white person” (Matolino 2011: 339). Africa as it is known today is a heterogeneous 
continent; and often times, great differences exists even between tribes lying side-by-side. 
Tempels postulates that the primary metaphysical category of African people is synopsized 
around an unconscious ultimate value called “Vital Force” (Tempels 1959:30). By vital 
force, Tempels means a kind of strength and power that is proper to a being, and it is “the 
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invisible reality of everything that exists, but is supreme in man. And man can reinforce 
his vital force by mean of the forces of other beings of creation” (1965: 32). That is to say 
that every being has a certain unique force, strength and power for which it is known for. 
According to Tempels, anything that strengthens a person’s vital force is held in great 
esteem, while anything that vitiates the vital force of a person is highly prevented by 
magical recipes. The magical rites are aimed at activating or invoking the natural forces 
that are purportedly placed at the service of man by God to strengthen man’s vital energy 
since Africans live their entire life in seeking ways to live strongly or to revitalize their 
Force through magic. Tempels then, declares that African philosophy is a philosophy of 
magic. I contend that this is a misinterpretation of African philosophy. As I already 
specified above, it cannot be assumed that Tempels’ study of the way of life of the Bantu 
and the philosophy that arose from it serves enough to suffice as African philosophy. 
Matolino (2011: 340) better explains this when he averred that: 
Tempels’ attempt at explaining his newly invented notion of force points to his 
commitment to philosophical racialism. For a start, Tempels claims that force is pervasive. 
It is everywhere and it is in everything. It extends sideways, upwards, and downwards. But 
most importantly, this notion of force, unlike its Western counterpart, is not static but 
dynamic. In other words, it is practical as it seeks to be fulfilled in the manner that the 
individual muntu relates to the rest of her society. Since Tempels had categorized force as 
an equivalent to the notion of being, we can see that he intended to show that there was a 
huge difference between African and Western metaphysics. This difference is primarily to 
be found in the way that Western notions are capable of abstracting while the Bantu are 
innocuous when it comes to such an activity. 
This is the reason why Theophilus Okere rightly criticizes Tempels by maintaining that 
“the essence of force of Tempels’ revolution is thus the systematic substation of the word 
“force” wherever one formerly read “magic” or indeed wherever one formerly read “mana” 
in the theories of religion and magic formulated by the rationalist-evolutionist schools of 
ethnology” (Okere 1983: 5). Hence, his aim in systematically presenting ‘African 
philosophy’ was for the purpose of civilizing, Christianizing and raising the Bantu or 
African person to the Western mode of living. He seeks only to understand the African way 
of life so as to present it to his European audience so that they can devise better ways of 
teaching and training the Africans. 
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From the above, it is not surprising therefore that Tempels views‘magical’ practices as 
some sort of ‘corruption’ of the logically coherent Bantu ontology. These practices, to him, 
represent continual deviation through the passion of the quest for vital strengthening 
toward realities that are not life, or toward magical means of strengthening that are claimed 
to hold higher worth (Tempels 1959: 27–45). For Tempels, there are two modes of thought 
or system of rationality and two philosophical systems derivable from them: one Western, 
the other Bantu or Africa. The former is scientific and proper, the latter is prima facie 
intuitive, magical, and contradictory. But if we may ask, what yardstick is Tempels using 
to appraise the African mode of thought? The answer is obvious: Tempels is 
inappropriately and indiscriminately applying the Western logical construct and the 
Christian ideal. Thus he bedevils the Bantu ontology and depicts it as inferior vis-à-vis 
Christianity. 
From my observation, Tempels appears to classify Western metaphysics under 
experimental sciences, and the Bantu theory of forces with the improvable experience. For 
this reason, strange as it may be, Tempels characterizes Bantu ontology as a product of the 
imagination of the Bantu, a subjective idea which does not correspond at all to reality, and 
is unacceptable from the point of view of reason, objectivity, and scientificity of the real 
(1959: 56–60). But this begs the question: can African values be properly classified using 
the European standard or yardstick without inevitably leading to a procrustean bed or a 
strait jacket? It clearly appears as if Tempels is of the idea or suggestion that rationality is 
the culture of the whites. “Tempels’ work conceives the Bantu as incapable of abstract or 
rational thought, which makes them not quite as human as Belgians. As they are primarily 
interested in matters of primitive force, the idea of justice, human dignity, and equality 
would hardly apply to them” (Matolino 2011: 340). From the above, we can see that 
Tempels reaches this conclusion because he is still deeply stanch in the idea that there are 
different races. In other words, in his in-depth thoughtfulness, there are different races and 
each of these races has different essential characteristics that make them different from 
each other. Compared to his Belgian compatriots, the Bantu are inferior, and their 
ontological outlook is different and inferior to that of his Belgian contemporaries. Thus it 
is clear that Tempels cannot escape the tag of extrinsic or intrinsic racism. 
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It is important to underscore that the vital force poses a stumbling block for European 
rationalists since it shows that not everything that is real is reasonable. The vital force is 
not dependent on reason to justify its very existence. It certainly exists with or without the 
vindication of reason. The Westerners must realise that not everything that exist can be or 
needs to be proved. Most importantly, the truth of vital force is a truth that is felt and lived 
and not merely thought of. Tempels claims prima facie that, vital force is a figment of the 
African imagination, but this of course is because the Westerners have always used reason 
rather than intuition to understand these phenomena. The vital force essentially transcends 
reason and it is by nature symbolic and polyvalent. To claim that they are mere figments 
of African imagination is to make an unfounded and pseudo claim. Besides, we know that 
when people, that is, the Europeans are afraid of something, they tend to bedevil that thing. 
Tempels accentuates that in African ontology, the concept of Force is inextricably bound 
to the notion of being. Africans conceive the notion of being as that which has force; 
something energetic, active and animated as opposed to something inert and lifeless. It 
suffices to state that force is being and being is force. Outside the notion of force, being 
cannot be known (1959: 34). In this regard, Africans distinguish beings according to the 
vital force proper to their essence or nature (: 35). This is why he equates being with force 
(Being = force), just as we would analytically equate “animal + reason = man” (Masolo 
1994: 48). This force according to Tempels is as much the essence of a mouse, a tree, a 
cow or a human as it is of a stone, footprint, soil, or a piece of cloth. In short, the vital force 
saturates the life of the Bantu. 
Extrapolating from African behaviour and usage of language, Tempels asserts that the 
entire behavior of the African people is lived with a dominant and oriental desire to 
intensify one’s vital force; to live strongly, to acquire life, potency and power. He 
elucidates that in the African concept, the perfect possessor and source of force in every 
creature is God, the ‘Strong One’ (Tempels 1959: 31). Thus, God is the one that endows 
every being in the universe – divinities, humans, animals, plants, inanimate things etc – 
with a certain unique vital force that is distinctive and proper to its being. As founders of 
the human race and transmitters of the divine inheritance of vital human strength, the spirits 
of the first ancestors are deemed to possess some extraordinary force almost immediately 
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after God (ibid). The dead people are also adjudged to possess potent powers capable of 
making influence in the world. 
Tempels’ exposé may at time seem convincing or persuasive, but looked at more closely, 
it contains many hitches. The background of the author rather than the research, influenced, 
controlled, and to an extent distorted his conclusion. An important feature of Tempels’ 
involvement with the Bantu must be remembered. His ultimate objective in studying Bantu 
Religion, magic, mythology, and ontology is to understand the worldview for the purpose 
of deciding its compatibility with Christianity and Western philosophy. The ‘danger’ of 
the objective is that Tempels is too eager to find his Christian-European experience 
represented in a Bantu worldview. Hence “he concurs with the main claim of the naked 
version of philosophical racialism that the capacity to think is something that was ordained 
by nature and naturally denied the African” (Matolino 2011: 340). Thus, he defines 
philosophy in such a manner that the conditions for the very possibility of philosophy are 
European. 
Tempels enjoys the privilege of being among those that have produced written work on 
African Philosophy. La Philosophie Bantoue is the outcome of Tempels’ observation of 
the behavior and study of the language of the Bantu people, the Shaba Baluba of Zaire. His 
work has to its credit whole hosts of concepts such as the famous vital force in African 
philosophy. In this regard, Tempels must be credited for being among those that has 
provided our generation a written work on African philosophy. His book influenced at the 
continental level, the self-understanding and development of twentieth century history of 
African philosophy. If it is said that most philosophy in the West is a footnote to Plato, I 
dare to say that most contemporary African philosophy is a footnote to Tempels. This is 
justifiable if one is to consider the philosophical activities that came to light after his 
publication of Bantu Philosophy. To date, many African thinkers are still either reacting or 
responding to his thesis. Indubitably, the publication of Tempels’ book jolted many 
scholars out of their customary lethargy provoking endless, sporadic and polemic debate 
about whether or not there exists such an entity as could be legitimately called African 
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philosophy. These also aroused the interest of the negretude movement and the pan-African 
movement that will be discussed in the next chapter. 
2.6.   Conclusion 
The main aim of this chapter has been to present the direct, indirect and unconscious ideas 
of different modern philosophers on race. I started by taking us back to Descartes’ 
“Cogito,” where I indicated that despite being the seeming foundation of the idea of race 
and racism, Descartes did not engage discussions on these concepts Although his Jesuit 
Descartes avoidance of these concepts as presented in the chapter could be linked to the 
fact that he undertook the intellectual journey of knowing who he is. In my perspective, his 
reason for knowing himself resulted from and was informed by the happenings during his 
time. The chapter also discussed Hume’s empirical theory of knowledge, his concept of 
human mind, and his idea on race. Taking a different stance from Hume, I contended that 
he was wrong about his idea of European civilization. I also discussed Kant’s idea of human 
knowledge and his idea of race, where he used the example of the Negro slave from Guinea 
that drowned himself as he was being forced into slavery. Reflecting on this example, I 
argued that that the Negro or rather anyone in that Negro’s position must have had a reason 
for his/her action, thus the evidence of reason and self-awareness which can be found in all 
humans. In same light, I advanced a general critique of Hume’s and Kant’s ideas on 
intellectual capacity. .  As a final point, I also examined Tempels’ idea of force and showed 






3. The Works of the Nationalist Ideological Philosophers and the 
Existence of African Philosophy as an Indirect Response on Hume’s 
and Kant’s ideas about the Negroes/Blacks 
 
3.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I explained that nature has essentially yielded or produced different 
kinds of human beings – by race. Hume in his thinking argued that the same nature made 
some people to have high levels of mental capacities and others not to have. He used the 
Negro as an example of those that do not have mental capacity. Hume asserted in his 
renowned footnote that “I am apt to suspect the Negroes, and in general all the other species 
of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites.20 
There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any 
individual eminent either in action or speculation; no ingenious manufacturers amongst 
them, no arts, no sciences” (1882: 252).  
I also explained that “in Kant’s table of moral classifications, while the Americans are 
completely uneducable because they lack ‘affect and passion’, the Africans escaped such 
a malheur, but can only be ‘trained’ or ‘educated’ as slaves and servants” (Eze 2003: 438–
439).  Based on his view, the African deserves this kind of ‘training’ because he or she is 
lazy, prone to jealousy and hesitation (ibid). He further said that “the African is all these 
because, for climate and anthropological reasons, he or she lacks ‘true’ (rational and moral) 
character” (Kant 1978: 264, Eze 2003: 439). Kant further attributed the supposed grades 
of superiority and inferiority of race to the presence or absence of “talent.” Taking skin 
colour as evidence of a racial class, Kant maintained that “white skin, seems the only 
concrete, physical evidence of this racial superiority; skin colour reveals race as species, 
                                                          
20 “We should keep in mind, therefore, that when Hume says that some races are inferior to others, and the 
evidence for this is that the inferior ones lack the science and the arts, he is saying, in effect, that members 




class, and morally as “difference in Character”” (1785: 138). As such, skin colour for Kant, 
was a proof of rational superiority or inferiority. 
On the basis of the above, my intention in this chapter therefore, is to show that the works 
of nationalist-ideological philosophers and the existence of African philosophy are proofs 
that Africans are not irrational or inferior to the whites. Thus, I discuss the works of the 
nationalist- ideological philosophers, and the existence of African philosophy as an indirect 
response to Hume’s and Kant’s ideas of the Negros/blacks, as captured above. My focus 
on this trend of discussion is purposeful because the nationalist-ideological approach, its 
thoughts and writings actually help to untie Africans from the yolk of colonialism. The 
nationalist-ideological philosophers are the first to start this movement of change. This 
trend is a viable alternative because the philosophical ideology of these philosophers is an 
ardent call for all Africans to return to their values and shun everything that is foreign and 
dehumanizing. Their works proof that intellectual superiority and inferiority is something 
that varies among individuals. Some persons are more gifted intellectually than others, and 
this does not have to be due to one’s race of colour. Even among people of the same race, 
some display high ingenuity while others display less. And their philosophical ideas and 
contributions prove that “African philosophy can only be revived if and when the African 
society is truly free and independent” (Ocheng’-Odhiambo 2010: 150 – 151). 
 
My intention in the first section of this chapter is to briefly explain the idea of the 
nationalistic-ideological philosophy, and the reasons that inform the philosophy. In the 
sections that follow, I aim to discuss the nature of nationalistic-ideological philosophy, and 
their philosophical ideologies as a response to the existence of African philosophy. Some 
of their philosophical ideas are: Consciencism, Communalism, Humanism, Cultural Life, 
Negritude, Black Consciousness, and Pan-Africanism. In line with this, I would also 
critique the nationalistic-ideological philosophy, and conclude the chapter by reaffirming 
the existence of African philosophy, as an indirect response to Hume’s and Kant’s ideas 
that blacks are irrational and inferior to the whites. Against Kant’s idea that African “can 
only be ‘trained’ or ‘educated’ as slaves and servants,” I would argue that the philosophical 
pride that some African philosophers have acquired has falsified his ideas. Likewise, I shall 
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support the idea that African philosophy should be primarily concerned with the 
experience, culture and history of Africans with the aim of making sense of the people’s 
experience through critical and rigorous reflection. 
3.2. Nationalist-ideological Philosophy 
Nationalistic-ideological philosophy emanates from the ideologies of national liberation 
movements. It arose before the independent era in Africa and out of the conviction that 
political independence must be accompanied by “a true mental liberation” (Bodunrin 1991: 
64). Basically, it started off as a fight against colonial imperialistic ideologies in Africa. 
This philosophy “advocates mental liberation and a return to African humanism” 
(Hapanyengwi-Chemhuru 2013: 46). The conviction that informs this philosophy is that 
the European model and ideologies have failed in Africa. The nationalistic-ideological 
philosophy used a practical way to convey their ideas, a way that obviously shows that 
Africa was in need of economic, political, social and cultural transformation. Thus, it is not 
surprising to note that “Nkrumah was deeply convinced that Africa must rationalize the 
dominant intellectual strands in Africa’s historical experience and reinstate what was noble 
and everlasting in traditional African society” (Mbonjo 1998: 176). Nationalistic-
ideological philosophy is thus an attempt to deal with the problems of national and socialist 
revolutions or African revolution (Mbonjo 1998: 183). 
3.3. The Birth of Nationalistic Ideological Philosophy 
Nationalistic-ideological philosophy was born out of the struggle for liberation of Africans 
from colonialism. Colonialism, as Tsenay Serequeberhan explains, set the communist-
social structure of African societies on the path to ruins, suppressing the stable indigenous 
African societies; a situation that left Africans wallowing in miasma of confusion in trying 
to fit in the shoes of their colonizers (1991: 3). Thus, the rich and solid traditional African 
life and culture which was set on a strong structure was distorted, because of colonialism. 
Africans lost their identity at the expense of colonial powers. The aftermath of colonialism 
propagated pseudo-ideas such as the conception that traditional beliefs and social structures 
(culture and language) are flawed, hence, there is a need for ‘civilization.’ This created the 
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idea of Africans being inferior to the Europeans. Thus nationalistic ideological philosophy 
was necessitated by the ravages of colonialism and the need for Africans to liberate 
themselves politically, and decolonize their minds from pseudo-ideas like white supremacy 
and black inferiority. 
Upon realization of independence many African leaders embarked on a quest for solutions 
to contemporary problems in Africa. They saw a need to restructure the disfigured and 
distorted African society. Consequently, nationalistic-ideological philosophy is a reaction 
to the debased African socio-political system which was founded by colonial powers. It is 
a reaction against the Western capitalist systems, economic imperialism, Marxism and 
western socialism. Nationalistic-ideological philosophy set out in the quest to re-establish 
and restructure the African social context after colonialism. This trend, as Makumba 
avows, “coming from the African worldview, was understood by Africa’s pioneer 
ideologies to be a worthy response to what had become a dehumanizing and exploitative 
situation brought about by colonization” (2007: 135). 
Nationalistic-ideological philosophy is geared towards a unique African political system 
which not only decolonizes the African but also equips them with solutions to 
contemporary African problems. This political system is based on the traditional African 
socialism, humanism, familyhood and the existential situation in Africa (Coetzee & Roux 
1998: 96). The members of this trend include African leaders and statesmen such as 
Léopold Sédar Senghor (of Guinea), Kwame Nkrumah (from Ghana), Kenneth Kaunda 
(from Zambia) Julius Nyerere (from Tanzania), Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Mboya (from 
Kenya), among others. The trend is embodied in the various manifestos and political 
writings produced by these statesmen/leaders during the African liberation struggle. The 
philosophical foundation of this trend, as Makumba puts it, was “influenced by the political 
and social urgency of their environment” (2007: 134).  These social and political urgencies 
led these optimistic statesmen to formulate philosophical blueprints for the reconstruction 




3.4. The Nature of Nationalistic-ideological Philosophy 
Basically, Nationalistic-ideological philosophy is an attempt “to evolve a new and if 
possible, unique political theory based on traditional African socialism and familyhood 
which Nyerere calls ujamaa Njoroge” (1986: 96). Nationalistic-ideological philosophy can 
be referred to as a philosophy of transition, “a voice crying in the wilderness”, calling all 
Africans to consciousness of their own identity and personality (Makumba 1998: 150). It 
is a social synthesis of contemporary African reality and African social values. This social 
synthesis of Nationalistic-ideological philosophy is geared towards political, economic, 
social, religious and cultural situations of pre and post – independent era. Nationalistic 
Ideological Philosophy according to Serequeberhan consists of the “manifestos, the 
pamphlets and political works produced by the liberation struggle” (1991: 20). It 
encompasses the whole gamut of national liberation literatures and the African anti-
colonial struggles which pan-Africanism is inclusive. As a result, the literature that has 
been produced in this time constitutes the basis of “an African philosophical discourse on 
politics” (ibid). In other words, “the political and philosophic output of the African anti-
colonial struggle as a whole has to be understood as the originative grounding that is 
presupposed by contemporary African intellectual works as such” (ibid). 
The role of nationalistic-ideological philosophy is that of “assuming a leading position in 
the questions of the best options befitting Africa’s divergent conditions of social and 
political organization and re-examination and re-appraisal of traditional culture in the hope 
of identifying and preserving what is useful and worth developing from what is obsolete 
and fit for dustbin” (Njoroge 1986: 96). According to the proponents of this trend, there is 
a necessary connection between theory and practice, which is praxis; in a nutshell, it means 
a unification of theory and action. These philosophers of pre and post-independent era saw 
that theory alone could not solve the problems of Africa, thus, the need to device a 
pragmatic way of salvaging the African problems. From the foregoing, it is obvious that 
these philosophers aimed at radical transformation of political, economic, social and 
cultural aberrations in African sequel to the impact of colonialism. It aimed at decolonizing 
the minds of Africans so that they can reassert themselves in the world. According to 
Mbonjo (1998: 183), the hallmark of nationalistic- ideological philosophy is their ardent 
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zeal and clarion call for all Africans to return to their values and shun everything Western 
that is not in conformity with this noble goal. Njoroge (1986: 88) further asserts that the 
nationalistic-ideological philosophy could also be called “political philosophy.”  
3.5. The Philosophical Ideologies of the Nationalist Ideological Philosophers 
What these African political thinkers have developed and offered to Africans are ideas such 
as consciencism, communalism, familyhood, negritude, humanism, nationhood, 
unification, socialism and Pan-Africanism.  
3.5.1. Consciencism 
Consciencism as presented by Nkrumah is the philosophy of the African revolution which 
upholds the ideology of socialism and the redemption of African humanist society of the 
past (Mbonjo 1998: 177).  Nkrumah defined Consciencism as: 
The map in intellectual terms of the disposition of forces which will enable African society 
to digest Western and Islamic and the Euro-Christian elements in Africa, and develop them 
in such a way that they fit into the African personality. The African personality is itself 
defined as the cluster of humanist principles which underlie the traditional African society.  
Philosophical Consciencism is that philosophical standpoint which, taking its start from 
the present content of the African conscience indicates the way in which progress is forged 
out of the conflict in that conscience (1970: 79). 
Consciencism is both revolutionary and evolutionary. Consciencism on the hand is 
revolutionary when it deals with colonialism and capitalism. On the other hand, it is 
evolutionary when it is “considered in relation to the traditional African society whose 
guiding principles of egalitarianism and the concern of all for each, seeks to reassert and 
enthrone and regard as fundamental to any society or social order” (Mbonjo 1998: 177). In 
other words, there are two main values found in the traditional African society which need 
to be guided or taken care of by the philosophical consciencism. The first is the idea of 
egalitarianism that all of us belong to the same species without discrimination of sex or of 
race. The second is that each person is responsible for the other as long as we live in a 
community. Consciencism has as starting point the idea that in every society, there is a 
kind of explicit or implicit ideology that defines a social cohesion towards a desirable 
society (ibid: 178). Hence consciencism is meant to theoretically guide the ideology of 
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socialism in Africa. In his own words, Nkrumah affirms that “philosophical consciencism 
builds itself by becoming a reflection of the objectivity, in conceptual terms, of the 
unfolding of matter” (ibid: 179). This leads us to the ethical perspective of the notion of 
philosophical consciencism. It has already been said that the ideology of socialism 
emphasizes on egalitarianism which derives directly from materialism (ibid: 180). Hence 
it follows according to philosophical consciencism that “each man must be treated as an 
end in himself and not just as a tool or a means to an end” (ibid: 180). In this respect, 
Nkrumah writes: “The cardinal ethical principle of philosophical consciencism is to treat 
each man as an end in himself and not merely as a means. This is fundamental to all 
socialist or humanist conception of man” (quoted in Mbonjo 1998: 180). Thus for 
Nkrumah, philosophical consciencism will serve as the solid theoretical foundation on 
which a truly unifying ideology for all Africa can be built (ibid: 182).  
Thus understood, consciencism could not and cannot accommodate colonialism. Reason 
being that colonialism is “a doctrine of exploitation and a doctrine of alienating” (Mbonjo 
1998: 21). This implies that colonialism is a means by which the colonial power secures 
material advantages for her own economic development. It is considered as a crude form 
of imperialism, which is the “policy that aims at creating, organizing and maintaining an 
empire” (ibid: 22). As a result, our African political thinkers reject colonialism as well as 
the idea that it is to bring civilization to a people or to prepare them for self-rule. In the 
Casablanca Conference of January 7 1961, Nkrumah delivered a speech – part of it reading 
thus:  
For my part, I must say that as long as I live, and as long as any little vestige of colonialism 
and imperialism remains in Africa, I shall prosecute a ruthless war on these monsters, a 
war in which there shall be no truce. Colonialism and imperialism have no honour, no 
shame, no morals and conscience. The devastation which they have brought in Africa is 
without parallel anywhere in the history of the world, but now Africans have arrived on 
the scene. We have arrested their progress and are determined to give them battle with all 
the forces of our command until we have achieved the total liberation of the African 
continent and have built a strong Union of African states. As I have always stated, and as 
I will continue to proclaim, I can see no security for African states unless African leaders 
like ourselves have realized beyond all doubts that salvation for Africa lies in Unity 




African traditional worldview encompasses “an attitude towards the human person, which 
can only be described in its social manifestation as being socialist” (Makumba 2007:139). 
Hence, African communalism was considered the ‘socio-political ancestor of socialism’ 
(ibid). This is what Julius Nyerere calls Ujamaa, meaning familyhood.  A family according 
to Nyerere embraces the whole human society. So it is “the foundation and the objective 
of African socialism... the true African socialist system regards all men as his brethren – 
as members of his ever-extending family” (ibid: 140). This idea of African socialism is 
opposed both to capitalism and Marxist socialism. In fact, capitalism “seeks happiness 
through the exploitation of one person by another, and Marxist socialism seeks happiness 
through conflict between persons” (ibid: 140). Conversely, African socialism rooted in 
African communalism is “an attitude of the mind” (ibid: 140). Its foundation lies in the 
principle of human equality which “has to be applied to the different sectors of society; 
namely economic, social and political” (ibid: 141); and based on love and sharing. 
3.5.3. Humanism 
In the same line as Julius Nyerere’s ideas, Kenneth Kaunda calls this attitude African 
Humanism. For him, it is because Africa is human-centred and that ideology conquered 
colonialism (Makumba 2007: 143). Central to Kaunda’s humanist claim is that humanism 
is rooted in human person in relation with God. As a result, African Humanism is closely 
related to Christian anthropology, where the human person is ‘truly self only before God 
and that the spiritual dimension is an integral part of the human personality’ (ibid). 
Humanism, as it is with the role of any society, seeks to uphold and protect the dignity of 
the human person. It is a form of socialism that is based on political, social, cultural and 
economic aspects of the life of a human person and geared towards the improvement of the 
human life. Kaunda saw a connection with Christianity and he advocated religious beliefs 
as fitting complements to traditional African society. Humanism was a tool to break away 
from the colonial heritage and to develop and reconstruct an African identity. 
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3.5.4. Cultural Life 
Amilcar Cabral sees cultural life as an element of resistance to foreign domination (Wolfers 
1979: 141). For him, there is a dependant and reciprocal connection between the cultural 
factor and the economic and political factor in the behaviours of human societies. “In fact, 
at every moment of the life of a society, culture is the result, with more or less awakened 
consciousness of economic and political activities, the more or less dynamic expression of 
the type of relations prevailing within that society” (ibid). Again, there is a characteristic 
common to every kind of imperialist domination, which is “the denial of the historical 
process of the dominated people by means of violent usurpation of the freedom of the 
process of development of the productive forces” (ibid). In this regard, who knows what 
would have been the technological and economic development from the different African 
cultures if they were not destroyed? The point is that according to Cabral, “culture is 
simultaneously the fruit of a people’s history and a determinant of history by the positive 
or negative influence it exerts on the evolution of relations between man and his 
environment and among men or human groups within a society, as well as between 
different societies” (ibid). 
3.5.5. Negritude 
In the Francophone case, the story has often been told, and the centrality of the race of 
Negritude cannot be ignored. Negritude was one of the first anti-colonial moments 
concerned precisely with the idea of race in Africa. Central to the concept of negritude is, 
“the idea of suffering through servitude either directly through slavery or indirectly 
through colonization” (Wolfers 1979: 27). Césaire and Senghor both experienced the 
sufferings of racial segregation as young students. Hence, for them, there was a need for 
awakening the black person as a process of converting the victims into consciousness of 
reshaping their destiny. Aimé Césaire coined the word “negritude”, and his idea of 
negritude basically originated in history, a history of bitterness and discomfort. Thus, 
“Negritude emerged as a concept with different resonances in, and applicable to different 
contexts. Yet, the revaluation of blackness and of the pan-African experience constituted 
a denominator common to all its variants” (Berktay 2010: 206–207). Césaire therefore 
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defines negritude as “the sum of the cultural values of the black world as expressed in the 
life, the institutions, and the works of black men; the sum of the values of the civilization 
of the black world” (Wolfers 1979: 44). Léopold Sédar Senghor (2001) in his work 
“Negritude and Modernity or Negritude as a Humanism for the Twentieth Century” 
explains Negritude as a “philosophy that postulates a cultural actions adapted to the 
spiritual and sociological conditions of the black man” (quoted in Wolfers 1979: 144). He 
further explains that Negritude has a double meaning: “subjective and objective, particular 
and universal, topical and eternal” (Senghor 2001: 144). “Objectively, as a civilization, 
Negritude is the totality of values; not only those of the peoples of black African, but also 
of the black minorities of America, or even of Asia or the South Sea Islands…Subjectively, 
Negritude is a will to take on the values of the black world, to live them oneself, after 
having impregnated and actualized them, but also to make them live in and through others” 
(Senghor 2001: 144). 
According to Wolfers (1979: 45), “the supreme value of black African civilization is life 
forces”. African values simply show that blood bonds are of great significance because of 
vital realities, but not just because of race. Senghor holds that “the family in Africa 
encompasses all persons descending from a common ancestor who is responsible for the 
flame of life transmitted to his descendants” (Wolfers 1979: 48). As a result, negritude is 
all about pointing out the African values and their authenticity. For instance, Senghor 
stipulates that:  
Black man’s emotivity is due neither to inherently superior sensory faculties nor to 
inherently inferior rational faculties, but to a particular attitude toward the external world 
and its apparent complexity. Essentially positive and dynamic, this attitude is a direct result 
of the notion of life force and its intensification and the tendency to relate to the external 
world as to a network of interacting forces (1979: 75). 
It is important to underscore that Senghor may have been disingenuous, but he is not at all 
innocent of the ongoing modern racial battles “over the meaning of reason and humanity 
when he notoriously defended a thesis that, on the surface, is unsurpassably droll: 
“Emotion is Negro, and reason Greek”” (Eze 2001: 41). According to Eze, it is as if 
Senghor said, “well, you keep your Reason; we have our Emotion. Besides, our Emotion 
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is superior to your Reason” (ibid). Nevertheless, Senghor’s theoretical work illustrates how 
race plays itself in modern discourse. 
3.5.6. Black Consciousness 
Steve Biko says that “the basic tenet of black consciousness is that the black man must 
reject all value systems that seek to make him foreign in the country of his birth and reduce 
his basic human dignity” (Boddy-Evans 2010). What Biko was trying to do, was to bring 
to the awareness of the African masses the injustice wrought on him by the apartheid era. 
His main point was that African should seek to reject injustice and recognise her value, 
and Africans should stop feeling inferior in their own home. In other words, he insisted on 
a sense of superiority instead of inferiority amongst blacks. According to Biko, the white 
people “must be made to realise that they are only human, not superior, and this goes same 
for the blacks. They must be made to realise that they are also humans, not inferiors” 
(quoted in Boddy-Evans 2010). What Biko was saying is that the white masses who 
colonized and forced apartheid on the black masses should not treat blacks as their 
inferiors. His idea was built on the knowledge that the white masses are not better than the 
blacks, in fact, all people are equal and should be treated as such. Biko further said that by 
merely “describing yourself as black you have started on a road towards emancipation, 
you have committed yourself to fight  against all forces that seek to use your blackness as 
a stamp that marks you out as a subservient being” (Bobby-Evans 2010). Thus, it is the 
responsibility of the blacks to fight against oppress. 
3.5.7. Pan-Africanism 
According to Appiah:  
For the generation that theorized the decolonization of Africa, then, “race” was a central 
organizing principle. And, since these Africans largely inherited their conception of “race” 
form their New precursors, we shall understand Pan-Africanism’s profound entanglement 
with that conception best if we look first at how it is handled in the work of the African-
American intellectuals who forged the links between race and Pan-Africanism (1992: 
10). 
The idea of African unity that these African political thinkers were all emphasizing and 
advocating is mainly expressed in the movement of pan-Africanism. The latter has as basic 
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premise that  “the people of Africa and African descent throughout the globe constitute a 
common cultural and political community by virtue of their origin in Africa and their 
common racial, social and economic oppression” (Mbonjo 1998: 121). Furthermore, pan-
Africanism holds that in order to bring about effective action for the liberation and 
development of Africa, a political, economic and cultural unity is necessary (ibid). Thus 
defined, pan-Africanism started to develop in the nineteenth century when the countries 
like Liberia and Sierra Leone were formed to “create a homeland in Africa for American 
Slaves and return them gradually” (ibid: 123). However, the expression “pan-Africanism” 
came into use with Henry Sylvester Williams from Trinidad and William Edward 
Burghardt Du Bois of the United States (ibid: 125). The essential elements of pan-
Africanism were “national self-determination, individual freedom and democratic 
socialism” (ibid: 126). It is in this sense that one can say that African unity “can only 
become a reality when national self-interest and continent-wide unity come together” 
(Makumba 2007: 147). 
3.6. African Philosophy and Philosophical Pride: The Existence of African 
Philosophy as an Indirect Response on Hume’s and Kant’s ideas about 
the Negroes/Blacks 
The philosophical writings of the nationalistic ideological philosophers and some modern 
African intellectuals were as a result of the intellectual racial discrimination and anti-
African prejudices in the works of some European thinkers like Hume and Kant. The works 
of some nationalistic ideological philosophers helped tremendously to proof that Africans 
are capable of intellectual exercise. Thus this section seeks to reaffirm the existence of 
African philosophy and to show that many works of Africans or African philosophers have 
been done just to express their divergent perspectives from that of the west, and to show 
that they are intellectually capable to engage in the discourse. 
The term “Africa”, while generally taken to refer to a particular geographical area located 
at the South Pole, has been bedevilled by different ill-conceptions. Terms like ‘the land of 
Darkness’, ‘the dead end’, ‘the cold-less’ or ‘sunny land’ have been used to describe the 
continent. As Mogobe B. Ramose (2002) noted, these derogatory expressions by some 
67 
 
anthropologists point to the fact that the history of Africa is mainly the history of West 
European experience of “Africa” and only incidentally is it the story of the peoples of the 
continent about themselves. By implication, all that arises from Africa is thought to be 
barbaric and unworthy of being counted among the credence of human achievement. To 
this end, the likes of Hume and Kant would categorize Africans as irrational beings who 
are unable to engage in critical reflection upon their own experience. This thought of 
African backwardness further drove Europeans, albeit their greed for her wealth, to invade 
the continent with the aim of civilizing the Africans. From this backdrop, the existence of 
African philosophy is denied. The above also imprints in Kant’s and Hume’s mind their 
fallacious views of blacks.  
If African philosophy does exist, which I take to be true, its nature is what constitutes our 
concern in this work. Etymologically, philosophy is the love of wisdom. It is an art of 
critical reflection upon lived experience. Taken as such, African philosophy ought to seek 
to reflect critically upon the lived experience of the people. So, when we talk about African 
philosophy, we are talking about works that relate to Africa. It can be philosophical works 
from Africans that contribute to one’s understanding of Africa and Africans, based on the 
person’s experience of African culture.  Hountondji defines ‘African philosophy’ as “a set 
of texts, specifically a set of texts written by Africans themselves and described as 
philosophical by their authors themselves” (1983: 33). This is to show that he actually 
affirms and acknowledges the existence of African philosophy. One thing to note from this 
is the contextual specificity of African philosophy. This is necessary taking into 
consideration that African philosophy has for long been silenced by the West. In response, 
Africa must speak up for herself and about herself. This is crucial because of the need to 
divest Africa and her mode of thought of any undue colonial influence. As Wiredu aptly 
noted, this task must be carefully carried out with a double critical stand towards both what 
is Western and African (1984). African philosophers must not shy aware from taking a 
critical stand towards elements within their cultural worldview that is inimical to rational 
thought, nor should they accept as axiomatic any conceptual work from the West. On the 
contrary, both traditions can offer philosophers materials upon which they can conduct 
their reflection. Thus, against Hountondji’s assumed definition, I want to argue that African 
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philosophy is the written and unwritten/oral reflection of thinkers based on the ways in 
which African people of the past and the present critically make sense of their existence, 
heritage, religion, customs, their tradition and culture, and the world they live in. 
As a reminder, we should note that the contextual specificity spoken of earlier should not 
be taken to be a report of cultural or communal worldview of a community within Africa. 
This is what Oruka calls ethnophilosophy (2003). In the face of criticisms from outside 
Africa, African philosophy must out-grow collective worldview. Philosophy is primarily 
about independent thought of persons about phenomena of their experience. However, the 
works of this trend of philosophy can be useful to professional philosophers as a material 
for reflection. More importantly, contextual specificity should take into consideration, the 
diversity of African cultures; as it is sometimes said: ‘there is not one Africa but many’. In 
this light, Wiredu makes a point by alluding that African philosophy “have to be intensive 
studies of those elements of culture that play significant roles in the constitution of 
meanings in the various African world views” (1996: 159). This is a call for particularistic 
studies that avoid hasty generalization. 
To this end, one may object that this culture of specificity can hamper intra-African and 
international philosophical dialogue. This objection needs not concern us given that a 
particularistic study done in a culture that interprets the language of that culture can spur a 
similar project in another. This would throw light on concepts with which communication 
can be carried out. After all, dialogue presupposes understanding of differences as well as 
similarities. “If we understand “philosophy” as the tradition to which Plato and Aristotle, 
Descartes and Hume, Kant and Hegel belong, then at least the following concepts are 
bound to be regarded as central to that canon: beauty, being, causation, evil, God, gods, 
good, illusion, justice, knowledge, life, meaning, mind, person, reality, reason, right, truth, 
understanding, and wrong.” As such, we will understand that both Western and African 
philosophers have engaged themselves in an ongoing task on these concepts, based on their 
own views and understandings, in search of similarities and differences (Appiah 1992: 86 
– 87). No doubt, that not all cultures have the above concepts, but any philosopher talking 
or discussing about any of these concepts, engage with it in contrast and in connection to 
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his/her own culture. According to Eze (1998: 217) therefore, “the idea of ‘African 
philosophy’ as a field of inquiry has its contemporary roots in the effort of African thinkers 
to combat political and economic exploitations, and to examine, question, and contest 
identities imposed upon them by the Europeans” (ibid). 
The arrival of the colonizers in Africa marked the interchange of modernity and tradition. 
It is in light of this interchange that I would like to applaud ethnophilosophy for acting as 
a backdrop to subsequent philosophical undertakings which were in support of either 
redefining or redeeming the African self-concept and ultimately human nature. The 
exchange of ideas and reasoning can be seen as a part of this interchange; an interchange 
of ideas and reasoning. I think it is a philosophical pride21 that African philosophers should 
really appreciate. Western education has happened in a way that actually warranted a 
proper communication of African philosophy to the world. The inquiring into the 
‘philosophicality’ of African philosophy is ipso facto the inquiry of the validity of 
philosophy in ‘cultures devoid of reason’. D. A Masolo appreciated the exchange of ideas 
and the role of reasoning by stating: 
The birth of the debate on African philosophy is historically associated with two 
happenings: Western discourse on Africa and the African response to it… At the centre of 
this debate is the concept of reason, a value which is believed to stand as the great divide 
between the civilized and the uncivilized, the logical and the mystical… To a large extent, 
the debate about African philosophy can be summarized as a significant contribution to 
the discussion and definition of reason… (1994: 1). 
Even if many people are still living with the belief that “Europeans had not invented 
African studies, Africans would have had to invent it” (Owomoyela 1987: 92), I believe 
that Africans cannot help but acknowledge the knowledge that they actually tapped from 
the European language and training which enables them to educate Europeans more about 
African tradition. Appiah affirms this when he writes: 
The training of African university philosophers has been in the traditions of the West, we 
may begin–here as elsewhere in the characterization of African intellectual life–by relating 
the situation of the contemporary African intellectual to the cultures of their former 
                                                          
21 Pride in this context means a deep sense or feelings of pleasure or satisfaction derived from one’s 
achievement, particularly a quality or skill. In this case, Africa philosophers cannot deny the fact that they 
are proud of what they have learnt and achieved from the Western philosophers. 
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colonizers. Provided we keep open minds, that need not blind us to the way that philosophy 
in Africa grows also out of her own indigenous traditions (1992: 86). 
Therefore, theAfrican way of philosophizing is a reflection of African tradition, her 
existential experience and her knowledge of what she has acquired from the Westerners. 
As Appiah puts it, “there is, then, in every culture a folk philosophy, and implicit in that 
folk philosophy are all (or many) of the concepts that academic philosophers have made 
central to their study in the West” (1992: 87). 
3.7. How is the Nationalistic-ideological Philosophy and the Existence of 
African Philosophy an Indirect Response to Hume’s and Kant’s Ideas 
about the Negroes/Blacks? 
According to Mogobe B. Ramose (2003: 3), “the struggle for reason – who is and who is 
not a rational animal – is the foundation of racism”. David Hume and Kant are good 
examples of the above statement. Hume believed that “some races have high levels of 
mental capacities and that others do not” (2002: 66). Kant believed that “white skin, it 
seems, is the only concrete, physical evidence of this racial superiority skin colour…” 
(1785: 138). As such, skin colour for Kant is proof of rational superiority or inferiority. 
From their ideas, it is quite clear that race is a real issue that affects Africans in various 
ways. We cannot doubt the fact that it is because of the issue of race that “African 
Philosophy labours under this yet-to-end exploitation and denigration of African 
humanity. This philosophy as argued by Eze (1998: 219) “challenges the long-standing 
exclusion as the negative “other” of reason and of the western world in the major traditions 
of modern Western philosophy”.. 
As I explained in my first chapter, the philosophical writings of some modern philosophers 
like, Hume, Kant and Hegel, aroused psychological defensiveness by most modern African 
intellectuals when they come across intellectual racial discrimination and anti-African 
prejudices in the works of some Europeans thinkers. Appiah, for example, relates that “Few 
contemporary readers are likely to be undisturbed when they discover the moments when 
Africa is banished from Hegel’s supposedly universal history and when David Hume 
declares in the essay on ‘National Characters’ that blacks are incapable of eminence in 
action or speculation” (1997: 400). This also includes Kant’s classification or hierarchical 
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chart on the different “races.” Appiah’s statement, the idea of race, and other colonial and 
neo-colonial exploitation and degradation of African humanity reawakens the existence of 
African philosophy. Following this view, nationalistic-ideological philosophy and trends 
of African philosophy can be conceived as an indirect response to Hume and Kant. To 
emphasize this point, I affirm that the nationalistic-ideological philosophy has 
tremendously helped in the restoration of Africa pride. The writings of the philosophers in 
this trend are visible examples which encompass the whole gamut of African values in her 
political, economic, and cultural values. They disentangled African society “from its yolk 
of colonialism, and then reverted to former cardinal principles of traditional African” 
(Ochieng’-Odhiambo 2010: 151). 
Kant explains that Africans “can only be ‘trained’ or ‘educated’ as slaves and servants”. 
Against this idea, the nationalist-ideological philosophers and other African 
philosophers/scholars proof that they can assimilate European culture and lifestyle, 
through education. The Europeans were ignorant of the existence of African philosophy, 
due to the language problems and barriers. By educating the Africans to better understand 
their language, the Europeans unconsciously paved the way for them to better understand 
African philosophy. Many are still ignorant of this fact, because the idea of educating 
blacks was for easy communication and exploitation. Unknown to many, European 
education was a means for Africans to educate the Europeans with their philosophy 
(African Philosophy). Eze confirmed this when he said that “we know that the earliest 
Africans in America and Europe were largely forcefully brought there through slavery, and 
that the succeeding generation who came after the abolition of slave trade came largely to 
learn the ways of the West in preparation for the revolutions that would crystallize in 
constitutional de-colonization (Kwame Nkrumah, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Senghor etc.)” (1998: 
219). It was as a result of the Europeans misinterpretation of her culture, ideas and way of 
life that the nationalist-ideological philosophers reinforced their ideas so that the 
Europeans can better understand their philosophy. Following this views, the existence of 
African philosophy can also considered as an indirect response to Hume and Kant. To 
emphasize this point, Eze states that: 
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African philosophy as a field of inquiry thus has its contemporary roots in the effort of 
African thinkers to combat political and economic exploitations, and to examine, question, 
and contest ideaties imposed upon them by Europeans. The claims and counter-claims, 
justifications and alienations that characterize such historical conceptual protests and 
contestations indelibly mark the discipline of African philosophy (2001: 217). 
Against Hume’s and Kant’s ideas that Africans are inferior to the whites, and are irrational 
beings who are unable to engage in critical reflection upon their own existence, I present 
that in this case the nationalist-ideological philosophers have employed their mental and 
rational capacities to address and articulate issues concerning Africans. This is no different 
from what the Europeans or modern Western philosophers have done. All human being, 
as rational animals, are endowed with these capacities and all societies are confronted by 
these ultimate questions. Since we apply reason in all that we do, reasoning does not belong 
to anyone, it is part of nature. 
Léopold Sédar Senghor’s theoretical work “advocated some kind of symbiosis within the 
African context, for some dominant suppositions within both the West and Africa 
contexts” (Ochieng’-Odhiambo 2010: 151). Senghor stipulated that “Black man’s 
emotivity is due neither to inherently superior sensory faculties nor to inherently inferior 
rational faculties, but to a particular attitude toward the external world and its apparent 
complexity. Essentially positive and dynamic, this attitude is a direct result of the notion 
of life force and its intensification, and the tendency to relate to the external world as to a 
network of interacting forces” (Senghor quoted in Wolfers 1979: 75). The above explains 
his idea on the meaning of reason and humanity. The above reaction from Senghor is 
simply an example that better describes and informs us on how the concept of race has 
affected some Africans. It explicitly shows Africans’ awareness of racial consciousness 
and their intellectual urge to defend it without the fore-knowledge of them being racist at 
the same time. In effect, this was what the works and writings of the Nationalistic-
ideological philosophers actually defended. 
Against Hume’s and Kant’s misunderstanding of Africans, I recap what I had articulated 
in my previous chapters (chapter one and two). The conceptual transformations that have 
been happening through the centuries, in both Africa and Europe, attest to the fact that our 
articulation of reality is a highly contested terrain. I consider as “Philosophy” all discourses 
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or texts that represent an attempt by individuals to employ their rational capacities to 
address, articulate and resolve the ultimate question of life. An unmistakeable feature of 
the African continent is its cultural and ideological plurality. We cannot subscribe to any 
essentialist notion of African thought, except that as members of human race living on the 
African continent, we can all account for an innate capacity to employ our mental and 
rational capacities. I believe that there are some ultimate questions which have been 
accorded greater emphasis in African and those that needs more emphasis, depending on 
the particular era of African history. The concept of race is one of these questions. The 
arrival of the colonizers in Africa marked the interchange of modernity and tradition. Out 
of this contentious union there is some ultimate questions, one of which is the underlying 
concern of the concept or race and African identities. It is to these regards that Chinua 
Achebe said: 
It is, of course true that the African identity is still in the making. There isn’t a final identity 
that is African. But, at the same time, there is an identity coming into existence. And it has 
a certain context and a certain meaning. Because if somebody meets me, say, in a shop in 
Cambridge, he says “Are you from Africa?” Which means that African means something 
to some people. Each of these tags a meaning, and a penalty and a responsibility (quoted 
in Appiah 1992: 173).22 
According to Appiah, “meaning is not always one we can be happy with, and identity is 
one we must continue to reshape. Thinking about how we are to reshape identity, we should 
do well to remember that the African identity is, for its bearer’s only one among many” 
(1992: 177). Masolo also gives a better explanation of African identity using the word 
“return” in Aimé Césaire’s book. According to Masolo, the word “return,” which appears 
in the title of Aimé Césaire Poem – Return to My Native Land – is a term “which 
symbolizes many aspects of the struggle of the peoples of African origin to control their 
own identity… a symbolic call to all black people to rally together around the idea of 
common origin and in a struggle to defend that unifying commonality… – a uniting idea 
of common origin for all black peoples” (1994: 2). This commonality became their identity 
tag and a language that expresses Africans unification. This is exactly what the 
                                                          
22 Achebe, Interview. 
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nationalistic-ideological philosophers and the existence of African philosophy has actually 
shown. 
3.8. Conclusion 
As a response to Hume’s and Kant’s ideas of the Negros/blacks, this chapter showed that 
the works of nationalist-ideological philosophers and the existence of African philosophy 
is a proof that Africans are not irrational or inferior to the whites. The chapter in summary 
explained the nationalist-ideological philosophy, capitalizing on the rationale that their 
works actually helped to untie African from the yolk of colonialism. The chapter further 
drew attention to the fact that the Nationalist-ideological philosophers are the ones that 
started movement of change. This trend became the viable alternative because the 
philosophical ideology of these philosophers constitutes an ardent call for all Africans to 
return to their values and shun everything that is foreign and dehumanizing. Furthermore, 
I probed the reasons behind nationalistic-ideological philosophy and also discussed its 
nature, as well as the philosophical ideologies of the proponents.In the chapter, I also 
argued that the philosophical pride that some African philosophers have acquired has 
counteracted Hume’s and Kant’s ideas that blacks are irrational and inferior to the whites. 
In reaffirming the existence of African philosophy, I elucidated that African philosophy 
should be primarily concerned with the experience, culture and history of Africans with 
the aim of making sense of the people’s experience through critical and rigorous reflection. 
Likewise, I discussed the philosophical pride that African philosophy has acquired, and 
concluded that the nationalistic-ideological philosophy and the existence of African 





4. Answering the Question: Can we Transcend or Go Beyond the 
Concept of Race? 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In recent years, philosophers have devoted their time to the discourse of race and to 
understanding the ascription of race. These philosophers have paid increasing attention to 
the idea and the normative question of whether race should be conserved or eliminated.  
Conservationists such as W. E. B. Du Bios, Lucius Outlaw, Paul Taylor and Ron 
Sundstrom argue that race is indeed very real and should be conserved, because race talk 
is very necessary. Du Bois argues that the common history, experiences, traditions and 
impulses, and common blood and language need to be preserved or conserved. This is 
because they are part of the Negro identity and Negroes can only contribute to civilization 
and humanity if and only if they keep all the above in mind. For Outlaw, the notion of race 
ought not to be eliminated but to be conserved, because the existence of racial groups plays 
a big role in our social life. He further claims that “for most of us, the knowledge that there 
are different races of people is one of the most obvious features of our social worlds” (1990: 
58). 
Eliminativists such as Kwame Anthony Appiah, Naomi Zack, Lawrence Blum and Ashley 
Montagu argue that race does not exist and that it is an illusion. Appiah’s argument in 
defense of the concept of race lies on his idea that race is an illusion and that the concept 
of race cannot do anything for us. Furthermore, he alludes that the biological idea of race 
is of limited use because what biologists seem to suggest about genetic idea of race is 
different from the historical theory of evolution.  Naomi Zack argues that “Essences, 
geography, phenotypes, genotypes, and genealogy are the only known candidates for 
physical scientific bases of race. Each fails. Therefore, there is no physical scientific basis 
for the social racial taxonomy” (Zack 2002: 88). What the above means is that the “ordinary 
concept of race has no scientific basis” (Zack 1993: 18). 
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Like the above philosophers, Eze’s (2002) work in Achieving our Humanity edges close to 
being a work of racial prognosis. However, more than this, Eze took a step forward by 
investigating Western and African philosophy alike for racial biases obtained from society. 
Eze argues that race is not essential to understanding and defining humankind. My reason 
for including Eze’s discourse of race in this chapter is that his work investigates the idea 
of race and racial biases within Western and African philosophy.  
My aim in this chapter is to discuss the ideas of the conservationists and the eliminativists 
camps, and to use their standpoints to answer the question posed in the title of this chapter 
about the possibility of transcending the concept of race. In this way, I would also elaborate 
on the meaning and idea of racial skepticism (eliminativists) and racial constructivism 
(conservationist), as well as discuss the race concepts of two philosophers from each camp. 
From the conservationists’, focus will be on the ideas of W. E. B. Du Bois and Lucius 
Outlaw; while the works of Kwame Anthony Appiah and Naomi Zack would be used to 
expand on the  eliminativists’ perspectives. The section following these would look at 
Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze’s ideas on race. Overall, the chapter would answer the question 
on the possibility of transcending the concept of race by expanding on and adopting Joshua 
Glasgow’s theory of ‘racial reconstructionism’ as the answer to the question posed. My 
argument for the choice of this theory would be based on the fact that it neither advocates 
for the elimination or conservation of the concept of race or race-thinking. It however 
encourages that we should see the concept of race as one that has a different meaning and 
future beyond the mere meaning that calls for its elimination or conservation. 
4.2. Racial Skepticism and Racial Constructivism 
Ron Mallon (2006) provides a good outline of the contemporary philosophical terrain of 
the concept of race. In his works, he divided the concept of race into different competing 
camps. They are made up of “three metaphysical camps (racial naturalism, racial 
skepticism, and racial constructivism) and two normative camps (eliminativism and 
conservationism)” (Michael 2012: 5). Racial naturalism  signifies the popular biological 
conception of race, which portrays races as bearing “biobehavioral essences: underlying 
natural (and perhaps genetic) properties that are (1) heritable, biological features, (2) shared 
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by all and only the members of a race, and (3) explain behavioral, characterological, and 
cultural predispositions of individual persons and racial groups” (Mallon 2006: 528–529). 
Racial skepticism holds that races of any type do not exist. According to the racial skeptists, 
“the term race cannot refer to anything real in the world, since the one thing in the world 
to which the term could uniquely refer—discrete, essentialist, biological races—have been 
proven not to exist” (Michael 2012: 3). Both Appiah and Zack adopt normative racial 
eliminativism, and this view recommends disposal of the concept of race entirely. In other 
words, the eliminativist argument is based on the idea that race is an illusion and should be 
eliminated from public discourse. 
Racial constructivism refers to the argument that, even if the biological concept of race is 
false, races have come into existence and continue to exist through “human culture and 
human decisions” (Mallon 2007: 94). Racial constructivists consent to the skeptics’ 
removal of biological race, but they argue that the term still meaningfully refers to the 
widespread grouping of individuals into certain categories by society. “Normatively, race 
constructivists argue that since society labels people according to racial categories, and 
since such labeling often leads to race-based differences in resources, opportunities and 
well-being, the concept of race must therefore be conserved in order to facilitate race-based 
social movements or policies – such as affirmative action – that compensate for socially 
constructed but socially relevant racial differences” (Michael 2012: 4). 
Normative racial eliminativism holds that race is an illusion, therefore we should eliminate 
race-thinking. Examples of those that belong to this group are; Kwame Anthony Appiah, 
Naomi Zack, Ashley Montagu and Lawrence Blum. The conservationists hold that race is 
very real and we should conserve the concept of race. Example conservationists include 
W. E. B. Du Bois, Lucius Outlaw, Paul Taylor and Ron Sundstrom. These philosophers 
can also be seen as racial realists for their proposition that the idea of race is real. 
4.3. The Ideas of the Conservationist and the Eliminativist 
In this section elaborates the ideas of race from the viewpoints of two philosophers from 
each camp. From the conservationists’, the  thoughts of W. E. B. Du Bois and Lucius 
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Outlaw constitute the focus; while those of  Kwame Anthony Appiah and Naomi Zack are 
eliminativists.  
4.3.1. William Edward Burghardt Du Bois 
W. E. B. Du Bois called his life story the “Autobiography of a Race Concept”. He was 
concerned not just with the meaning of race, but with the truth about the concept. In his 
paper “The Conservation of Race” (1897), he declared that the “American Negro,” has 
“been led to…minimize race distinctions” because, “most of the discussions of race with 
which he is familiar have lurked certain assumptions as to his natural abilities, his political, 
intellectual and moral status, which he felt were wrong” (1897: 75). Nevertheless, he went 
on to say that “in our calmer moments we must acknowledge that human beings are divided 
into races, and “even if when we come to inquire into the essential difference of races we 
find it hard to come at once to any definite conclusion” (1897: 75). He further said that so 
far, “the final word of science is that we have at least two, perhaps three great families of 
human beings – the whites and Negroes, possible the yellow race” (1897: 75). This is not 
to say that he was satisfied with the final word or conclusion of nineteenth century science. 
This explains his views that “what matters are not the “grosser physical differences of 
colour, hair and bone” but the “differences – subtle, delicate and elusive, though they may 
be – which have silently but definitely separated men into groups”” (1897: 75). What 
mattered for him was the idea that “race” is not a biological concept, but a historical and 
sociohistorical concept. For him, the “sociohistorical races each had a “message” for 
humanity – a message which derives in some way from God’s purpose in creating races.” 
He claimed that “the Negro race has still to deliver its full message; therefore it is the duty 
of Negroes to work together – through race and organizations – so that this message can 
be delivered” (Appiah 1985: 25). By virtue of the Negros sociohistorical community, what 
one can decipher from the above is that to deliver this message that Du Bois was talking 
about; the concept of race needs to be conserved. 
Du Bois was not satisfied with the late-nineteenth century biological and anthropological 
idea of race, which was why he said that the concept of race is a sociohistorical notion. 
Considering the sociohistorical idea of race, he argued that the history of the world is not 
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of individuals, “but of groups, not of nations, but of races, and he who ignores or seeks to 
override the race idea in human history ignores and overrides the central thought of all 
history” (Du Bois 2001: 84).  Du Bois considers that there are eight “distinctly 
differentiated races, in the sense in which history tell us the word must be used” (1897: 
76). He listed distinct races as follows: “slave, Teutons, English (in both Great Britain and 
American), Negroes (of Africa and America), the Romance race, Semites, Hindus, and 
Mongolians. Du Bois further asserted that: 
The question now is: What is the real distinction between these nations? Is it physical 
differences of blood, colour and cranial measurements? Certainly we must all acknowledge 
that physical differences play a great part. . . . But while race differences have followed 
along mainly physical lines, yet no mere physical distinction would really define or explain 
the deeper differences–the cohesiveness and continuity of these groups. The deeper 
differences are spiritual, psychical, differences–undoubtedly based on the physical, but 
infinitely transcending them (1897: 77).   
Thus, he defined race as “a vast family of human beings, generally of common blood and 
language, always of common history, traditions and impulses, who are both voluntarily and 
involuntarily striving together for the accomplishment of certain more or less vividly 
conceived ideals of life” (2001: 85). Tommy Lott defined Du Bois’s definition of race 
when he said that “Du Bois wanted to get African Americans to invent themselves as a 
cultural group because he wanted blacks to be strong, and believed that the ‘strength of a 
group lies in its cultural integrity” (quoted in Boxill 2001: 33). Furthermore, Du Bois 
proposed that the “negro people as a race have a contribution to make to civilization and 
humanity, which no other race can make” (1897: 85). This contribution can only be 
achieved when the “Negro decent, as a body, maintain their race identity until this mission 
of the Negro people is accomplished, and the ideal of human brotherhood has become a 
practical possibility” (ibid). What the above means is that in order for the Negro people or 
decent to achieve the above, they must conserve the idea of race; that is, the idea that they 
are of the same race (identity), before they can possibly achieve or contribute to civilization 
and humanity. Du Bois made this clear when he said that “the eight million people of Negro 
blood in the United states of America–must soon come to realize that if they are to take 
their place in the pan-Negroism, then their destiny is not absorption by the white 
Americans” (1897: 79). He further said that: 
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Manifestly some of the great races of today – particularly the Negro race – have not as yet 
given to civilization the full spiritual message which they are capable of giving. I will not 
say that the Negro race has as yet given no message to the world, for it is still a mooted 
question among scientists as to just how far Egyptian civilization was Negro in its origin; 
if it was not wholly Negro, it was certainly very closely allied. Be that as it may, however 
the fact still remains that the full, complete Negro message of the whole Negro race has 
not as yet been given to the world: that the messages and ideal of the yellow race have not 
been completed, and that the striving of the mighty Slaves has but begun. The question is, 
then: How shall this message be delivered; how shall these various ideals be realised? The 
answer is plain: By the development of these race groups, not as individuals, but as races 
(2001: 87). 
Du Bois maintained that the common history, experiences, traditions and impulses, and 
common blood and language need to be preserved or conserved, because they are part of 
the Negro identity and Negro can only contribute to civilization and humanity if and only 
if they keep all the above in mind. Du Bois further states that “it is our duty to conserve 
our physical powers, our intellectual endowments, our spiritual ideals; as a race we must 
strive by race organization, by race solidarity, by race unity to the realization of that broader 
humanity which freely recognizes differences in men, but sternly deprecates inequality in 
their opportunities of development” (2001: 88). 
4.3.2. Lucius Outlaw 
Lucius Outlaw (2001) argues for the conservation of race, in his article “Toward a Critical 
Theory of “Race”. According to Outlaw, “the notion of “race” as a fundamental component 
of “race thinking”–that is, a way of conceptualizing and organizing social worlds composed 
of persons whose differences allow for arranging them into groups that come to be called 
“race”–has had a powerful career in Western history and continues to be a matter of 
significant social weight (2001: 63). He further asserts that: 
the term “race” is a vehicle for notions deployed in the organization of these worlds in our 
encounters with persons who are significantly different from us particularly in terms of 
physical features (skin color and other anatomical features), but also, often combined with 
these, when they are different with respect to language, behavior, ideas, and other 
“cultural” matters (2001: 58). 
Outlaw asserts that in the United State, “race” seems to be a constitutive element of their 
common sense and focal point of contention. Outlaw stresses that “as we are constantly 
burdened by the need to resolve difficulties, posing varying degrees of danger to the social 
whole in which “race” is the focal point of contention, we are likewise constantly 
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reinforced in our assumption that “race” is self-evident” (2001: 58). The void of conflicts 
seems to rest on the rationalization of “race” as society progresses, develops and share 
some new forms of self-understanding and similar forms of social practices. Thus, there 
has been persistence of social struggles in which race is a key factor due to anticolonial 
and antiracist struggles throughout the “so-called Third World and Europe.”  
Outlaw seems to pair the notion of race with the idea of ethnicity. He believes that 
racial/ethnic bonds have been the backbone of different communities. David E. McClean 
further clarifies this point on Outlaw’s assertion that racial/ethnic bonds continue to hold 
communities together, and that physical features are caught up in the formation of those 
bonds. This physical features are, “skin colour and other anatomical features, appears to be 
a reason why various community are still living together” (2004: 155). Thus, for Outlaw, 
without the racial/ethnic bonds a community of people cannot live together. To further 
explain the above, Outlaw tried to explain his idea of ethnicity when he said that: 
According to the logic of “ethnicity” as the paradigm for conceptualizing groups 
differences and fashioning social policy to deal with them, the socially devisive effects of 
“ethnic” differences were to disappear in the social-cultural “melting pot” through 
assimilation, or, according to the pluralists, ethnic identity would be maintained across time 
but would be mediated by principles of the body politic: all individuals, “without regard to 
race, creed, color, or national origin,” were to win their places in society on the basis of 
demonstrated achievement (i.e., merit). For both assimilationists and pluralists, group 
characteristics (ethnicity) were to have no play in the determination of merit. Their 
legitimacy was restricted to the private sphere of “culture.” This has been the officially 
sanctioned, and widely socially shared, interpretation of the basic principles of the body 
politic in the United States in the modern period, even though it was, in significant measure, 
a cover for the otherwise sometimes explicit but always programmatic, domination of 
Africans and of other peoples (2001: 61). 
The above can definitely give one the idea that Outlaw is really devoted to the robustness 
of racial and ethnic based identities–so much that, “he seems to view them as almost 
inviolable, as having almost inalienable rights to exist as they are and to be protected from 
eroding assaults from the outside, and especially by those who use Eurocentric notions or 
reason and scientific method” (McClean 2004: 155). By a frequent combination of race 
and ethnicity/culture as a way of suggesting that one cannot do without the other, Outlaw 
rhetorically argued for the conservation of race. Thus, it applies that if one decides to 
criticize the concept of race, that person is also criticizing ethnicity or cultures. “To those 
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who would do away with racial/ethnic groups by dint of logical reasoning,” Outlaw says 
that, “they are violating the Aristotelian principle that we must determine whether the 
subject of an inquiry is a teche or an episteme–that race/ethnies are more appropriately 
analyzed as morals and politics are examined, that is, with appropriate reference to the 
needs, character, and purposes of individuals and communities” (Ibid). And so Outlaw ends 
by saying that: 
Lest we move too fast on this, however, there is still to be explored the “other side” of 
“race”: namely, the lived experiences of those within racial groups (e.g., blacks for whom 
Black Nationalism, in many ways, is fundamental). That “race” is without a scientific basis 
in biological terms does not mean, thereby, that it is without any social value, racism 
notwithstanding. The exploration of “race” from this “other side” is required before we 
will have an adequate critical theory, one that truly contributes to enlightenment and 
emancipation, in part by appreciating the integrity of those who see themselves through the 
prism of “race.” We must not err yet again in thinking that “race thinking” must be 
completely eliminated on the way to emancipated society. That elimination I think 
unlikely–and unnecessary. Certainly, however, the social divisive forms and consequences 
of “race thinking” ought to be eliminated, to whatever extent possible (2001: 82). 
For Outlaw therefore, the notion of race ought not to be eliminated, but to be conserved 
because existence of racial groups plays a big role in our social life. He further asserts that, 
“race” “is partly political and partly cultural;” and “the biological aspects of “race” are 
conscripted into projects of cultural, political, and social construction” (2001: 70). 
4.3.3. Kwame Anthony Appiah 
Kwame Anthony Appiah (1992), in his book “In My Father’s House”, gives us his idea on 
race which he perceives would help preserve humanity. According to Appiah, “to say that 
biological races existed because it was possible to classify people into a small number of 
classes according to their gross morphology, would be to save racialism in the letter but 
lose it in the substance” (1992: 37). Appiah believes that race is relatively unimportant by 
virtue of the fact that it does not explain biological difference among human beings. 
According to Appiah, the meaning that has been attached to racial classification is not 
important. Considering Du Bois’ idea and the biological concept of race, race can be seen 
as non-existent. Appiah further criticizes the biological concept of race by drawing from 
his experience and arguing that “biological evidence about race is not sufficiently known 
and appreciated” (Appiah 1985: 22). Appiah adopts normative racial eliminativism which 
83 
 
endorses the idea of discarding the concept of race completely. In other words, he holds 
that race of any kind does not exist, and because of its historical genealogy, the term race 
can only refer to one or more discrete groups of people who alone share biologically 
significant genetic features” (Michael 2012: 2). A monopoly on certain genetic features 
could only arise in a group of people that practices inbreeding at a high level that is well 
genetically isolated. The Amish in American can be an example of such genetic isolation 
(Appiah 1996: 73). 
Appiah argues that: 
To establish that this notion of race is relatively unimportant in explaining biological 
differences between people, where biological difference is measured in the proportion of 
differences in loci on the chromosome, is not yet to show that race is unimportant in 
explaining cultural difference. It could be that large differences in intellectual or moral 
capacity are caused by differences at very few loci, and that at these loci, all (or most) 
black-skinned people differ from all (or most) white-skinned or yellow-skinned ones. As 
it happens, there is little evidence for any such proposition and much against it. But suppose 
we had reason to believe it. In the biological conception of the human organism, in which 
characteristics are determined by the pattern of genes in interaction with environments, it 
is the presence of the alleles (which give rise to these moral and intellectual capacities) that 
accounts for the observed differences in those capacities in people in similar environments. 
So the characteristic racial morphological–skin and hair and bone–could be a sign of those 
differences only if it were (highly) correlated with those alleles. Since there are no such 
strong correlations, even those who think that intellectual and moral character and strongly 
genetically determined must accept that race is at best a poor indicator of capacity (1992: 
37). 
The recovered notion of race would be of no biological interest, as there “are relatively 
straightforward reasons for thinking that large parts of humanity will fit into no class of 
people who can be characterized as sharing not only a common superficial morphology but 
also significant other biological characteristics” (Appiah 1992: 37).  He further argues on 
the ground of the origin of human descent and conventional evolutionary theory. According 
to Appiah, “There is no doubt that all human beings descend from an original population 
(probably, as it happens, in Africa), and from there people radiated out to cover the 
habitable globe” (ibid). “Conventional evolutionary theory would predict that as these 
populations move into different environments and new characters were thrown up by 
mutation, some differences would emerge as different characteristics gave better chances 
of production and survival” (ibid). If I can get his idea correctly, Appiah is of the idea that 
based on human descent there is nothing as race because we are all from one descent and 
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mutational change should not be a reason for human/racial classification. Differences 
would emerge based on environment but that still is not a reason for classification. “In a 
sense, trying to classify people into a few races is like trying to classify books in a library: 
you may use a single property–size, say–but you will get a useless classification… No one 
– not even the most compulsive librarian!–thinks that book classifications reflect deep facts 
about books. Each of them is more or less useless for various purposes” (Appiah 1992: 38). 
Thus, for Appiah, the classification of human beings does not reflect any deep facts about 
humans in general. In other words, the concept of race does not reflect any deep facts about 
human beings. Human beings as we know have different purposes to achieve in life, so the 
classification of humans does not tell us which races we should value, as “the numbers in 
the Dewey decimal system does not correspond with qualities of utility or interest or 
literary merit” (ibid). 
 “The notion of race that was recovered would be of no biological interest–the interesting 
biological generalizations are about genotypes, phenotypes, and their distribution in 
geographical population” (Appiah 1992: 37).  Besides the above biological classification 
or generalizations, the notion of race would be of no biological interest because all humans 
are linked with each other and there is no need to classify people into different races based 
on human descent. According to Appiah, if there arises any need for the classification, “we 
could just as well classify people according to whether or not they were redheaded, or 
redheaded and freckled, or redheaded, freckled, and broad-nosed too, but nobody claims 
that this sort of classification is central to human biology” (ibid). Appiah further argues 
that “the appeal of race as a classificatory notion provides us with an instance of a familiar 
pattern in the history of science” (1992: 38). Scientists started the idea of classification and 
categorization based on their folk theory of the world. Gradually science developed and 
became the sole tools for a deeper understanding of things around us. Thus, “in early 
chemistry, color and taste played an important role in the classification of substances; in 
early natural history, plant and animal species were identified largely by their gross visible 
morphology” (ibid). Because of the above and scientists’ methods of discovery and 
organization, and classification becomes a special activity. “The benefit we gain is that we 
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are able to make generalization of greater power and scope” (ibid), but the disadvantage is 
that we seem to always classify things that do not need to be classified. 
Concluding on this discourse, Appiah states that:  
The truth is that there are no races: there is nothing in the world that can do all we ask race 
to do for us. As we have seen, even the biologist’s notion has only limited uses, and the 
notion that Du Bois required, and that underlies the more hateful racism of modern era, 
refers to nothing in the world at all. The evil that is done is done by the concept and by 
easy–yet impossible–assumptions as to its applications. 
To call it “biologizing” is not, however, to consign our concept of race to biology. For what 
is present there is not our concept but our word only. Even the biologist who believe in 
human races use the term race, as they say, “without any social implication”23 What exists 
“out there” in the world–communities of meaning, shading variously into each other in the 
rich structure of the social world in the province not of biological but of human sciences 
(1992: 45). 
It is important to underscore that the outlook of Appiah’s argument in defense of the 
concept of race lies on his idea that race is an illusion and that the concept of race cannot 
do anything for us. More so, the biological idea of race is of limited use because what 
biologists seem to suggest about genetic idea of race based on the idea of classification is 
different from the historical theory of evolution. Thus, Appiah believes that race is 
relatively unimportant because it does not explain the biological difference among human 
beings. 
4.3.4. Naomi Zack 
Naomi Zack, in “Philosophy of Science and Race” (1993, 2002) provided a clear view of 
the racial skeptic’s argument against the idea of the biological foundations of race. Like 
Appiah, Zack adopts normative racial eliminativism, which endorses the idea of discarding 
the concept of race completely. In other words, she holds that race of any kind does not 
exist because the idea of racial naturalism seems to be false. To Zack, “Race” “means a 
biological taxonomy or set of physical categories that can be used consistently and 
informatively to describe, explain, and make predictions about groups of human beings 
and individual members of those groups” (2002: 1). Zack further explains that “race cannot 
                                                          
23 Nei and Roychoudhury, “Genetic Relationship and Evolution of Human Races,” 4. 
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be founded upon transmission genetics, since the genes transmitted from one generation to 
the next lead to very specific physical traits, not general racial characteristics shared by all 
members of a putatively racial group” (Michael 2012: 5). Furthermore, “genealogy cannot 
ground race, since clades (populations descended from a common ancestor) may have 
common genetic characteristics, but these need not correlate with the visible traits 
associated with races” (Michael 2012: 5). Zack further suggest that many “biologists and 
anthropologists are sceptical of the concept of race as a useful scientific tool because no 
racial population, past and present, has ever been completely isolated from other races in 
terms of breeding” (1993: 15). 
In Michael’s view, “Zack provides an accessible summary of the racial skeptic’s argument 
against the biological foundations for race, sequentially summarizing the scientific 
rejection of essences, geography, phenotypes, post-Mendelian transmission genetics, and 
genealogies as possible foundations for races” (2012: 2). Zack discussed Aristotelian and 
Thomist doctrines of essence and substance. Zack explains their doctrines, saying that they 
“are what they are because they contain the essences of the kinds to which they belong: 
essences (somehow) inhere in individual things that are substances; and the essences of 
substances support their accidental attributes” (2001: 44). The above ideas, especially the 
Aristotelian doctrine of essence “thought to ground the common characteristics of distinct 
species,” were rejected by Zack and early modern philosophers. “If essences cannot even 
ground differences among species, then they clearly cannot ground the differences among 
races, which even nineteenth century racial science still understood as members of the same 
species” (Michael 2012: 2). This essentialist doctrine of race was philosophically 
dethroned by the folk concept of race. Zack further elaborated on this by stating that: 
The present folk concept of race did not exist when essentialist theories of ontology and 
meaning were widely accepted in the ancient and medieval periods. And, essentialist 
theories of ontology and meaning were philosophically dethroned by the later half of the 
nineteenth century, when American scientists constructed speculative theories of the 
hierarchy of human races, based on philosophical essentialism. These scientists posited a 
unique essence or “genius” for each race that was present in all its members: in cultural 
and biological rank, the white race was highest, the black race lowest; the essence of the 
black race was infinitely transmittable from one generation of direct genealogical descent 
to the next, but the essence of the white race could only be preserved if the essence of the 
black race were not present with it in the same individual (2001: 44). 
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Against the essentialist theory, the folk theories divided humanity based on their 
geographical location. Geographically humanity was divided into African, European, 
Asian, and Amerindian races. But contemporary population genetics divulge the emptiness 
of this divide for two reasons. Firstly, “geographically based environmental stimuli lead to 
continuous physical adaptations in skin, hair and bone rather than the discrete differences 
associated with race” (Michael 2012:2). Secondly, “although mitochondrial DNA 
mutations provide evidence of the geographical origins of populations, these mutations do 
not correlate with the physical traits associated with racial groups” (Michael 2012: 2). 
Similarly, Zack is of the idea that phenotypes cannot be a ground for folk theories of race. 
Skin color has been the primary common sense criterion for racial classification, 
membership and identification.  “Skin color differences are taken for granted as evidence 
of racial difference, if not considered to be racial differences in themselves, then skin color 
is assumed to be the evolutionary result of ancestral geographical environment” (Zack 
2002:42). According to Zack, there are problems with this assumption, one being “using 
an evolutionary geographical model to explain skin color differences.” Zack further 
explains the problems stating that: 
People with dark skin are present in cold climates, and light skin is not necessarily an 
adaptive advantage in cold climates that have less sunlight, because recent evidence 
suggests that vitamin D can be stored in the body. Even more recent evidence suggests that 
skin color differences around the globe are adaptive responses to the amount of ultraviolent 
light present. UV light is necessary to produce vitamin D-3 and folate, which support fetal 
growth, and more of it is absorbed by lighter than darker skin. Too much UV light causes 
skin cancer, and too little retards fetal growth and bone development (2002: 42). 
Zack further asserts that there are two important problems when we use skin color as the 
basis for race. The first problem is an obvious one, it is based on the idea that “apart from 
custom, there is no reason to believe that skin color differences are in themselves, or in 
combination with other biological differences, sufficiently important to provide a basis for 
a human subspecies, or racial, taxonomy” (2002: 42 – 43). The second problem is that 
“while skin color is accepted as a foundation for racial difference in society, in nature there 
are no distinct groups. Furthermore, the geographical continuity of human skin color is not 
an isolated pattern of human phenotypical difference” (Zack 2002: 43). Zack also argues 
that race cannot be founded upon transmission genetics. This idea of transmission genetics 
and genealogy, which I explain late, focuses on hereditary. According to Zack, there are 
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two ways that race seems to be heredity. “First, physical racial traits are hereditary traits 
and to a large extent are determined by genes. Second, an individual’s racial membership 
is usually taken to be the result of the racial membership of his or her parents and ancestors” 
(2002: 59). Zack explains this using Mendelian law of heredity, which elucidates that the 
hereditary material of animal and plants is contained in DNA, “the molecule 
deoxyribonucleic acid. Thus she argues that the genes transmitted from one generation to 
the next lead to very specific physical traits and not general racial characteristics shared by 
all members of a putatively racial group” (Michael 2012: 2). Zack asserts that in genetic 
terms, there is nothing about “racial traits” that makes children or people racial. 
Furthermore, she avows that, “if there are no racial phenotypes to begin with, then there 
cannot be any racial genotypes because, effects not in evidence cannot be presumed to have 
causes” (2002: 71). Lastly, Zack argues that genealogy, which is the second kind of racial 
hereditary, cannot ground race. The subject of genealogy has to do with one’s ancestral 
racial groups or family lineage. “Since the environment usually changes in ways that are 
continuous geographically, the so-called racial traits of indigenous populations or groups 
that have lived in particular places for relatively long time periods have been called clines” 
2002: 73). According to Zack:  
Genealogy has a macro and micro level. On the macro level and evolutionary group 
spanning millennia could provide a genealogical grounding of race if it had distinctive 
common ancestry. On the micro level, genealogy describes how, within time frames in 
social, recorded history, individuals are related to each other through parents, ancestors, 
and collateral kin (relatives descended from common ancestors in different parental lines 
of descent), both macro and micro genealogy concern relations of entire organisms and not 
simply their specific biological traits. (2002: 59–60). 
Thus, Zack argues that genealogy cannot ground race “since clades (populations descended 
from a common ancestor) may have common genetic characteristics, but these need not 
correlate with the visible traits associated with races” (Michael 2012: 2). In this given, Zack 
concludes her argument with the idea that “Essences, geography, phenotypes, genotypes, 
and genealogy are the only known candidates for physical scientific bases of race. Each 
fails. Therefore, there is no physical scientific basis for the social racial taxonomy” (Zack 
2002: 88). She further states that “black and white racial designations are themselves racist 
because the concept of race does not have an adequate scientific foundation. If racial 
designations are racist, then people ought to be identified in the third person as members 
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of races, then individuals in the first person ought to have racial identities” (Zack 1993: 3–
4). 
4.3.5. Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze 
Like the above philosophers, Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze’s (2002) work – Achieving our 
Humanity – edges close to being a work of racial prognosis. However, more than this, Eze 
treads a rare route, investigating Western and African philosophy alike, for racial biases 
obtained from society but granted a certain transcendentalism or philosophical back-bone 
in detailed scholarly analysis. Eze argues that race is not essential to understanding and 
defining humankind. In other words, the effect of race is best invalidated than maintained. 
To show this, he brings metaphysics to bear on race, enlightening race’s difficult problem. 
He also brings race to bear on the history of modern metaphysics and moral thinking, 
enlightening modern philosophy’s responsibility with hateful uses of race. He also talks 
about race in line with the history of African philosophy, illuminating negritude’s and 
African philosophy’s responsibility with supposedly revalued uses of race. He thus brings 
to the fore the idea that race has a significant impact on the birth and structure of modern 
and African philosophy. This is why Eze said that he “would be pleased to hear that that 
race has indeed been postmodernly transcended; but the contemporary reality of social 
experience instructs otherwise” (2001: xvii). In essence, he argues for the universality of 
the world’s different cultures and the visible possibilities of the transcendental modern idea 
of race. 
As something of a curative to modern philosophy’s “racial unconscious”, Eze proposes an 
ethnographic critique. According to Eze, modern philosophy, often referred to as 
enlightenment philosophy, needs an enlightenment of its own. Such enlightenment would 
be two-pronged. First, it would awaken modern philosophy to the fact that much of its 
“universalist” philosophizing is underlined by racial undertones obtained unconsciously 
from specific societal contexts. Eze further  argues that what modern philosophy has done 
without knowing, is to promote and discuss issues without an awareness that their 
deliberations are informed by racial biases and underpinnings already imbued in the 
culture, language and predispositions in Europe. Second, Eze says, “that while maintaining 
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the strength of modern philosophy’s universal achievements, it also contextualizes these 
achievements in the racial and ethnic attitudes that limit them – in view of calling 
philosophy to further transcend these limits” (2002: x). This means that rather than simply 
imposing  the findings of Western philosophical theories of reason (for example) on all the 
other races of men, philosophy should contextualize – or investigate the possible 
application of ‒ its universalist findings in the world’s different cultures, in the hope of 
drawing out some universality. 
In order to accomplish his aim in the ethnographic critique, Eze posits that we can cash in 
on the long standing relationship between anthropology and ethnology on the one hand, 
both of which are disciplines which systematically study man in his context; and 
philosophy on the other hand serves as a useful starting point. This relationship is seen in 
modern western philosophy, but more so, it has also been obtained in modern African 
philosophy. What Eze seems to be suggesting is that while philosophy, which treads 
universals, obtains universal results needs to clearly state or show what qualifies as reason. 
Philosophy is supposed to bank on the contextualization mechanisms present in 
anthropology and ethnology to ask and seek an answer concerning what reason would 
translate into in each cultural context. Now, while a critique about the specific way in which 
Eze believes this conjoining of philosophy and ethnology or anthropology can be most 
fittingly achieved for his purposes may seem fickle at this point, such ceases to be the case 
in the face of multiple ways of achieving it, which are not necessarily analogous to each 
other. 
There are two possible ways to perform this interfusion, which are to draw from the 
universalistic character of philosophy and the limit placed on it in the work done on 
particular cultures by anthropologists and ethnologists, but which do not necessarily arrive 
at the result Eze anticipates – in fact one of them does quite the opposite. First, philosophy 
with what Eze terms the strength of its universal achievements might work to “reform” 
how ethnology and anthropology obtain its results. In such setting, the questions asked, the 
strategies employed and the sources of information are likely to differ from what they are 
traditionally in ethnographic and anthropological studies, without these disciplines 
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radically losing their context-value. One classic example of such a setting is one that has 
constituted the focus of debate in African philosophy since the mid-1940s when it 
appeared, namely, Placide Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy, which was discussed in chapter 
two. On one side of the debate, Bantu Philosophy is considered a classic work of ethnology, 
since it attempts to delineate and analyze the experiences (spiritual and otherwise) of the 
Bantu, as a people different from other peoples – like whites or Europeans, as in Tempels’ 
case. Generally speaking, this is what ethnology as a branch of anthropology does. On the 
other end of the disputation, scholars like Henry Odera Oruka have termed Bantu 
Philosophy a piece of ethno-philosophical work, a fusion of philosophy and ethnology. 
What we find in this fusion is an overwhelming of ethnology by philosophical methods, 
language and a universalistic outlook. Criticisms of Bantu Philosophy have included the 
fact that it barely bears a resemblance of Bantu cosmo-reality. The Bantu family of 
languages, for instance, does not even have a word for vital force, a term at the centre of 
Tempels’ analysis. Here, at least we find a possible case in which a fusion of philosophy’s 
universalist character and ethnology’s context-value, more than anything else seems to 
have failed to achieve an ethnographic critique that fits Eze’s bill. 
Enthusiasts of Eze’s overall position in Achieving our Humanity may contend that Eze’s 
omission of an articulation of how philosophy and ethnography may co-operate in the 
ethnographic critique does not play so much of a part towards the postracial future he 
proposes. I believe the opposite is quite the case. A disproportionate fusion of philosophy 
and ethnography, as I have shown above, will certainly affect the viability of Eze’s 
postracial future. While I admit that it will be rather difficult even for Eze to speculate as 
to the specifics of such fusion as my critique demands of him, and that it would probably 
take him far afield and off topic, nothing detracts from its importance in any way. 
Therefore, it seems to be the case that Eze would have ventured a definition of what the 
limits of such a relationship ought to be.  
But what is the aim of the ethnographic critique? What sort of effect does Eze expect it to 
have first in philosophy, and from philosophy into the wider society? What must be kept 
in mind is that Eze links the ethnographic critique somewhat fundamentally to the main 
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aim of Achieving our Humanity, namely, (to quote from the title) achieving the idea of a 
post-racial future. He says “the project of a postracial philosophy is, as it were, an effort to 
enlighten further modern philosophy’s projects of enlightenment” (2002: x). 
To adumbrate the ethnographic critique’s aim Eze gives something of a personal race 
history. He says that growing up in Nigeria, his home country, he never knew such things 
as races; “it wasn’t until I came to the United States and England that I became black. In 
Nigeria, I grew up believing that I belong to the Igbo “tribe,” so that when the Igbos had 
conflicts with other equally “tribal” groups–conflicts such as the one that led to the Biafra 
war of the 1960’s–the language for articulating intergroup tensions and grievances was that 
of tribalism” (2002: 216). In his travels around Africa – journeys that took him to Zaire – 
he observed that though he was known as a “foreigner” never had he, for once, thought of 
himself as a member of a discrete race, disparate from members of other races in certain 
clearly defined ways, until he arrived in the United States of America, and more 
specifically, until he had to fill out a form to obtain a Social Security Number. Eze tells 
this story to the intended effect of arguing that race is not a necessity, that it is a contingent 
reality. He says, “examples abound that it is not necessary for humans to belong to a 
particular “race” in order to pursue and realize a socially meaningful sense of private or 
public humanity” (ibid.). So how did we come to have race? Whatever the answer to this 
question, Eze believes that philosophy can help us navigate the present realities of the racial 
experience, given that what has been of interest to philosophy in race matters is the 
dialectical and transcendental elements of race discourse,. So philosophy can fashion a 
system or perspective that recreates the dialectics of race. The post racial world Eze 
envisions is one in which, without denying that races exist, one can no longer be 
disadvantaged merely for his or her belonging to a given race, and one can no longer be 
advantaged over another merely because one belongs to a particular race. 
Now, let us evaluate the plausibility of Eze’s claim (about himself and his idea of race) that 
“it wasn’t until I came to the United States and England that I became black” (2001: 216). 
This statement is of paramount importance since it is the premise upon which Eze builds 
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his claim that race is a contingent reality. It is a claim central to the conclusion he reaches 
in this book. 
One would notice that Eze’s claim here is not that “it wasn’t until I came to the United 
States and England that I knew I was black”; this is an epistemic claim; a claim about 
knowledge, and a rather difficult claim to refute, as knowledge is objectively private. It is 
rather awkward to try to refute a person’s claim about when that person got to know 
something or when that person acquired a piece of knowledge, without twirling yourself 
into an incoherent critique of that person’s knowledge. To evaluate this claim, let’s call 
this epistemic claim “E”. Note, Eze’s actual claim is that “it wasn’t until I came to the 
United States and England that I became black”. This claim seems to be an ontological 
claim; a claim about what a thing essentially is. To evaluate this claim again, let’s call this 
ontological claim “O”. Now, the difference between E and O is important in two respects. 
First, both claims do not amount to the same thing and are not subject to the same 
criticisms. In Eze’s work both claims could not be deployed with the same desired effect 
toward the conclusion. E is a claim about what a thing knows it is, while the second, O, is 
a claim about what a thing is, whether or not that thing knows it. Since, the difference is so 
clear, the question is, “why is it of any import to point this out here?” A consideration of a 
possible critique of Eze’s main claim – that is of O ‒ reveals why it is of importance to 
maintain the vital distinction between both.  
A critique of Eze’s claim has it that, Eze conflicts the moment when he knew he was black 
with the moment he became black. Critics posit that Eze seems to think that the moment 
he knew he was black is the same as the moment he became black. This critique is made 
much more insistent if you transpose it into two different times; the time of an incidence 
and the time of one’s awareness. The time of the incidence and the time of one’s awareness 
are two different things. In other words, both periods are not one and the same. For 
example, an injured soccer player, his or her injured or broken leg does not depend upon 
the player’s knowledge of it. So, to return to Eze’s actual words, critics opine that it was 




This critique would work if racial identities or if races were merely about the colour of 
one’s skin. The racial dialectics as Eze discussed in detail in this work is such that it is 
impinged upon another. He speaks about society always looking for “a class of victims”, 
about blacks all around the world being bound together by the experience of “being 
blackened together” and in the racial dialectic; he speaks of the “white” racial identity as 
having defined the “black” racial identity. What this means is that racial “blackness” or 
“whiteness” is put upon you by the other, crucially in a dialectic moment and in a moment 
of racial interaction and interlocution. I think that Eze was “blackened” when he entered 
upon this interlocution on his first meeting with people of a different racial kind. Further, 
what this shows is that racial “whitening” or “blackening” is not a necessary part of our 
existence but rather something added on from the outside. The above is clear in Eze’s 
inscription that: 
The idea of tribe or ethnicity in Africa has little or nothing to do with the color of skin, eye, 
or hair. In Nigeria all the people who belong to the various tribes and ethnicities may be 
said to be considered racially “black” only because, as I and other Africans growing up in 
the modern world have discovered, one can be black–with those special and over 
determined meanings attaching to the label–without knowing or choosing it. With the 
exception of the very educated individuals who travel to South Africa, Europe, and the 
Americas, or who have read extensive literature produced by Africans and African-
descended peoples in these parts of the world, Nigerians do not routinely identify 
themselves racially. In fact, the language or race and the vocabulary of racism as means of 
initiating and conducting intra- or intergroup conflict are practically absent in most parts 
of contemporary Africa. With the exceptions of the Republic of South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
or Algeria, which have had large settlements of white populations, these observations apply 
to most of Africa’s modern nations. Thus, despite travels in West and Central Africa where 
my status as “foreign” was always on display either through my physical features or 
inability to speak the local languages, it is outside of Africa that I learned the modern 
meanings of “blackness” as a racial identity (2001: 218). 
A critique of Eze’s claim which I think much more formidable, and difficult to respond to, 
would be that whether Eze knew of it or not, Eze’s race-group had already been 
“blackened” . That is to say Eze’s first encounter with the facts of (his) race does not 
translate to his first moment as black or “blackened”. Now, it is hard to respond to this 
critique especially as Eze’s claim was very specifically personal – considering he utilized 
the personal pronoun ‒ which means we do not know exactly how this figures in a critique 
that puts Eze within a collectivity. What is clear, though is that this critique does not 
significantly thwart Eze’s conclusion that race is not a necessary human phenomena, since 
to do that the critique would need to establish the appreciably more robust claim that 
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humans were born “blackened” or “whitened” even before any interaction and interlocution 
ever took place between the races. 
4.4. Can we Transcend the Concept of Race? 
The question of whether we should conserve or eliminate race is twisted up in the question 
of whether race is real or illusory. Thus, the conservationists and the eliminativists both 
want to conserve or eliminate the concept of race for different reasons. For instance, the 
eliminativists want to wave-away racial discrimination, biological make up, and social 
injustice. This is visible in Appiah’s statement, when he says: “as we have seen, even the 
biologist’s notion has only limited uses, and the notion of Du Bois required, and that 
underlies the more hateful racisms of the modern era, refers to nothing in the world at all, 
the evil that is done is done by the concept and by easy – yet impossible – assumptions as 
to its application” (1992: 15). From the above argument, it is apparent that the 
eliminativists are concerned about the damage the concept has caused, and also the possible 
damage it will continue to cause if the concept of race is conserved. On the whole the 
eliminativists want to eliminate the concept of race from public discourse, ignoring the fact 
that the concept of race is still a social issue. On the other hand, the conservationists want 
to conserve the concept of race solely because of their racial experiences. For example, 
colonial experience, racism and oppression. According to the conservationists, racial 
identity entails the reality that there exist people thought to be members of a particular race 
because they share certain characteristics with others which they do not have in common 
with other people. However, the ability to categorize and compare is widely considered a 
basic element that suggests difference. This categorization and comparison, according to 
the conservationists is seen as the reality of human society. For them, people of the same 
race often cannot help but compare themselves to each other. Such comparison often does 
not need to degenerate into a search for what is better, white or black, but human history 
and experience show that we compare mostly so that we could choose that which we have 




There is no doubt that both camps have good reason why they avow their positions. Their 
contribution, I think, is a perspective that is “grounded in the histories of philosophical 
thought in modern Europe and in Africa” (Eze 2001: 221). While their engagement in racial 
discourse has contributed a lot, I however do have some points of disagreements with both 
camps. I disagree with the eliminativists on the idea that race is an illusion. Besides the 
“conventional evolutionary theory would predict that as these populations move into 
different environments and new characters were thrown up by mutation, some differences 
would emerge as different characteristics gave better chances of production and survival” 
(Appiah 1992: 37). Looking at the idea of the ungrounded biological classification of race 
that the eliminativists based their argument on, I think that the eliminativists are scared of 
the idea that if we hold on or cling to the negative baggage (colonialism, oppression, racism 
and racial segregation), history might repeat itself. On, the other hand, I disagree with the 
conservationists’ idea on conservation or race because, the past experience and negative 
baggage should be seen as epistemic knowledge that needs to be thought as part of history, 
instead of using it as a tool for recognition and dominance. Moreover, I believe that Du 
Bios’ assertion that the “Negro decent as a body maintain their race identity until this 
mission of the Negro people is accomplished, and the ideal of human brotherhood has 
become a practical possibility”, is based on his and the ‘negroes’ past experiences and 
negative baggage of the past. I submit therefore that instead of maintaining the idea that 
Negro decent has a mission to accomplish, we rather should say that the human race has a 
mission to accomplish. 
Against the eliminativists, I want to argue that we24 do not need to eliminate the concept 
of race; rather we only need to revisit the concept of race. In other words, we need to revisit 
the main reason why the concept of race is seen as an illusion according to the 
eliminativists. I think that their main spur dangles on the idea of the negative past, which 
hinges on the idea of colonization, oppression and racism.25 They see race as an illusion 
not because of their argument that there is no biological racial classification or racial 
                                                          
24 “We” in this context refers to humanity in general (both philosophers, scholars, and non-academics in 
general). 
25 A more detailed explanation of colonization, oppression and racism is in chapter one. 
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categorization, but because if the categorization happened to be recognized there will 
always be the idea of oppression, racial segregation and racism. Their desire to leave race 
behind is clouded with their hasty generalization that one’s negative past will always lead 
to a destructive end. That is to say that, the historical negative past (colonization, 
oppression and racism) will eventually lead to retaliation, which can be catastrophe and 
destructions. Thus, in order to avoid catastrophe and destruction, the idea of the negative 
past needs to be eliminated or be seen as non-existence. Against this backdrop, I hold that 
we do not only need the concept of race because of the historical negative past, but we need 
the concept of race because we need the errors of the past that are intrinsically good and 
valuable in itself, to repair the future that we desire. Thus, in order to transcend the concept 
of race for a best possible future, we have to hold on to the intrinsic good and value of the 
past. Some intrinsic good and value can be the idea of education and easy communication. 
Against the conservationists, I want to argue that we do not need to conserve the concept 
of race solely because of historical experiences or what the Negro race has to offer, but 
rather we only need to revisit the concept race. In other words, we need to revisit the main 
reason why the concept of race is real and should be conserved according to the 
conservationists. Even if we all accept that we are all different races there is no need for 
that continuous use of racial labels when referring to individuals. I am inclined to think that 
the main reason behind their conservation of the concept of race hangs on the historical 
experience of the past, which paved way for the idea of categorization and comparison. 
That is why according to the conservationists, racial identity entails the reality that people 
are said to be members of a particular race because they share certain characteristics with 
some people which they do not have in common with other people. The idea of comparison 
often seems to bring an atmosphere of tension. Questions like “which race is better?” arise. 
Conservationists still need to keep in mind that such comparisons often do not need to 
degenerate into a search for what is better, or best between white or black. This idea is 
dominant in Du Bios’ idea about the mission of the Negro people. This is part of the reason 
why Appiah rejected the concept of race as it is often used to judge the intellectual capacity 
and moral character or other people. The judging of one’s intellectual capacity based on 
race is an idea that has been dethroned and it should not be the case in this modern time. 
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Eliminativists and the conservationist are blinded by their argument of conserving or 
eliminating the concept. It has not dawned on them that this concept is now a universal 
concept that has more to offer for the future; “postracial future.” The language is the 
continuous engagement of an idea for a better understanding and philosophizing. The same 
can be said of the concept of race. There is a language proper to it which facilitates that 
universality. The language proper to it is the continuous engaging of the concept, which 
has been in places for long. Now, it is perfectly within our rights to presume that we have 
gotten to an extent in which there is no way we can diminish one of these languages (the 
ideas of the eliminativists and the conservationists) with regards to the ideas. Perhaps we 
have arrived at the point where we should stop arguing about which is the best theory of 
race, and instead combine ideas from both theories to better understand the concept of race. 
The possible idea we can get from the fusion is a future where racial labels may no longer 
impose on individuals or groups (Eze 2001: 223). A future “where no one is forced into a 
position in which one must automatically bear the privileges or the costs of a racial tag” 
(ibid). 
Apparently it would take a lot of work and effort to wean these social identities of race, but 
it is in principle possible. More to the point, “it was very possible to create these social 
identities. Given various goods such as knowledge, productivity, stability, and recreation, 
we were able to justify creating new identities of being a professor or a Supreme Court 
Justice” (Glasgow 2009: 140–141). Since we can create these social identities, perhaps we 
can also choose to keep them aside when we choose to “through ‘mere’ convention” 
(Glasgow 2009: 141). Thus, I am inclined to think that both camps did not take these points 
into cognizance. They are both anxious with the negative past and what it can cause, 
disregarding the fact and reality that they all live together amidst the difference of skin 
colour. Although race discourse has become an existential issue, both the eliminativists 
and conservationists are out for the count of the fact that they have made racial discourse 
‘existentially malleable.’ By this I mean that they are unaware that they have systematically 
made the concept of race or race discourse an existential issue that can be discussed in 
different ways for one to better understand without waving away the semantic meaning of 
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the concept. This simply means that the concept of race has become an everyday issue that 
people need to address 
It is important to underscore that in order to balance the concept of race as propounded by 
both camps; we should eliminate some racist baggage from the ideas of both. This, I believe 
would help in levelling the disagreement between the camps. The differences, such as 
colour, eyes and hair, do not necessarily acquire hurtful relations in society. What the 
differences require is a better understanding of what makes the difference, why the 
difference, and what we can achieve together with the difference. The biological and other 
proof that has been argued to be the difference might not suggest the finality of concept, 
but it can only be seen as a stepping stone towards a more reliable understanding of the 
presupposed differences. Thus, I think that the concept of race has a “unique mission in the 
history of humankind” and this mission can only be actualized through the fusion of both 
camps (Glasgow 2009: 1). 
Against the ideas of eliminativists and conservationists, Joshua Glasgow suggested “that 
we should replace racial discourse with a nearby discourse” (2009: 2). Glasgow asserts 
that “the basic idea to this position–what I will label racial reconstructionism–will be that 
we should stop using terms like ‘race,’ ‘black,’ ‘white,’ and so on to purport to refer to 
biological categories–as we currently use them. Instead we should use them to refer to 
wholly social categories” (2009: 2 – 3).  As the name applies, racial reconstructionism is 
the idea that we should reconstruct our racial discourse. According to Glasgow (2009: 139), 
“Reconstructionism is a substitutionist view, not an eliminativist view, and according to 
substitutionism we should replace racial discourse with a nearby discourse, with attendant 
proximate concepts and conceptions.” With much relevant arguments on the untenability 
and tenability of race, Glasgow puts forth that, “if we are cognitively cursed to represent 
humanity in something like racial ways, then eliminativism is dead on arrival, but 
reconstructionism remains a viable alternative, since it asks us not to entirely do away with 
racial thinking, but to replace it with racial thinking” (2009: 143). He further suggests that 
this replacement will gear to further address moral, political, and prudential challenges that 
we want to face head-on. 
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To further affirm my point of argument and the possible outcome of Glasgow’s theory of 
‘racial reconstructionism,’ I would propose a position or theory that will be the new 
beginning after the implementation of Glasgow’s theory. This position or theory is that we 
should neither eliminate the concept of race or race-thinking, nor conserve it. But that we 
should see the concept of race as a concept that has a different meaning and future beyond 
the mere meaning that calls for its elimination or conservation. The basic idea to this 
position–what I will label racial transcendentalism–will be that in as much as we use the 
terms like ‘race,’ ‘black,’ ‘white,’ and so on to refer to different individuals, we should 
instead use them not only as social or biological categories, but as an idea that keeps aside 
the negative ideas that call for its elimination or conservation. This negative idea involves 
moral, political and prudential challenges that we want to face head-on. 
Transcendentalism or transcending in this context is to indicate that the agent “goes 
beyond” what simply is toward what can be: “the factual—including the agent's own 
properties—always emerges in light of the possible, where the possible is not a function of 
anonymous forces but a function of the agent's choice and decision” (Crowell 2010: 2). In 
this process of racial transcendence, the agent still recognises and retains his/her knowledge 
of where s/he started from and where s/he is at that moment, without a negative view of 
the old self or negative baggage, but a positive acceptance of it, in order to transcend it for 
a best possible future/world. This best possible future, as I said earlier, is a future “when 
no one is forced into a position in which one must automatically bear the privileges or the 
costs of a racial tag” (Eze 2001: 223). Our continuous learning and critical engagement 
regarding race–race discussion might help us more to move without hesitation beyond what 
we do know to what we do not know about race. It is therefore of essence to underscore 
that what we do know about race is the idea that race has little or nothing to do with the 
colour of skin, hair, or eye and racial classification or racial identity. The concept of race 
has more to do with what we can do together as a group, independent of our skin colour. 
Thus, what this idea of racial transcendence envisions is a best possible future/world in 
which, without denying the idea of race, but acknowledging its intrinsic good and values 
for a best possible future/world, one can no longer be disadvantaged merely for his or her 
skin color; one can no longer be advantaged over another merely because one belongs to a 
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particular group of people with a different skin colour; or that one comes from a different 
continent. With the above idea, it is important to underscore that the concept of race has 
come to stay in our modern imagination. 
Via a thought experiment, I want to further explicate the possibility of racial transcendence. 
Supposing a renowned scientist comes up with some clear proofs that in fifty years’ time 
Aliens or Robots might take over this planet earth. And according to this scientist, the 
chance of us dying that same year of invasion is highly probable.  Suppose the only chance 
we have of preventing this from happening is to gather different scientists and brilliant 
minds from different parts of the world for a quick solution. According to this scientist, 
with the help of brilliant minds, we can stop the invasion in fifty years of research and hard 
work, very close to the day (aliens or Robots) invasion will start. Obviously, the probability 
of this scientist and brilliant minds being selected based on their race or skin colour is not 
one-over-two, or rather, the visibility of that selection is not plausible. The why inquiry 
that naturally should follow this example is substantiated on the basis that  at the moment 
this scientist and brilliants minds are working to stop the invasion, they are not fighting for 
the survival of their own race, but for the entire human race. What comes into play is what 
you can offer, not what the colour of your skin can offer. After the research, for the research 
solutions to be effective, there is a need for unification. Unification in this sense means to 
work together during the fight to prevent the invasion. 
Imagine again that after fifty years, following the fight for the survival of the human race, 
it was said that the human race will would again experience this kind of invasion every 
twenty years; that it will take fifteen years to build another machine/weapons that humans 
can use to fight against aliens or robots; and that unification is of great importance.  Do we 
perceive that after the fight, one will be forced into a position in which the other (black or 
white, etc) that helped in the survival process will automatically hold the idea of ‘racial 
tagging or segregation’? The answer is no. And this is because the idea of ‘unification’ will 
be imprinted in every one’s mind in order to survive the subsequent invasions. Even after 
the fifty years and subsequent years of invasion, the children that are born before and after 
each invasion might learn from their parents’ racial classification for epistemic reasons (for 
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knowledge seek), not for its implementation again. In our world today, the struggle to 
transcend or address moral, political, and prudential challenges can also be seen as the 
struggle to fight or avoid alien or robot invasion as used in the thought experiment. 
Therefore, with or without the idea of challenges or invasion, if we can transcend the 
concept of race for good reasons for a best possible future/world, we would not rally around 
the fear “from having race, to not having races, to having races again” (Glasgow 2009; 
121). This best possible future/world will be a future/world where “no one is forced into a 
position in which one must automatically bear the privileges or the costs of a racial tag” 
(Eze 2001: 223). In this case racial tags might still be in place, but without any 
cost/benefits. 
Some years back I introduced a friend by the name of Grace to my friends, but occasionally 
some of my friends refer to her as ‘your white friend’. But I continuously reminded them 
that her name is Grace. For them Grace is white, but for me Grace is Grace – a human 
being like me. I do not see the skin colour but the person. Being a ‘white lady’ is not the 
essence of Grace, but an accident. Her essence is different from the idea of her being a 
white lady which is an accident. Her essence for me is the fact that she a human being. In 
this case, I have undoubtedly transcended the idea of colour that some of my friends are 
still battling with.  When I first met Grace I saw her as a ‘white lady’, but as time went by 
I got to know and understand Grace beyond the idea of her colour. This is what the idea of 
transcendence in this context is all about. Transcending a given idea actually takes time. It 
involves a continuous engagement with that particular idea before we can be able to 
transcend it. Thus we can only transcend the concept of race if we continuously engage 
with the idea. Transcending is a process that will take time, but it is possible. According to 
our popular idea of the creation story, the creation of the world took time; the same can be 
said of the concept of race.  
A similar example will be that of any other human being and their friends. Take for 
instance, when we first met our friends, it took time before we could know and understand 
them better. Our knowledge of them developed when we engaged in a continuous 
interaction and meetings with them. After some while, our knowledge of our friends 
changed and was noticeable. Change here is the idea that what we know about them now 
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has gone beyond what we know about them then. This is what the idea of transcendence in 
this context is all about. 
Thus, in absence of the Enlightenment figures “it is our job – in the spirit of maintaining 
both the sparks of enlightenment we inherit and in pursuit of our own enlightening – to 
boldly show ourselves and others why and how one need not uncritically absorb the 
concept of race and racism from the past simply because the authorities we seem to trust 
did not know better” (Eze 2002: 286). 
It might be objected that there is no difference between what I am arguing for and that of 
the eliminativists and conservationists, and that my proposal is not different from theirs. In 
response, I think this is a hasty conclusion. First, as we have seen from different 
philosophers, the concept of race is a volatile concept and subject, constantly changing in 
meaning. One of the more obvious examples of this is that “the once widespread belief in 
a natural or even metaphysical racial hierarchy is disappearing (even if some invidious 
remnants remain). Such change is the result of, among other things, intellectual debate, 
social activism, racial conflict, and a resultant improved science” (Glasgow 2009: 142). 
Jennifer L. Hochschild (2005: 71) also notes that it was once “common and uncontested” 
to use phrases such as ‘the Yankee race,’ which we do not hear too often. Thus it will be 
common at a point in time to use the word race without actually attaching it social identities 
and baggage. And the concept would not be heard too often at a point in time. 
Secondly, according to racial transcendentalism, as a part of its change and evolution, we 
are only giving up some social identities or identifications of race. We are only giving-up 
the negative baggage of the past in order to better transcend the concept. Hence, I am 
neither eliminating nor conserving the whole ideas of both the eliminativists and 
conservationists. To put it simply, I am doing some ‘racial ideological selection.’ In this 
case, I am selecting what I think we do not need and what we need in order to transcend 
the concept of race. The negative ideas that we have to give up or keep aside are just there 
for epistemic reasons. Epistemic reasons in this sense mean that the ideas can be seen as a 
‘knowledgeable stepping stone’ from where the discourse started, where it is now, to where 
it will be in the future. Therefore, if we are cognitively cursed to represent humanity in a 
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racial way, then some negative baggage or some ideas of the eliminativists and 
conservationists are not considered necessary. Racial transcendentalism can become a 
viable alternative, since it asks us also not to completely do away with the concept of race 
or racial thinking, but to transcend it for a better understanding of the concept for a best 
possible future/world. 
4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to discuss the ideas of the conservationists and the eliminativists, and 
to answer the question posed in the title of this chapter. In this way, the chapter commenced 
with a brief explanation of the meaning and idea of racial skepticism (eliminativists) and 
racial constructivism (conservationist).  In discussing the concept of race as propounded 
by some proponents of these schools of thoughts, the chapter capitalized on the views of 
four philosophers, two from each school. Drawing from the conservationists, I discussed 
W. E. B. Du Bois’ and Lucius Outlaw’s ideas of race, and also elaborated on the 
eliminativists’ racial concepts as propositioned by Kwame Anthony Appiah and Naomi 
Zack Following this trend of discussions, I equally examined Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze’s 
thoughts on race, while also making an argument for the possibility of transcending the 
race concept. This was achieved following the analytical discourse of the conservationists 
and the eliminativists assertions about race where I highlighted the points of agreement, 






This study was a   critical assessment of how the concept of race affects African philosophy 
and how the concept can be transcended. In view of this aim, the study used the standpoints 
of the Eliminativists and Conservationists schools of thoughts to build on its contentions 
as well as reconcile the various discourses on the race concept. 
To accomplish the study’s aim, the first chapter outlined the basic understanding of the 
concept of race by departing from the biological perspective to the knowledge of how the 
concept has affected African identity and philosophy. Furthermore, it drew attention to the 
reality of the foundation of African philosophy as embedded in historical events such as 
slavery, colonialism, race and racism. Using Aristotle’s idea of slavery, I then maintained 
that the Europeans invention of race as a tool to rationalize their enslavement of Africans 
is unjust. Likewise, I asserted that the concept of race has affected African identity; 
however, the African philosophical project seeks to resolve this concept and is expressive 
of the African experience. From these, I concluded by indicating that the concept of race 
continues to be valued as a means of recognition or appointment of worth. 
The second chapter expounded on the direct, indirect and unconscious ideas of different 
modern philosophers on race. In effect, the chapter took us back to Descartes’ “Cogito,” 
which seems to be the foundation upon which some idea of race or racism rests. Discussing 
Hume’s empirical theory of knowledge, his concept of human mind and idea on race, I 
argued to the contrary that he was incorrect about the ideas of European civilization, 
inferiority and superiority, and intellectual capacity. Equally, I discussed Kant’s ideas on 
human knowledge and race. Using his example of the Negro slave from Guinea that 
drowned himself when being forced into slavery, I took a converse view and argued that 
the Negro or anyone in that Negro’s situation must have had or have a reason for his/her 
action, and this actually is  evidence of reason and self-awareness which can be found in 
all humans.  Conclusively, I argued against Tempels’ misinterpretation of force by 
insinuating that it basically led to his unconscious idea of race or racism. 
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The third chapter discussed the way in which some African philosophers responded to the 
direct and indirect interests of some modern philosophers. The chapter showed that the 
works of nationalist-ideological philosophers and the existence of African philosophy are 
evidences that Africans are not irrational or inferior to the whites. As such, I argued and 
reaffirmed the existence of African philosophy and the philosophical pride that some 
philosophers like Eze have acquired. Following from this, the fourth chapter discussed the 
notion of race as propounded by some of the proponents of conservationism and 
eliminativism.  
Having elaborated on how race has affected African philosophy and the possibility of 
transcending the concept of race, the point of departure now is what to make of the issues 
and arguments covered in the research project. Claims and arguments have been made in 
support of my position on the subject; wherein I contributed my philosophical 
understanding of race by arguing that that Tempels’ misinterpretation of the Bantu 
Ontology and African philosophy is an unconscious racial intention. In this given, I 
explained why I think the nationalistic-ideological philosophy and the existence of African 
philosophy is an indirect response to Hume and Kant. As a new insight, I also contended 
that it is possible to reconcile some ideas of the eliminativists and conservationists in order 
to transcend the concept of race. These new insights on the philosophy of race and African 
philosophy only seek to establish that racial transcendence may point us to the right 
direction with regards to ideas on whether or not we should eliminate or conserve race. The 
idea of universalism and particularism in African philosophy, which can also play a key 
role on African philosophy, is not considered in this light because it was not intended to be 
a part of this thesis. Moving forward and for the purposes of emerging research on the 
subject of this thesis, I recommend that future studies on African philosophy and the 
concept of race should be taken seriously. Seeing that race is a reality that challenges 
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